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Abstract  
 
The boundaries of citizenship are increasingly contested. The trend among scholars is to 
try to expand the state’s responsibilities and duties to include non-citizens in the 
relevant polity. Legal, social and political theorists ask whether citizenship can or should 
exist beyond the nation state and a defined territory.  
This debate closely relates to the burgeoning research regarding diaspora communities 
and their connections with their countries of origin or homelands (‘kin-states’). Diaspora 
communities have always maintained some level of interest in the affairs of their kin-
states, but globalisation and advanced communication technologies have made it easier 
for people in the diaspora to engage in activities that are directed at the political and 
social life of their kin-states. Kin-state governments also increasingly extend their 
actions beyond their state borders and reach out to their diaspora communities in order 
to promote a specific definition of the national community and to reap political and 
economic gains.  
This trend of diaspora communities influencing political decisions in a country in which 
they do not reside raises a question of legitimacy in traditional liberal-democratic 
models of governance: why should diaspora people be allowed to affect political 
decisions in their kin-state when they may not have to bear the consequences of such 
decisions? As diaspora populations become more and more involved in political 
processes in their kin-states, modern democratic theories need to adapt in order to 
accommodate such encroachments on traditional democratic principles.  
In this thesis I analyse the challenges and legal implications created by the existence of 
large and influential diaspora communities in today’s globalised world. I connect 
diaspora theory with deliberative democratic theory, filling a gap in deliberative 
democratic literature. I contend that elite models of deliberative democracy can be 
useful in overcoming the challenges mentioned above. I examine the role of 
constitutional courts in a deliberative democracy and argue that they may be better 
situated to conduct deliberations in divided societies where ethnic and religious 
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tensions prevent other democratic bodies from deliberating effectively. This is especially 
relevant when dealing with divided societies with large diasporic populations.  
To support these claims, I examine the Israeli Supreme Court. I analyse the Israeli 
Supreme Court’s unique deliberative features and explain how these features have 
enabled diaspora Jews (and other groups of non-citizens) to participate in the Israeli 
democratic process. I examine illustrative cases in which Jewish diaspora activists were 
involved in proceedings and deliberations at the Israeli Supreme Court. The case studies 
demonstrate that, under certain circumstances, diaspora communities can legitimately 
and effectively participate in political processes in their kin-states, challenge 
constitutional norms and influence government policies and laws. 
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I. Overview 
 
There is a growing debate among academics regarding the boundaries of citizenship. In 
today’s world, globalisation increases the number of people who feel deeply connected 
to more than one state. Concepts of ‘global’, ‘transnational’ and ‘denationalised’ 
citizenship are developed in an attempt to replace traditional concepts of citizenship.1 
The trend among scholars is to try to expand the state’s responsibilities and duties so as 
to include non-citizens in the relevant polity.2 As a result, legal, social and political 
theorists ask whether citizenship can or should exist beyond the nation state and a 
defined territory.3  
These questions closely relate to the burgeoning research regarding diaspora 
communities and their connections with their countries of origin or homelands (‘kin-
states’).4 Diaspora studies has emerged as a distinct academic field in recent years. A 
substantial part of it focuses on the relationship between diaspora communities and 
their kin-states.5 Diaspora communities have always maintained some level of interest 
                                                     
1 Yishai Blank, ‘Spheres of Citizenship’ (2007) 8(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 411; Linda Bosniak, 
‘Citizenship Denationalized’ (2000) 7(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447; Linda Basch, Nina 
Glick Schiller and Christina Blanc-Szanton, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Post-Colonial 
Predicaments, and De-Terrotiralized Nation-States (Routledge, 1994); Christian List and Mathias Koenig-
Archibugi, ‘Can There Be a Global Demos? An Agency-Based Approach’ (2010) 38(1) Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 76. 
2 Avigail Eisenberg, ‘Voting Rights for Non-Citizens: Treasure or Fool’s Gold?’ (2015) 16(1) Journal of 
International Migration and Integration 133; Cristina M Rodriguez, ‘Noncitizen Voting and the 
Extraconstitutional Construction of the Polity’ (2010) 8(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 30; 
Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (Yale University Press, 1998) 54; Sarah 
Song, ‘Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights’ (2009) 13(6) Citizenship Studies 607. 
3 Bosniak, above n 1; Blank, above n 1. 
4 See, for example, Rainer Bauböck, ‘Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A 
Normative Evaluation of External Voting’ (2007) 75(5) Fordham Law Review 2393; Blank, above n 1; Rainer 
Bauböck, ‘Cold Constellations and Hot Identities: Political Theory Questions about Transnationalism and 
Diaspora’ in Rainer Bauböck (ed), Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods 
(Amsterdam University Press, 2010) 295; Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc-Szanton, above n 1; Anupam 
Chander, ‘Disaspora Bonds’ (2001) 76 New York University Law Review 1005. 
5 See, for example, Yossi Shain, Kinship & Diasporas in International Affairs (University of Michigan Press, 
2007); Amanda Roth, ‘The Role of Diasporas in Conflict’ (2015) 68(2) Journal of International Affairs 289; 
Steven Vertovec, The Political Importance of Diasporas (Working Paper No. 13, Centre on Migration, Policy 
and Society, University of Oxford, 2005); Khachig Tölölyan, ‘The Contemporary Discourse of Diaspora 
Studies’ (2007) 27(3) Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 647; Hariz Halilovich, 
‘Trans-Local Communities in the Age of Transnationalism: Bosnians in Diaspora’ (2012) 50(1) International 
Migration 162; Adeno Addis, ‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age 
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in the affairs of their kin-states, but globalisation and advanced communication 
technologies have made it easier for people in the diaspora to engage in activities that 
are directed at the political and social life of their kin-states. Kin-state governments also 
increasingly extend their actions beyond their state borders and reach out to their 
diaspora communities in order to promote a specific definition of the national 
community and to reap political and economic gains.6 
Traditional liberal-democratic models indicate a legitimacy problem when people are 
able to influence political decisions in a country in which they do not reside: why should 
diaspora people be allowed to affect political decisions in the kin-state when they may 
not have to bear the consequences of such decisions?7 I therefore address in this thesis 
a major problem in democratic theory. As diaspora populations become more and more 
involved in political processes in their countries of origin, modern democratic theories 
need to adapt in order to accommodate such encroachments on traditional democratic 
principles.  
One way to resolve this tension is to look at it through the prism of deliberative 
democracy. Deliberative democracy has gained popularity among academics as a useful 
model to deal with legitimacy problems in modern democratic societies.8 The major 
element emphasized by deliberative democratic theory, as opposed to other democratic 
                                                     
of the Diaspora’ (2012) 45 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 963; Andy Sundberg, ‘Diasporas 
Represented In Their Home Country Parliaments’ (U.S. Vote Foundation, 2007) <https://www. 
overseasvotefoundation.org/files/Diasporas_Represented_in_their_Home_Country_Parliaments.pdf>.  
6 See, for example, Illa Ben-Porat, ‘Perpetual Diaspora, Changing Homelands: The Construction of Russian-
Speaking Jews as a Diaspora of Both Israel and Russia’ (2011) 17(1) Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 75; 
Costica Dumbrava, ‘External Citizenship in EU Countries’ (2014) 37(13) Ethnic and Racial Studies 2340; 
Bauböck, ‘Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of 
External Voting’, above n 4; David Fitzgerald, ‘Rethinking Emigrant Citizenship’ (2006) 81(1) New York 
University Law Review 90, 105. 
7 See Fitzgerald, above n 6, 107. 
8 See Robert E Goodin, ‘How Can Deliberative Democracy Get a Grip?’ (2012) 83(4) Political Quarterly 806; 
Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (Oxford 
University Press, 2012); Mark E Warren and Hilary Pearse (eds), Designing Deliberative Democracy: The 
British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton University Press, 2004); Jane Mansbridge et al, ‘A 
Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy’ in Jane Mansbridge and John Parkinson (eds), Deliberative 
systems : deliberative democracy at the large scale (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 1; KM Hansen and 
CF Rostbøll, ‘Deliberative Democracy’ in B. Isakhan and S Stockwell (eds), The Edinburgh Companion to 
the History of Democracy (Edinburgh University Press, 2012) 502; Ron Levy and Graeme Orr, The Law of 
Deliberative Democracy (Routledge, 2016).  
3 
 
models, is that legitimacy does not derive only from the act of voting at elections but 
from the act of reflective judgment taking place prior to voting among equally placed 
citizens. The concept of deliberative democracy is based on principles of mutual respect, 
reciprocity, fairness and rational argument.9 Deliberative democrats also emphasise 
that the deliberation process should be as inclusive as possible and involve all those who 
will be affected by the ultimate decision.10 Applying deliberative democratic principles 
to diaspora issues should therefore lead us to include diaspora people in major 
constitutional deliberations taking place in kin-states.11 Another deliberative democratic 
principle holds that participants in deliberation should deliberate on an ‘equal basis’.12 
So how can diaspora people be engaged on an ‘equal basis’ when they do not live in the 
relevant kin-state territory and therefore are not subject to the same rules as the kin-
state residents? The challenge is to find legitimate avenues of inclusion that enable 
diaspora people to be involved in political affairs in their kin-states, despite the fact that 
they are not citizens. 
In this thesis I analyse the challenges posed to democratic theory by diaspora 
communities and I contend that deliberative democracy (and in particular, elite models 
of deliberative democracy) can be useful in addressing these problems. I utilise 
deliberative democratic theory to examine diaspora communities’ involvement in 
political processes in their kin-states. Using deliberative democratic theory in this 
context can help in two ways: first, it provides a theoretical framework that is able to 
reconcile democratic ideals with participation of non-citizens. Second, it enables 
democratic states to design various legitimate ways by which to engage with their 
diaspora populations as well as other groups of non-citizens.13 
                                                     
9 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, ‘Deliberative Democracy beyond Process’ (2002) 10(2) Journal of 
Political Philosophy 153; Jane Mansbridge et al, ‘The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in 
Deliberative Democracy’ (2010) 18(1) The Journal of Political Philosophy 64, 94. 
10 See Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2002); Gutmann and 
Thompson, above n 8; Ron Levy, ‘The Law of Deliberative Democracy: Seeding the Field’ (2013) 12(4) 
Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 355. 
11 As I will explain later on, some decisions taken by the kin-state can affect diaspora people in various 
ways. See below p 20, 52.  
12 See Sarah Song, ‘The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by 
the State’ (2012) 4(1) International Theory 39, 44. 
13 In chapter III I define, in depth, what definitions of ‘legitimate’ I use throughout the thesis. 
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Many kin-state governments have already come up with different methods of 
addressing the interests of their diaspora people who maintain a strong connection to 
the kin-state. These methods usually include preferential citizenship rights (e.g., to 
applicants who share a common ethnicity with the kin-state) and allocation of special 
electoral constituencies for overseas diaspora communities.14 Diaspora communities 
get involved in their kin-states’ affairs in various ways, for example, by lobbying and 
donations to political groups and candidates. This thesis focuses on a particular way by 
which diaspora people influence policies and decisions in their kin-states. This way does 
not involve voting in general elections or referendums but rather challenging legislation 
or policies that have major effects, relevance or importance to diaspora populations 
through the kin-state constitutional court.  
Some deliberative democrats see courts as potentially a successful, albeit elite, 
deliberative democratic body.15 However, deliberative democrats differ on the role 
ascribed to governing elites in deliberation. Popular variants of deliberative democracy 
aim to encourage deliberation among the greater public. On the other hand, elite 
variants of deliberative democracy view elites as both capable and responsible for 
transferring, through deliberation, the often vague and unrefined demands of the 
masses into practical law.16 I will argue that while popular deliberation may be neither 
desirable nor practical in divided societies with large diasporic populations (for various 
reasons), elite models of deliberative democracy can be useful in overcoming the 
challenges mentioned above.  
Elite models of deliberative democracy focus on fostering deliberation among decision-
making bodies such as legislatures and the judiciary. The literature on the deliberative 
democratic quality of courts is mixed. Theorists like Rawls, Dworkin, and Gutmann and 
Thompson, hold that courts (especially constitutional court) provide a model for ideal 
                                                     
14 See, for example, Dumbrava, above n 6; Fiona B Adamson, Blurring the Lines: Diaspora Politics and 
Globalized Constituencies (14 July 2015) World Politics Review <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ 
articles/16224/blurring-the-lines-diaspora-politics-and-globalized-constituencies>. 
15 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1996) 45; Conrado Mendes, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 3. 
16 See Levy, ‘The Law of Deliberative Democracy: Seeding the Field’, above n 10, 358. 
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deliberation.17 A court generally deliberates in a transparent manner, hears and 
challenges experts’ opinions, provides reasoned arguments and is (partially) separated 
from electoral constraints. Others, like Sen and Waldron, claim that the court is in fact 
not as deliberative as some would have us believe.18 They question the actual quality of 
deliberation practiced in courts and highlighte the courts’ elitist and undemocratic 
nature.19 I address such objections and explain how the quality of deliberations that take 
place in courts can be evaluated and improved. I also argue that deliberations in 
constitutional courts can enhance democracy, either by allowing non-citizens to submit 
petitions to the court or by accepting and including in deliberations submissions made 
by third parties through the process of hearing amicus curiae (‘friends of the court’).20 
Constitutional courts may also be better situated to conduct deliberations in divided 
societies where ethnic and religious tensions prevent other democratic bodies from 
deliberating effectively. Especially when dealing with divided societies with large 
diasporic populations, a court can be more conducive to effective democratic 
deliberation than parliaments or popular initiatives.  
To support these claims, I examine the case of Israel. The Israeli case is enlightening and 
relevant for several reasons. Israel has dealt with the challenges posed by a large and 
influential diasporic population (overseas Jewish communities) and a significant ethnic 
minority (Arab Israelis), while being in constant conflict with its neighbours. Although 
many problems persist, Israel has developed a mostly viable democracy and maintained 
its distinctive ethnic character without lapsing into civil war, unlike other countries 
dealing with large and influential diaspora populations.21 Also, unlike other diaspora 
communities, the Jewish diaspora pre-dates the creation of the modern State of Israel. 
                                                     
17 See Gutmann and Thompson, above n 8, 45; John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason’ in James Bohman 
and William Rehg (eds), Deliberative democracy: Essays on reason and politics (1997) 95; John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996) 231–6; Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 
(Harvard University Press, 1985) 70. 
18 Maya Sen, ‘Courting Deliberation: An Essay on Deliberative Democracy in the American Judicial System’ 
(2013) 27 Notre Dame Journal of Ethics & Public Policy 303; Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against 
Judicial Review’ (2006) 115(6) The Yale Law Journal 1346. 
19 See Sen, above n 18; Waldron, above n 18 . 
20 See Levy and Orr, above n 8, 44. 
21 Israel is the only country in the Middle East categorised as ‘free’ by Freedom House. See Puddington, 
Arch and Tyler Roylance, ‘Freedom in the World 2016’ (Freedom House, 2016) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016>. I am referring here to 
sovereign Israel, excluding the Palestinian Territories. 
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This meant that the young modern Israeli nation state had to rely culturally, financially 
and politically on support from its diaspora communities from its inception. Even today, 
when almost half of the worldwide Jewish population lives in Israel, the State of Israel is 
still partly dependant and intertwined with its diaspora, as I will explaine later on.  
Israel’s capacity to deal with the tensions that arise when diaspora people seek 
involvement in the kin-state affairs can be attributed, at least partially, to the willingness 
and courage of the Israeli Supreme Court to delve into questions that courts in other 
jurisdictions might consider non-justiciable. The Israeli Supreme Court has dealt with 
cases that concern the contours of the state’s national and ethnic character, the 
relations between the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities and also the role of religion 
in citizens’ lives. The Israeli Supreme Court would not have been able to do all this 
without having attained a high level of perceived legitimacy among Israeli citizens and 
politicians as well as non-Israeli Jews.  
In this thesis, I examine illustrative cases in which the Israeli Supreme Court deliberated 
on constitutional questions that had a direct impact on the Jewish diaspora and its 
relationship with the state of Israel, and on the rights of Israel’s minorities. Diaspora 
people were involved in such cases on two levels: first, they were often directly involved 
in court proceedings either as individuals or through diaspora organisations.22 Second, 
diaspora interests were considered (directly and indirectly) by the judges in their 
deliberations on the matter. These cases addressed questions such as: who is considered 
a ‘Jew’ and therefore belongs to the Jewish diaspora? Is there an ‘Israeli’ ethnicity that 
encompasses both Jews and Arabs (and excludes diaspora Jews)? The Court’s decisions 
in those cases had a direct impact either on the lives of Jewish people living in the 
diaspora or on their ability to intervene and shape Israeli laws and policies.  
Allowing diaspora communities to participate and affect major political deliberations in 
their kin-states therefore achieves an important goal. It offers a legitimate way to 
include diaspora people in important political and social decisions that bear on the life 
and interests of diaspora communities. Importantly, it does so while maintaining the 
                                                     
22 In some cases, diaspora organisations were directly involved, whether as petitioners or as respondents. 
In other cases, diaspora organisations were indirectly involved as major donors and supporters of local 
Israeli NGOs that submitted the petitions. 
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relevant distinction between diaspora people who participate through a deliberative 
process, and citizens who are able to influence laws through voting in elections and 
referendums. 
The relationship between diaspora communities and their kin-states raises issues that 
have been discussed mainly by social and international relations theorists, but largely 
neglected by legal scholars.23 This thesis aims to fill this gap by building scholarly bridges 
between diaspora studies, deliberative democratic theory and studies of the judicial 
branch of government. This thesis covers all of these issues with a focus on the legal 
implications created by the involvement of diaspora communities in the politics of their 
kin-states, particularly in divided societies. I demonstrate in this thesis that there are 
democratically legitimate ways for diaspora communities to be involved in shaping 
constitutional norms in their kin-states. Moreover, this thesis sheds light on a specific 
legal issue that arises in the context of the diaspora-kin-state relationship: the 
involvement of diaspora individuals and organisations in constitutional litigation in their 
kin-state. It does so by examining diaspora Jews and their involvement in constitutional 
litigation in the Israeli Supreme Court. 
For deliberative democrats, this thesis offers the valuable insight that where popular 
deliberation is not feasible, a reflective constitutional court can serve as an effective 
deliberative democratic body. For legal scholars, it offers a unique view on how laws can 
be shaped by groups of non-citizens, and how the courts can effectively take the 
interests of non-citizens into account when discussing issues that implicate such groups.  
  
                                                     
23 Addis, ‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the Diaspora’, 
above n 5, 975. See however Chander, above n 4. 
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In order to address the research questions I described in the introduction, I first explore 
and clarify their constituent parts. For example, I explain what the term ‘diaspora’ 
denotes, and what kind of ‘citizenship’ one has in mind when referring to diaspora 
people as citizens of a greater polity. I also present clear definitions in order to 
understand what ‘deliberative democracy’ means and how it is relevant to societies with 
a diasporic population. Finally, I connect all these dots analytically and explain 
specifically how diaspora issues affect deliberative democratic theory. Therefore, in the 
first chapters of this thesis I explore the main theories and approaches in the relevant 
literature. I utilise analytical inquiry as the main methodology in order to understand the 
normative implications of different definitions and theories and to identify gaps and 
problems within the current literature. Empirical evidence is also important and so I 
utilise existing empirical research when analysing the different types of engagement 
between diaspora communities and their kin-states and the prospects of successfully 
applying deliberative democratic theory to divided societies with large diasporic 
populations. 
I apply both analytical inquiry as well as existing empirical data in order to evaluate the 
deliberative level of different constitutional courts. For example, I assess the 
deliberative level of the Israeli Supreme Court by the incidence of dissenting opinions in 
constitutional cases.  
The case studies from the Israeli Supreme Court demonstrate the ideas extracted from 
the previous theoretical parts. I show through the case studies how diaspora 
communities can be involved and affect policies of the kin-state directly and indirectly 
through the kin-state’s legal system. The theoretical analysis and the case studies 
support my claims that diaspora communities are important players in their kin-state 
politics. There are ways, other than voting, for diaspora people to participate in 
constitutional deliberations in their kin-state. In particular, under certain conditions, a 
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constitutional court can function as an effective deliberative democratic body in divided 
societies – especially when large diasporic populations are involved.  
To support my research I conducted interviews with two senior former Israeli Supreme 
Court judges.24 These senior judges sat in many of the cases I examine in the case study 
chapter. These interviews gave me a unique understanding and insight into the 
deliberative dynamics between judges in the Israeli Supreme Court. I used insights 
gained through these interviews to test and develop some ideas and arguments 
presented in this thesis. 
My discussion entwines deliberative democratic theory with theories of judicial practice 
and citizenship. While I do not aim to make a specific contribution in each and every one 
of these areas, the value of this thesis amounts to more than the sum of all its parts. As 
a result of putting together a coherent argument building on all of these areas, each 
area benefits by being informed and integrated into a more complete interdisciplinary 
framework. This thesis contributes to the literature dealing with diaspora communities 
and their involvement in political processes in their kin-states by viewing this process 
though a deliberative democratic lens. It also enriches deliberative democratic theory 
by showing how deliberative democracy is relevant to divided societies. Legal scholars 
will find in this thesis a much needed examination of the issues raised by the growing 
involvement of diaspora populations in their kin-states.  
 
 
 
  
                                                     
24 The interviews were conducted according to ANU Human Ethics Protocol Approval 2015/355. 
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i. Diaspora populations 
In this chapter I explain the concept of diaspora. I discuss why and how diaspora people 
engage in the affairs of their kin-states and why this poses a challenge to democratic 
theories in general and to deliberative democratic theory in particular. 
I commence this chapter with a general introduction to diaspora theory: the origins of 
the term diaspora and what kinds of people can be described as belonging to a certain 
diaspora. I explain what binds diaspora people together with the people that reside in 
the kin-state and what separates them. I explore the concepts of ‘citizenship’ and 
‘diaspora’ in relation to each other and discuss the effects of diaspora populations on 
citizenship laws in their kin-states. I explain how a feeling of belonging and connection 
to the people residing in the kin-state drives people who were born or raised overseas, 
in countries far away from the kin-state (‘host-states’), to become interested in 
influencing political and social affairs in their kin-state. I review the various legal and 
economic tools being used by diaspora communities and the respective kin-state 
governments to interact with each other. I connect these issues to current trends in 
citizenship law that acknowledge the fact that people today can belong to more than 
one polity and affect decisions in countries other than those in which they live.  
This will lead into a discussion of the ‘diasporic citizen’ and the legal concepts that 
scholars are trying to develop for people who live outside the kin-state’s territory and 
do not share the same rights and obligations as citizens of the kin-state who reside in it. 
This discussion will clarify the nature of the relationships between diaspora communities 
and their kin-states and I will explain in what sense, or under what circumstances, one 
can describe diasporic people as ‘citizens’ of their kin-state. I conclude that diaspora 
populations are key players in their kin-state politics, especially in cases of divided 
societies. As diaspora communities increasingly constitute an integral part of the demos, 
they will be involved in one way or another in deliberations in the kin-state over major 
constitutional issues that concern them. The challenge therefore is to find 
11 
 
democratically legitimate ways to enable diaspora people to be involved in political 
affairs in their kin-states, despite their different citizenship or residence status.  
ii. Deliberative democracy  
In this chapter, I introduce the concept of deliberative democracy: What does 
deliberative democracy mean? What are the concept’s theoretical principles? What are 
its practical implications? I review in detail the concept of legitimacy which deliberative 
democracy aims to reinforce. I then differentiate the opinions of deliberative democracy 
scholars. For example, I examine the difference between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ 
accounts of deliberative democracy and between popular and elite models of 
deliberation. I also examine the different views on what kinds of arguments and 
justifications should be raised in a deliberative process, as well as other nuances in the 
literature.  
After a general review of deliberative democratic theory, I specifically discuss the 
challenges to deliberative democratic initiatives in societies divided across ethnic and 
religious lines. This is relevant to my overall argument as such societies often produce, 
and are accompanied by, active diaspora communities. 
iii. Elites, democracy and deliberation 
The difficulties in applying deliberative democratic theory to divided societies lead me 
to focus on elite models of democratic deliberation. I explain in this chapter the 
important role played by elites in introducing and instituting democratic principles in 
general, and specifically in emerging democracies and divided societies. I then apply 
these insights to deliberative democratic theory and conclude that in divided societies 
where effective popular deliberation is unlikely, elite models of democratic deliberation 
can prove useful.  
iv. Courts as deliberative democratic bodies 
After elaborating on elite deliberation in a more general sense, I explore the courts’ 
unique roles as elite deliberative democratic bodies. I specifically focus on how 
constitutional courts can embody the ideals and principles of deliberative democratic 
theory, namely, rational, fair and impartial deliberation that takes place among equal 
citizens. I address some criticisms raised against the deliberative processes that take 
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place in courts as well as against the courts’ allegedly undemocratic character. I then 
offer a list of criteria that can be used to examine the level and quality of deliberation 
exercised by a given court. These criteria can help us discover whether a certain court is 
actually more amenable to democratic deliberation than another court. I will argue that 
a court that performs well on the deliberative scale can encourage and foster 
deliberation in the media and the public sphere, thus improving deliberation in a society 
as a whole. This can be particularly useful in societies where democratic deliberation is 
wanting, such as divided societies or societies with large diaspora populations. Also, a 
deliberative court can give voice to groups of non-citizens, such as diaspora people and 
migrants. 
v.  Case studies from the Israeli Supreme Court 
This chapter illuminates a unique mechanism for the involvement of diaspora people in 
the affairs of their kin-states that has not been adequately discussed in the literature 
before: the participation of diaspora people in constitutional litigation in their kin-
state.25 The previous chapters establish the basis for my theoretical framework, namely, 
that diaspora populations should be involved in constitutional deliberations and that 
constitutional courts can be arenas where diaspora concerns can be raised and 
deliberated effectively. This chapter applies this theoretical framework to real cases in 
the Israeli Supreme Court. 
In order to understand why members of the Jewish diaspora utilise the Israeli Supreme 
Court as a way to influence Israeli politics, I first provide background on the relationship 
between the State of Israel and the Jewish diaspora as well as the unique characteristics 
of Israel’s Supreme Court. I then examine in more detail various cases in which the Israeli 
Supreme Court deliberated over constitutional questions that were raised by diaspora 
representatives and had bearings on the Jewish diaspora. I also analyse cases that, 
although not concerning the Jewish diaspora, were raised by Israeli NGOs funded and 
supported by Jewish diaspora organisations. Such cases involved other groups of non-
citizens, such as Palestinians, illegal migrants and asylum seekers. Using the criteria 
presented in the theoretical section, I assess whether and to what extent the Israeli 
                                                     
25 This point was briefly mentioned discussed in Shain, above n 5, 80. 
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Supreme Court dealt with these issues in a deliberative manner. I point out the 
deliberative democratic principles that were applied in the adjudication of these cases, 
and how the Court’s proceedings fostered deliberation among other institutions and the 
greater Israeli public.  
Through these case studies, I explain the conditions that can enable diaspora people to 
use legal means to push for changes in kin-state policies, even in controversial issues 
that divide diaspora people from the people who live in the kin-state. When diaspora 
people use legal means to intervene in the political affairs of their kin-state, they use 
kin-state institutions. This approach potentially avoids some of the legitimacy problems 
that may arise when diaspora people act outside kin-state institutions and against the 
official policies of the kin-state. 
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II. Diaspora populations: theory and practice 
 
In this chapter I explain what diaspora populations are, what the nature of their 
relationship with host-states and kin-states is and why diaspora populations pose a 
significant challenge to certain democratic theories. I start by exploring the concept of 
‘diaspora’. I then turn to discuss the concepts of citizenship and nationality and how 
these two concepts relate to diaspora populations. This discussion is needed in order 
clarify under what circumstances diaspora people can be regarded as citizens of their 
kin-states. Understanding the difference between these concepts is also essential when 
deciding who should be entitled to participate in political processes, and to what extent. 
This chapter will also review the legal and socio-economic tools being used both by 
diaspora communities and their respective kin-state governments to interact with each 
other. Current trends in citizenship law are also discussed. These trends demonstrate 
the significance that many countries ascribe to their diaspora communities and the 
importance of diaspora populations to the kin-state national identity. However, despite 
the growing experience and debate over these issues, scholars still struggle to come up 
with concrete and satisfactory political systems that are able to accommodate diaspora 
people who are members of more than one polity. I argue that, in one way or another, 
diaspora populations play a key role in shaping the political life of their kin-state 
societies. Consequently, there are good normative and practical reasons to accept this 
involvement rather than reject it, and to explore the legitimate means available to 
manage such involvement.  
 
A. What is a diaspora? 
Traditionally, the literature defined ‘diaspora’ as an ethnic community that experienced 
a traumatic, far-reaching forced dispersal from their homeland to multiple points.26 The 
                                                     
26 Robin Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers’ (1996) 72(3) International 
Affairs 507; Myra Waterbury, ‘Bridging the Divide: Towards a Comparative Framework for Understanding 
Kin State and Migrant-Sending State Diaspora Politics’ in Rainer Bauböck (ed), Diaspora and 
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term was originally used to describe the Jewish diaspora as the paradigmatic case of 
diasporic population and it was later used to describe other similar cases such as the 
Greek, Armenian and African diasporas. Kin-state is the term used to describe states 
whose majority population share ethnic or cultural characteristics with a minority 
population that lives in a different state (for example, Italy is the kin-state with respect 
to people of Italian heritage living outside Italy).27 
When scholars discuss diasporas in the traditional sense, they identify three main 
characteristics. The first, as mentioned above, is dispersal from a homeland to multiple 
locations. The traumatic dispersal of the nation to multiple points is often the starting 
point of diaspora creation. However, although the notion of victimhood is at the heart 
of any definition of diaspora, Cohen argues that it is necessary to transcend it, as 
diasporas have not only suffered, but often also thrived and consolidated among host-
states.28 The second characteristic of a diaspora is an enduring presence in at least some 
of the locations to which people were dispersed. A migration wave alone does not create 
a diaspora. A substantial amount of time needs to pass before one can recognise the 
formation of a new diaspora. A diaspora undergoes different phases and forms over 
time, and in many cases of migration waves, members of a particular ethnic group may 
intend to embrace the opportunity to lose their prior identity and assimilate into the 
new host nation.29 The persistence of diasporic identity across multiple generations is 
therefore an essential criterion for distinguishing diasporic groups from the more 
temporary phenomenon of transnational migration. The third characteristic is a 
continuing flow of social, cultural or political ties among the different communities 
comprising the diaspora in different locations.30 These three are the most common 
characteristics, but some scholars add other factors to the list. Safran, for example, 
                                                     
transnationalism: concepts, theories and methods (Amsterdam University Press, 2010); Thomas Faist, 
‘Diaspora and Transnationalism: What Kind of Dance Partners?’ in Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (eds), 
Diaspora and Transnationalism (2010); Rogers Brubaker, ‘The “diaspora” Diaspora’ (2005) 28(1) Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 1. 
27 See The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations & Explanatory 
Note (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, High Commissioner on National Minorities, 
2008) <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/33633 >, 3. 
28 Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers’, above n 26, 513. 
29 Ibid 516–7. 
30 Nicholas Van Hear, New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant 
Communities (UCL Press, 1998) 6. 
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identifies two more characteristics: a partial alienation from the host society and a 
continuous commitment to rebuild and perhaps return one day to the homeland.31 
However, over the last few decades the use of the term ’diaspora’ has expanded further 
and it is now used in a variety of contexts to describe different categories of people who 
do not fulfil all the traditional characteristics mentioned above, such as expatriates, 
expellees, political refugees, alien residents and migrants. For example, a website 
dedicated to the rights of Australians who are living abroad uses the terms ‘Australian 
diaspora’, ‘Australian expatriates’ and ‘overseas Australians’ interchangeably.32 A 
modern definition is given by Shain and Barth who define diaspora quite broadly as ‘a 
people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside 
the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland’.33 
The overuse of the term ‘diaspora’ meant that it has moved away from its original 
meaning and has been stretched to accommodate various intellectual, cultural and 
political agendas.34 North-Africans in France, Turks in Germany, Chinese in South-East 
Asia, blacks in North America and the Caribbean and even French speaking Belgians in 
Wallonia are all now said to be part of a ‘diaspora’.35  
Scholars have similarly developed alternative constructivist accounts of the term 
‘diaspora’, different from the traditional models described above. These accounts focus 
less on what a diaspora is, but rather on what a diaspora does. Diaspora is seen as ‘a 
category of practice, project, claim and stance, rather than as a bounded group’.36 
Sometimes using the term ‘diaspora’ is politically motivated rather than scientific or 
objective.37 Bauböck, for example, proposes that diasporas should be seen as a political 
project. He suggests viewing a diaspora less in terms of historic origins of the group, and 
                                                     
31 William Safran, Diasporas in Modern Societies : Myths of Homeland and Return (1991) 83. 
32 See the Southern Cross Group website at <https://web.archive.org/web/20170407081607/http:// 
www.southern-cross-group.org/>. 
33 Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, ‘Diasporas and International Relations Theory’ (2003) 57(3) International 
Organization 449, 452. 
34 Brubaker, above n 26, 1. 
35 See Safran, above n 31, 83; Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers’, above 
n 26; Tölölyan, above n 5. 
36 Brubaker, above n 26, 13. 
37 Elena Barabantseva and Claire Sutherland, ‘Diaspora and Citizenship: Introduction’ (2011) 17(1) 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, 5. 
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more in terms of intended actions by elite groups who use diaspora communities to 
promote their interests and ideologies.38 For example, Paerregaard argues that Peruvian 
migrant elite groups construct a diasporic identity by excluding working-class, less 
privileged Peruvian migrants.39 Thinking of diaspora activities in these terms enables us 
to recognise how certain segments of a particular diaspora community are actually more 
committed to the ‘diasporic project’.40  
According to such contemporary views, diasporas are not only created by minority elites 
in host-states but also by kin-state governments in accordance with the government’s 
interests.41 For example, Greece actively promoted the idea of Greek diaspora during its 
struggle for independence.42 As Chander writes, ‘[t]he use of the term was often political 
and sought to establish a common identity through a shared historical experience to 
gain political strength through numbers and solidarity’.43  
In this thesis, I refer mainly to ‘diaspora’ in the narrower sense, as traditionally described 
in the literature. This excludes groups such as expatriates (i.e., people who temporarily 
relocate for overseas for work); people who were born and raised in the kin-state and 
were forced to leave as refugees; and migrants who chose to leave their kin-state for 
economic or other personal reasons. Although many parts of this thesis are relevant for 
all kinds of diaspora, I highlight examples from countries such as Israel, Ireland and 
Armenia whose diaspora communities fulfil all or most of the traditional criteria 
mentioned above: an experience of traumatic expulsion, an enduring presence in 
multiple locations, and the maintenance of close cultural and political exchanges over 
multiple places (including with the kin-state) over a long period of time. There are two 
reasons why such traditional diaspora communities are more intriguing and relevant for 
                                                     
38 Bauböck, ‘Cold Constellations and Hot Identities: Political Theory Questions about Transnationalism 
and Diaspora’, above n 4, 315. 
39 Karsten Paerregaard, ‘Interrogating Diaspora: Power and Conflict in Peruvian Migration’ in Diaspora 
and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods (2010) 91. 
40 Catarina Kinnvall and Bo Petersson, ‘Diaspora Groups, Transnational Activism, and Democratic 
Legitimacy’ in Eva Erman and Anders Uhlin (eds), Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the 
Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 133. 
41 Waterbury, above n 26, 133. 
42 See Elpida Vogli, ‘The Making of Greece Abroad: Continuity and Change in the Modern Diaspora Politics 
of a “Historical” Irredentist Homeland’ (2011) 17(1) Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 14. 
43 Chander, above n 4, 1022. 
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the purposes of this thesis. First, there is a difference between people who reside 
outside their homeland for reasons of personal preference (such as economic migrants) 
and people who perceive their life outside the kin-state to be a result of forced historical 
political events. The latter perception, found among traditional diasporas, produces 
more intense relationships between diaspora communities and their kin-states. Second, 
it is not surprising that people who grew up in their kin-state, but were forced to leave 
it, are still connected to their kin-state and wish to be involved in its political affairs. The 
involvement of such people in the affairs of the kin-state is also not problematic from a 
democratic point of view. After all, they were born in the kin-state and are (almost 
always) still citizens of the kin-state. The involvement of traditional diasporas in kin-state 
affairs is more complex as they feel connected to the kin-state despite the fact that 
neither they nor their parents or grandparents grew up in the kin-state.  
 
B. Diasporic identity 
One may wonder why people who live in the diaspora maintain such an emotional 
involvement with places and communities that are often thousands of kilometres away, 
and continue to do so across generations. To better understand this powerful 
connection we must consider the role played by the kin-state in shaping the diasporic 
individual identity.  
 
An individual’s sense of identity is not fixed, but is formed and modified over time 
through complex relations of exclusion and inclusion with significant ‘others’.44 It is very 
common to find that an individual’s identity is influenced by her ethnicity or nationality. 
However, sources of identity vary and may include cultural, territorial, political, 
economic or social pedigrees.45 The significance and structure of an individual’s identity 
also varies across cultures: for example, in the western world it is more connected to 
                                                     
44 See Addis, ‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the Diaspora’, 
above n 5, 988 n 77. 
45 Samuel P Huntington, Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity (Simon & Schuster, 
2005) 21,27; Chander, above n 4, 1019–20. 
19 
 
one’s nationality and culture, while in the Islamic world it tends to revolve more around 
the family and religious tribe.46 
  
Huntington makes several important points concerning identities: (i) both individuals 
and groups have identities; (ii) identities are constructed by the individual, who, despite 
inheriting some features as race or ethnicity, is free to redefine his or her identity as he 
or she wishes; (iii) individuals, and to a lesser extent groups, often have multiple 
identities (this is very characteristic of diaspora people and migrants, who often have 
‘blended identities’, namely, several simultaneous different aspects or dimensions of 
self-definition);47 (iv) though defined by the self, identities are the product of interaction 
between the self and others; and finally (v) the relative salience of alternative identities 
for any individual or group is situational (as will be discussed below).48  
 
In their analysis of diasporas, Shain and Barth emphasise identity as a key factor in the 
relations between diaspora people and their kin-states.49 Shain and Barth contend that 
diaspora people are motivated by their perception of a shared identity with the people 
in the kin-state.50 Other than its function as a source of national identity for a collective 
of people, the kin-state is an important source of identity to the diasporic person. 
Diaspora people generally view their connection with the kin-state as essential to their 
sense of individual identity. 51 They perceive themselves and are perceived by others as 
belonging to the national community of their kin-states.52 At the same time, diaspora 
people are not identical to the people in the kin-state. A distinctive aspect of diasporic 
identity is that members of the diaspora often are only marginally included in both their 
host-state and their kin-state.53 For example, an Australian with Indian heritage may feel 
‘Indian’ in Australia and ‘Australian’ in India, with both societies seeing him as partly 
                                                     
46 See Huntington, above n 45, 16. 
47See Mark Nolan and Kim Rubenstein, ‘Citizenship and Identity In Diverse Societies’ (2009) XV(1) 
Humanities Research 29. 
48 See Huntington, above n 45, 22–4. 
49 Shain and Barth, above n 33, 455. 
50Ibid 451. 
51 Ibid 138. 
52 Shain, above n 5, 11. 
53 Barabantseva and Sutherland, above n 37, 4. 
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compatriot, partly foreign. The differences between people who reside in the kin-state 
and people who live in the diaspora may include different legal status, language, wealth 
and education. Those differences often lead these two groups to perceive each other as 
different and foreign, despite being connected through ethnic or religious ties.54  
As diaspora people have little control over their status as perceived members of their 
kin-state nation, they often become unwillingly involved in their kin-state’s international 
affairs.55 For example, Jews living in the diaspora are often victims of attacks by anti-
Israeli activists and terror organisations.56 Famous examples include the bombing of the 
Jewish community building in Buenos Aires in 1994 and deadly shooting attacks against 
Jews in France in recent years.57 
This is one reason why some diaspora people see their kin-state policies as having an 
impact on the interests of ‘the people’ as a whole, including the people inside and 
outside the kin-state territory. Another reason why people in the diaspora demonstrate 
concern over the ways in which the kin-state’s government conducts its affairs is that 
they do not want to see their kin-state endangered as a place of refuge or as a place of 
inspiration and pertinence to their identity.58 According to Shain and Barth: 
Diasporas thus engage in efforts to shape national identity not so 
much to gain through it leverage over (material) interests, but 
mainly because it is their interest to insure and sustain an identity 
that perpetuates and nourishes their self-image.59 
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above n 5, 988. 
55 Shain and Barth, above n 33, 453. 
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Such connections between diaspora communities and kin-state people are typical for 
relatively weak, new or reconstituted states (e.g., Israel, Armenia). In such cases, 
national identity has often been embodied by the experience of calamity and suffering 
of the diaspora until the (re)establishment of the independent nation-state.60 As the 
culture has been developed and formed in the diaspora for centuries, the new or 
reconstituted state draws its own culture and traditions from those formed in the 
diaspora. In such cases it is the kin-state that depends on its diaspora more than the 
other way around. This is due not only to the fact that the new state relies on the culture 
and heritage created in the diaspora, but also for the simple reason that more people 
may live in the long established diaspora communities than in the new kin-state. Modern 
Israel for example was home to a small minority of Jews when it was established and 
the majority of the worldwide Jewish population still lives outside Israel (although the 
trend is moving towards reversing that balance).61 In the Armenian case, people living 
in the diaspora outnumber and are often wealthier than the people living in the kin-
state and so they have more international political influence.62 Indeed, in some cases, it 
is the diaspora itself that enjoys universal recognition and legitimacy as the true 
representatives of the polity. For example, the Tibetan diaspora succeeded in gaining 
support for Tibetan human rights, cultural survival and political autonomy; and in recent 
years the Syrian National Council, based in Turkey, gained (temporary) recognition by 
many states as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.63 
This chapter clarifies what diaspora people share with citizens of their kin-states on the 
one hand, and what separates them on the other hand. Evidently, to say that some 
people belong to a certain diaspora implies that there exists a homeland from which this 
diaspora originated. This homeland may be real or symbolic (as is the case, for example, 
                                                     
60 Shain, above n 5, 103. 
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with the Kurdish and Sikh diasporas),64 independent or under foreign control. If this 
homeland exists as a modern, independent nation state, we assume a difference 
between the citizens of this nation state and the diaspora people who are affiliated with 
this nation while living elsewhere. This distinction is important in order to avoid 
confusion such as mistakenly accrediting ‘diaspora’ status to any person who is outside 
the borders of his or her home country. For example, a person of Irish descent living in 
the United States can be said to belong to the Irish diaspora, but if she is also an Irish 
citizen and has lived in Ireland, we might simply call her ‘Irish’ without tagging her as 
‘diasporic’. In order to proceed with the analysis of diaspora populations and their 
interactions with their kin-states, we must understand and make a distinction between 
people of a particular nation who are citizens of their kin-state and those who, despite 
belonging to the same nation and maintaining a connection with their kin-state, are 
nevertheless citizens of a state other than their kin-state. It is important therefore to 
supplement our discussion of diasporas with a discussion about citizenship and the 
difference between the concepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’. This discussion will 
explain why countries want to engage with these groups of people who are not 
necessarily their citizens. It will also help in understanding the challenges that these 
states face when they try to reach out and engage with their diaspora communities.  
 
C. Citizenship and nationality 
People often mean different things when they talk about citizenship. The concept of 
citizenship is sometimes conflated with nationality and both are mentioned together in 
discussions regarding the identity of an individual or a group. While it is true that 
citizenship and nationality essentially represent the same general concept, they differ in 
a technical legal sense: the term citizenship is used mostly in domestic legal forums, 
while the term nationality is used in international law forums.65 Moreover, citizenship 
usually denotes a legal status that confers rights and obligations, while nationality 
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sometimes represents an informal connection or membership with an ethnic group. 
Therefore, when one uses the term citizenship, one needs to be clear whether one is 
referring to a legal status, a system of rights, a form of political activity or a form of 
identity and solidarity.66 In the next few sections I will clarify these issues and provide 
some useful definitions. I will then apply these definitions in answering some questions 
about diaspora people and their legal status vis-à-vis their kin-states: In what senses can 
diaspora people be called citizens of their kin-states? What exactly is the difference 
between a kin-state citizen and a diasporic citizen? In order to answer these questions I 
will explore the different meanings of the term ‘citizenship’ and other, related terms, 
such as ‘nationality’ and ‘ethnicity’.  
 
As mentioned above, citizenship is usually used in the domestic legal context and 
nationality in the international legal context. Nevertheless, the term ‘nationality’ is 
sometimes used to describe someone’s citizenship; for example, ‘she holds Australian 
nationality’ or ‘his nationality is Canadian’. However, in this section I refer to nationality 
in its other meaning, which relates to someone’s ethnic origin or group affiliation. We 
already know that diaspora people often see themselves (and are sometimes perceived 
by others) as part of the same nation that resides in the homeland or the kin-state. But 
what is this nation?  
A nation, to adopt one popular model, is a group of people who are bounded by some 
connection that differentiates it from others and is ready to receive authority only if it 
emanates from within the group.67 A popular view sees nationhood as a creation of 
modernity that emerged in Europe during the 19th century. However, the ‘primordial’ or 
‘perennial’ view holds that nationhood existed before modernity, not only in Europe but 
throughout the world.68  
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The relationship between a group of people and a defined piece of land is a crucial 
feature of national identity,69 although, in its early stages, European nationalist identity 
was defined primarily in religious terms (e.g., Protestant/Catholic). During the 19th and 
20th centuries, national ideologies in Europe became more secular.70 However, 
secularism gave rise to other nationalistic forms such as Fascism.  
Ethnicity, nationality and the state affected each other in a dialectical process. In the 
past, the primary task of the state was to create and defend the nation: ‘war made the 
state, and the state made war’.71 Ethnicity and nationality were mixed together with the 
state in many cases, as throughout history different groups of people sought self-
determination and rulers believed that a sense of common identity was necessary to 
maintain people’s loyalty.72 However, although nation states appeared only when 
ethnos and state converged, ethnicity is seldom homogeneous or clear-cut. As a nation 
state grows, it often becomes more heterogeneous. Distance often produces variable 
intermediate ethnic affinities within a larger ethnos, which can later develop into 
cleavages and outright splits.73 
The creation and cultivation of a defined national group did not only serve rulers who 
wished to control their subjects. It also fulfilled a basic natural need of the individual. 
Membership in a defined political community is widely recognised as a social good that 
many individuals seek and wish to maintain.74 Even today, some scholars contend that 
a nation cannot be based only on a political contract between individuals who lack any 
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other common traits that differentiates them from ‘others’ who are situated outside of 
their group.75  
Although there might be good reasons to try to abolish ethnicity and nationalism, such 
attempts are unlikely to be successful, as they go against a deep human preference 
toward one’s own.76 ‘Kin-culture identity, solidarity, and cooperation, including their 
national form, have deep roots in the human psyche and have been among the most 
powerful forces in human history’.77  
Historical experience and sociological analysis show that in the absence of an external 
‘other’ as a threat to national security, unity is undermined and dormant divisions 
arise.78 Walzer, for example, supports the right of states to impose limits on immigration 
in order to retain what he calls ‘communities of character’, that is, stable, ongoing 
associations of people with special commitments to one another and a sense of common 
life: ‘the distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, 
cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life’.79 Indeed, many countries are 
experiencing an ‘identity crisis’, questioning what they have in common and what 
distinguishes them from other nations.80 Each crisis has its unique causes, but common 
factors are globalisation processes and rising levels of migration, which drive some 
people to redefine their identities in narrower senses.81  
Ethnicity and nationality often continue to be mixed together with the concept of the 
state. Though some modern states adopt a kind of civic identity that is arguably not 
dependant on a particular ethnicity or religion (e.g., the United States, Australia), many 
countries are still closely affiliated with a particular ethnic group or religion.82 For 
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example, the Belgian Constitution states that Belgium is made up of three communities: 
the French community, the Flemish community, and the German-speaking 
community;83 Israel is defined in one of its quasi-constitutional ‘basic laws’ as a ‘Jewish 
and democratic state’;84 and the preamble to the Irish Constitution provides explicit 
references to Christianity as the state’s religion.85 
Since diaspora people often share the same ethnicity or religion with people in the kin-
state, both groups may also be described as sharing the same nationality. Having all 
these features in common, it becomes more apparent why diaspora people view their 
connection with the kin-state as a significant element in forming their collective and 
individual senses of identity. 
 
However, despite all these common features, what often separates diaspora people 
from people in the kin-state (besides physical distance) is their different citizenship 
status. It is important not to conflate one’s ‘citizenship’ with one’s ‘nationality’ when 
discussing diaspora communities and their relationships with their kin-states. The next 
section will therefore elaborate on the concept of citizenship.  
 
 
A diasporic person stands in contrast to a ‘citizen’ of the respective kin-state (although 
sometimes diaspora people can acquire the citizenship of their kin-state if they wish to 
do so). For example, a person of Irish descent living in the United States can be said to 
belong to the Irish diaspora, but often she would hold American rather than Irish 
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citizenship. On the other hand, an Irish citizen who temporarily relocates to the United 
States will be called simply ‘Irish’ and not ‘diasporic Irish’, and may or may not be of Irish 
descent.86  
The exact meaning of ‘citizenship’ is contested among scholars. Although most agree on 
the concept’s value and importance, it is used both as a descriptive and a normative 
term, which can sometimes lead to confusion.87 In the famous Nottebohm case, the 
International Court of Justice defined citizenship as ‘a legal bond having as its basis a 
social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests, and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties’88 (the court in that case used 
the term ‘nationality’ but it did so in terms of the domestic, legal notion of citizenship, 
not in terms of ethnic nationality). One can immediately recognise the complexity of 
such a definition: What is a genuine connection? How can sentiments be measured? In 
order to unpack this definition, it is important to realise that the term ‘citizenship’ may 
take the form of three different concepts: the first is a legal status, namely, the rights 
and responsibilities of an individual vis-à-vis the state; the second is a broader view that 
includes political participation, social membership and substantive equality; and the 
third is a desirable activity – being involved in public life and caring for the public good.89  
The first concept is a narrow concept, limited to legal obligations between subjects in a 
specific state. This concept suggests that, unlike nationality, citizenship is necessarily 
associated with a particular territory: people can be dispersed to multiple locations but 
still be part of the same ‘nation’. In contrast, citizenship is a quality that is limited to a 
group of people in a defined territory. Interestingly, a number of countries have recently 
either amended or attempted to amend their laws in order to make it easier for the 
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state to revoke citizenship of both naturalized and born citizens.90 Australia, for 
example, amended its citizenship legislation in 2015 to enable the termination of 
Australian citizenship in circumstances where a dual citizen engages in terrorism-related 
conduct.91 This implies that there is more to citizenship than merely a formal system of 
legal rights and obligations. Such laws suggest that citizenship is connected with loyalty 
to the nation-state (or ‘allegiance’ as used by the Australian legislator). Citizenship can 
be therefore taken away under circumstances in which loyalty is deemed to have been 
breached.92  
The other two concepts view citizenship as much more than merely a set of legal 
obligations between particular subjects. These concepts view citizenship as a set of 
activities, ideas and emotions. For example, some theorists support mandatory national 
service as a method of citizenship-making.93 In Israel, for example, serving in the Israel 
Defence Forces (IDF) is a major constituent of citizenship.94 Nationalist Arab leaders 
object to attempts by the Israeli government to recruit Arab youth to serve in the IDF 
(or other modes of national service) because they are worried that this will weaken their 
Palestinian identity and encourage integration into Israeli society.95 Similarly, Ultra-
Orthodox Jews oppose serving, fearing that it would encourage assimilation into Israel’s 
secular Jewish society.96 The refusal of members of these groups to participate in any 
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mode of national service may cause the majority of the population to treat them as 
‘second class citizens’. 
When considering these broader concepts of citizenship, we can identify two kinds of 
membership and political participation: one is participation in the local sphere, where a 
community’s close and immediate needs encourage collective action on issues such as 
waste, environment, law and order. The other occurs at the global level, where activists 
support causes that concern people living in different places, such as human rights and 
environmental issues.97 This kind of political activism creates a kind of ‘international’ or 
‘global’ civil society that is able to confront issues in the global public sphere and is not 
confined to a specific state or territory.98  
Diaspora people can be described therefore as citizens of their kin-state in the sense 
that they share a sense of identity and solidarity with the political community in the kin-
state. Solidarity is not necessarily connected with territorial boundaries, but can be 
forged through shared history, culture or values.99 However, diaspora people can only 
be described as citizens of the kin-state when applying the broad concept of citizenship. 
When applying the narrower concept that is linked to political obligation, rights and legal 
status, diaspora people do not qualify as citizens of the kin-state.100  
 
D. Diaspora engagement – legal and social effects 
This chapter has explained what a diaspora is, what role the kin-state plays in the lives 
of diasporic people and the difference in status between diaspora people and people in 
the kin-state. I will now describe the practical ways in which diaspora communities and 
kin-states interact with each other. These include legal, social and financial means used 
by people in the diaspora to influence and participate in the political issues of their kin-
states as well as means used by kin-states to engage with their diaspora communities. I 
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first review the common (and sometimes controversial) legal tools that many state 
governments use in engaging with their diaspora communities. These include the 
granting of preferential citizenship and voting rights to co-ethnics who live in the 
diaspora. I also review other social and economic tools used by diaspora communities 
and kin-state governments to interact with each other. I then focus on the special role 
played by diaspora communities in divided societies. I conclude with a review of the 
challenges to traditional democratic theories that arise as a result of these interactions 
and how scholars have attempted to address these challenges.  
 
 
Kin-states often grant citizenship rights to people who are affiliated with the kin-state’s 
dominant ethnic, religious or national character. There are two major modes of 
automatic citizenship acquisition: (i) jus soli, which grounds the right to citizenship on 
the territory where one was born; and (ii) jus sanguini, which grounds it on whether this 
person has an ancestor (e.g., a parent) who shares nationality or citizenship with the 
country in question.101 
Diaspora people are usualy citizens of their host-states, according to jus soli provisions. 
However they often are also able to apply for citizenship of their kin-state, if such kin-
state has jus sanguini policies in place. Many countries have both jus sanguini policy and 
jus soli provisions.102 In Europe it is common to find legislation that allows for facilitated 
access to citizenship to people who are regarded as sharing ethnic or national ties with 
the state.103 Greek citizenship law, for example, distinguishes between persons of Greek 
Orthodox descent (‘ethnic Greeks’) and other persons, and grants descendants of ethnic 
Greeks (who are Orthodox Christian) preferential access to citizenship.104 Kin-states use 
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such provisions in order to strengthen ties with their diaspora, protect them from 
persecution or undo historical wrongs. Spain, for example, has recently adopted special 
provisions for restoring citizenship to descendants of Jews who were expelled from the 
country in the late 15th century.105 In many post-communist countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe there are special provisions for preferential (re)acquisition of citizenship 
by co-ethnics living outside the country. For example, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Poland provide for the restoration of citizenship to persons who 
were deprived of citizenship by the former communist regimes.106 Hungary, Slovakia and 
Slovenia have adopted laws that introduce quasi-citizenship for minorities of co-ethnic 
descent living abroad; other countries (including Germany, Ireland, Japan and Portugal) 
grant citizens of other countries facilitated or automatic naturalization based on ethnic 
descent or previously held citizenship among their ancestors.107 In Central and Eastern 
Europe, preferential acquisition of citizenship for co-ethnics has been the most 
important method of acquisition of citizenship, with ‘external citizens’ constituting 
approximately 20% of the total population.108 Italy is another country that grants access 
to citizenship to co-ethnics in the diaspora. Gallo and Tintori estimate that at least 30 
million people of Italian descent living around the world can prove their Italian descent 
and acquire Italian citizenship by ‘reviving’ their Italian nationality. Between 1998 and 
2007, 786,000 people acquired Italian citizenship in this way.109 In Israel, the ‘Law of 
Return’ provides the granting of Israeli citizenship to every Jew who chooses to settle in 
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Israel, including a son, daughter or a grandchild of a Jew and their non-Jewish spouses.110 
All of the laws described above aim to reaffirm the country’s national character and to 
protect the co-ethnics living in the diaspora.111  
One consequence of today’s globalised world is the proliferation of dual and even plural 
citizens, who hold citizenship rights in more than one country. The acceptance of dual 
nationals is a necessity as more people travel and move across borders. In no period in 
history has it been as easy and affordable to travel from one side of the world to the 
other as it is today. But countries also promote dual citizenship as a way to utilise their 
diaspora communities to advance their own interests. Russia, for example, promoted 
dual citizenship to Russian speakers after the fall of the Soviet Union as a means to gain 
influence in the new independent countries.112 Both Israel and Russia treated Russian 
Jews as part of their own diaspora in order to promote their interests.113  
Often, if a diasporic person decides to immigrate to her kin-state from her host-state, 
she is able to participate in the kin-state political life by acquiring citizenship and voting 
in elections. But what about diaspora people who take on their kin-state’s citizenship 
but remain located in their diaspora communities? The next section explains how non-
resident diasporic citizens are able to participate in a kin-state’s political processes.  
 
As explained above, diaspora people are often not citizens of their kin-state in the legal 
sense and therefore are not allowed to vote in their kin-state’s elections.  But even when 
their legal status allows them to vote, they often lack a real ability to exercise this right.  
For example, Jews who live in the diaspora cannot vote in Israeli elections unless they 
hold Israeli citizenship, and even if they are Israeli citizens, they have to be registered as 
Israeli residents and be physically present in Israel on election day.  However, there is 
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increasing support among many kin-states for granting voting rights to their diaspora 
populations.  
Most countries still prefer to grant political rights based on nationality rather than 
residency.114 An ethno-nationalist approach that identifies the polity by using an ethno-
cultural and historical demarcation supports the granting of external voting rights to 
members of this group, regardless of their location. ‘External Voting’ is the general term 
used to describe different categories of people who may be allowed to vote from 
abroad. In addition to diaspora people, these categories include diplomats, members of 
the armed forces and others who temporarily or permanently are absent from their 
country of origin.115 The globalisation of political and economic life and large scale 
migration have contributed to an increasing interest in external voting. With the existing 
variety of advanced communication methods, people living overseas remain closely 
connected to the political life in their kin-states and wish to participate in their political 
processes. For example, organisations representing the Hungarian diaspora aim to 
amend the Hungarian constitution so as to grant Hungarian nationals living overseas the 
right to vote.116 Another example was the Southern Cross Group, an international 
advocacy and support organisation for the ‘Australian Diaspora’, which actively 
promoted changes to Australian laws and policies that negatively impact or 
disadvantage those in the Diaspora.117 
Some countries, including Croatia, France, Italy and Portugal, even reserve seats in their 
parliaments for diaspora representatives.118 Having such an overseas constituency 
further reinforces the diaspora’s link with its national political community in the kin-
state and vice versa. Candidates and parties in the kin-state try to garner support from 
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diaspora leaders and their organisational networks.119 In such cases, it is not uncommon 
to see electoral campaigns spill over into diaspora communities. For example, one can 
find Italian senators campaigning and meeting potential voters in a Melbourne 
suburb.120 The Irish Constitutional Convention, which operated between 2012-2014, 
was mandated to consider eight specific issues, one of them being the granting of voting 
rights in presidential elections to people in the ‘Irish diaspora’ (more accurately, to 
citizens who reside outside the state). Members of the Constitutional Convention were 
in favour of granting Irish citizens living outside the state the right to vote in Presidential 
elections.121 
From a democratic perspective, external voting raises various challenges. As Bauböck 
notes:  
States cannot protect their citizens’ civil rights outside their own 
territory nor provide them with social citizenship rights to public 
education, health care or poverty relief. Why should they then have 
an obligation to secure exactly the same rights to vote for external 
citizens as for those who live in the territory?122 
But there is an even stronger moral problem at play here: why should people who do 
not live in the territory influence decisions that affect those who live in it?123 It seems 
that a question of legitimacy is raised when people who live overseas under different 
governments, holding passports of other countries, can shape the rules which will 
govern the residents of the kin-state. Kin-state residents have no alternative but to obey 
the decisions of the kin-state government, but diaspora people are not subject to these 
decisions in the same way that kin-state residents are; diaspora people are often more 
affected by the rules of their host-state.124 One may argue therefore that diaspora 
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people are outsiders who should not be allowed to influence the political community 
they either chose to leave or refused to re-join.125  
External voting also raises special complications in post-conflict situations. In post-
conflict societies with large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, external voting 
operations are often organised on a massive scale. For example, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro), Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and most 
recently Iraq, the International Organisation for Migration (‘IOM’) promoted external 
voting operations to create conditions conducive to the return of refugees and other 
displaced persons.126 It is no wonder that different political parties have very different 
views on who should participate in elections. If one group of people has left the country 
as a result of conflict or persecution under the other, ruling group, people affiliated with 
the ruling group will naturally resist extending voting rights to diaspora communities.  
External voting also raises difficulties in host-states that are home to large diaspora 
populations. Host-states do not always look favourably on foreign governments that try 
to engage with a large group of their own citizens. Such host-states do not always 
welcome external voting rights for their dual-nationals. For example, Canada forbids 
other countries from including Canada as part of an overseas constituency.127 In 
Romania, tensions with Hungary arose after the Hungarian government granted 
citizenship to some 400,000 ethnic Hungarians living in the diaspora so that they could 
vote in the Hungarian general elections.128 In March 2017, tensions arose between the 
Netherlands and Turkey after Turkish Ministers were barred from attending rallies in 
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Dutch cities aimed at encouraging Turkish migrants living in the Netherlands to vote in 
a Turkish referendum.129  
Although external voting is an increasingly popular way for diaspora people and 
expatriates to get involved in political processes in their kin-states, there are problems 
with its implementation in particular contexts. But diaspora involvement goes far 
beyond citizenship and voting rights. As I will discuss in the next part, even without 
citizenship status and a right to cast votes in elections and referendums, diaspora people 
have other ways to become politically involved in their kin-states.  
 
In the era of advanced global electronic communications, diaspora communities, 
organisations and individuals are increasingly vocal and influential.130 This consequence 
of globalisation has significant effects on political movements and affiliations. The 
spread of mass media across the globe naturally helps diaspora communities to maintain 
close contacts with their original kin-state.131 It enables not only diaspora people, but all 
people, to identify and connect with people outside their own state, creating a global 
civil society which allows people from across the globe to confront global issues 
together.132 As a result of such processes, national sovereignty is inevitably undermined 
and isolationist views are often weakened.133 Citizens of the nation state may hold less 
power over their state affairs and policies than external actors such as multinational 
corporations, leaders of foreign countries, international NGOs, the World Trade 
Organisation (‘WTO’), the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) and UN bodies.134 This 
presents a challenge, as there is a discrepancy between those who hold the power and 
those who are affected by the use of this power. But there are also positive implications 
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of this phenomenon, such as the ability of people from different countries to co-operate 
and combat global issues together.135 International groups and NGOs recruit activists all 
over the world and governments can no longer ignore global public opinion. 
In this context, diaspora people establish and mobilise institutions in their host-state to 
support causes and effect political changes in their kin-states.136 Politically, diaspora 
organisations lobby host-state governments and other international players in support 
of their kin-state (or on behalf of certain factions within the kin-state).137 For example, 
one can find Tamils in Norway lobbing for establishing a Tamil state in Sri Lanka, as well 
as passionate Sikh nationalists in Australia and Canada.138 Through such activities, 
diaspora people expand the notion of political membership beyond territorial 
boundaries and reaffirm their connection with the nation residing in the kin-state.139 
However, not all diaspora communities exert the same level of influence and 
involvement in kin-state affairs. Shain and Barth argue that for diasporic influence to be 
effectively exerted on kin-states, two conditions must be present: (i) a democratic host-
state must allow diasporic activity in its territory; and (ii) a strong sense of identity must 
exist to connect diaspora people to the kin-state and motivate the former to act.140 Shain 
and Barth also divide members of large diaspora communities into three categories: 
core members, passive members and silent members. Silent members constitute the 
largest group of the three and consist of people who are generally uninvolved in 
diasporic affairs but who may be encouraged to get involved in times of crisis (e.g., by 
protesting or donating money). Passive members are generally available for action when 
the active diaspora leadership calls upon them. The core members are the organising 
elites who are intensively active in diasporic affairs and mobilise the other two diaspora 
groups when necessary.141 
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Many kin-state governments are well aware of the potential lying latent in their diaspora 
communities and therefore seek to connect with their diasporic population for 
economic as well as political reasons.142 Apart from preferential citizenship rights and 
external voting, kin-states try to build economic and cultural ties with their diaspora 
communities. Currently, over 100 countries try to benefit from their ‘diaspora capital’ 
and employ a variety of ways to engage and connect with their diaspora communities.143 
Kin-state governments invest substantial resources in developing methods to approach 
and engage with their diaspora communities.144 Ireland, Armenia, Georgia, Israel, Serbia 
and India are just a few examples of countries that have created special governmental 
ministries in charge of diaspora issues.145 These countries try to benefit from the fact 
that many of their citizens or co-ethnics live abroad, realising that ‘brain drain can 
become brain gain and brain exchange’.146 These ministries operate in various forms. 
For example, they guarantee the security of their diaspora communities through 
diplomatic means, they perform information gathering and fund cultural projects in the 
diaspora, and they provide political and economic support for repatriation and 
naturalisation of diaspora people.147  
Apart from official government ministries, there are numerous diaspora organisations 
that coordinate between diaspora communities and kin-state governments. For 
example, the Organisation of the Swiss Abroad represents the interests of Swiss 
expatriates and provides them with a wide selection of services, such as advice on issues 
relating to emigration and returning to Switzerland.148  
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Economically, diaspora people create business and trade opportunities between their 
host-states and their kin-states. Fostering economic ties with a diaspora community can 
take many forms. For example, some kin-states issue and sell ‘Diaspora Bonds’ to their 
diaspora population in order to raise money in times of financial difficulty.149 Israel, for 
example, relied heavily on Jewish funds in its early days, with Zionist endeavours in 
Palestine receiving financial support from the Jewish diaspora as early as the late 19th 
century.150 The economies of countries like the Philippines, Mexico and Egypt are heavily 
dependent on remittances.151 In Somalia, the annual remittance flows provide for the 
government’s largest source of revenue.152 
Cultural ties can also take many forms. India issues a ‘Person of Indian Origin’ card which 
is available to anyone who was formerly an Indian citizen or who is the child, grandchild, 
or great-grandchild of an Indian citizen.153 Ireland is also a prominent model in this field, 
employing wide-ranging programs and schemes to engage with its diaspora.154 For 
example, the Irish Government declared in 2011 that it would issue a ‘Certificate of Irish 
Heritage’ for members of the Irish diaspora who do not qualify for Irish citizenship. 
People applying for the certificate must provide proof of their ancestry and connection 
with Ireland.155 Also in 2011, the Irish government announced a new annual award that 
would honour individuals of the Irish diaspora for sustained and distinguished service to 
Ireland.156 More recently, the Irish Minister for Diaspora Affairs has suggested an 
orientation course on ‘what it is to be Irish’ aimed at young people from the Irish 
Diaspora. This idea was inspired by the Israeli ‘Taglit’-Birthright program which brought 
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more than 400,000 young Jewish people from around the world to visit Israel over a 
period of 15 years.157 
The tendency of some kin-states to see themselves as protectors of their diaspora 
communities has even led to military interventions in countries where kin-states felt 
that their diaspora communities were threatened. This ostensibly happened for 
example with Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus and the Russian interventions in Georgia and 
Ukraine.158 Israel’s commitment to the protection of Jews worldwide is expressed by 
extending its criminal jurisdiction to foreign countries in certain cases. For example, a 
special law deals with persons who committed crimes against Jews during the Nazi 
regime (before Israel was established).159 Another example is a law that allows for the 
application of the Israeli penal law not only in Israel but also to offences committed 
overseas against the life, person, health, freedom or property of any Jew or the property 
of any Jewish institution.160  
It is therefore not surprising that, in some cases, a diaspora’s connection with its kin-
state may seem threatening from the host-state’s point of view. Some host-state 
governments and societies may see this connection as endangering the integrity of their 
own nation state. Some question the diaspora’s loyalty to its host-state, suggesting that 
diaspora people are trying to ‘have their cake and eat it too’.161 Tensions between kin-
states and host-states over kin-state-diaspora activities led the European Council in 2001 
to formally acknowledge the legitimacy of ties between a cultural-ethnic community and 
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its kin-state.162 In this report, the European Council recognised the right of kin-states to 
look after the interests of those it deems to be part of its nation and help them preserve 
their identity in their host-states.163  
In this part, I reviewed the various ways in which diaspora people are involved politically 
and culturally with their kin-states and vice versa. Voting rights, economic and cultural 
ties, prizes and awards are a few examples of diasporic participation and engagement 
with the kin-state, but this is not an exhaustive list. Other means of diasporic 
participation in the kin-state are still being imagined and structured, such as diasporic 
advisory councils.164 In chapter VI I will describe how the Jewish diaspora uses the Israeli 
Supreme Court to try to promote their political agenda and preserve their interests in 
Israel.  
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, large diaspora communities are often 
created as a result of a conflict in the original homeland. It is more common for divided 
societies in which different groups compete, sometimes violently, over the state’s 
national character, to produce complex and influential diaspora populations. In the next 
section I will examine more specifically the involvement in, and effects of, diaspora 
populations on ongoing conflicts in their kin-states. 
I define divided societies as societies where large groups of people are divided, mainly 
according to ethnic or religious lines; and where such divisions are often a source of 
conflict between the different groups, and may include violent conflicts that create large 
migration waves. The former Yugoslavia and the states that were created following its 
downfall provide a typical example; so do the more recent examples of Syria and Iraq. A 
lot of the scholarship on diaspora-kin-state relationships has focused on diaspora 
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involvement and intervention in conflicts in their kin-states.165 Diaspora support of the 
kin-state during conflicts can be critical. Diaspora communities provide financial 
resources, propaganda platforms, weapons and recruits. Jews, Armenians, Kurds, 
Indians, Vietnamese and Turks living in the United States all devote tremendous efforts 
to lobby the US government in favour of what they see as their kin-state interests.166 In 
the last few decades, Kosovar Albanians, Croats, Sri Lankan Tamils, Syrians and others 
have returned to participate in struggles taking place in their homelands.167 During the 
Arab Spring, demonstrations and protests by Arab migrants were widespread in major 
European and North American cities.  
Various factors motivate people in the diaspora to try and influence conflicts in their kin-
states. Shain identifies five main concerns that influence diasporic attitudes toward 
conflict resolution efforts in their kin-states: (i) maintaining their ethnic identity as they 
conceive of it; (ii) competition with the kin-state for leadership of the transnational 
community; (iii) organisational or bureaucratic interests stemming from diasporic 
organisations; (iv) other political interests; and (v) economic interests.168  
It has been widely suggested that diaspora involvement in conflict resolution efforts in 
their kin-states is counter-productive and tends to perpetuate conflicts rather than 
ameliorate them.169 When compared with their co-ethnics who live in the kin-state, 
diaspora people are often more hard-line nationalistic.170 People in the diaspora live 
under different conditions, and may develop beliefs and ideologies that may be at odds 
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with those of their ethnic group members in the kin-state.171 For example, while a kin-
state citizen might be willing to give up a certain territory of significant symbolic value 
in order to improve her living conditions, the practical value of peace with a former rival 
is not directly relevant to the diasporic person’s daily experience.172 It is not uncommon 
therefore to find influential diaspora organisations and individuals acting against the 
official policy of their kin-state government.173 For example, during the Israeli-
Palestinian peace talks in 1993, some American-Jewish organisations protested against 
Israeli concessions to the Palestinians, while American-Palestinian intellectuals such as 
Edward Said and Joseph Massad labelled Palestinian leaders as ‘collaborators with 
Israel’ for negotiating a peace settlement.174 According to Shain: 
Some may argue that the diaspora has the luxury of dwelling in the 
past, while at home, governments and people must occupy 
themselves with issues of day-to-day existence. Yet others maintain 
that the diaspora’s faithfulness to issues of kinship identity reminds 
the homeland of its historical obligations to preserve certain values 
that are crucial to the nation’s raison d’être.175 
Contrary to the above, there are also scholars who suggest that diaspora communities 
can play a helpful role in resolving conflicts. They argue that diaspora communities can 
foster moderate politics, peace-building and democratisation activities precisely 
because of their remoteness from the range of fire.176 For example, the Irish diaspora 
(especially in North America) played a key role in the Northern Ireland peace process.177 
In cases where diaspora populations are created as a result of oppression and 
persecution by the government in an undemocratic kin-state, as the case is with the 
Iranian and Ethiopian diasporas, people who live in the diaspora are often the only ones 
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who can freely criticise the current government in the kin-state and offer an 
alternative.178 In this regard, we can also distinguish between different types of 
diasporas. Not all diasporas are in a position to constructively contribute in this context. 
Asylum seekers, exiles and stateless people often do not have the opportunity to 
develop skills, knowledge and insights to the same extent as those who hold legal status 
and are already settled in well-developed host-states. 
One should therefore be cautious when generalising about ‘typical’ diaspora tendencies. 
As is often the case with large groups of people, multiple and contradictory opinions can 
be found among large diaspora populations. As Shain notes: ‘the larger the diaspora and 
more diverse its perspectives, the greater is the likelihood that its members produce 
conflicting views that mirror debates in the homeland rather than dictate them’.179 What 
is evident is that diaspora populations play a key role in conflict resolution efforts in their 
kin-states. Kin-state governments therefore cannot ignore this fact and should develop 
effective strategies to deal with the different attitudes prevalent among their diaspora 
populations.  
E. Challenges of diaspora-kin-state relationships 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the world has changed since Hobbes stated that ‘no 
man can obey two masters’.180 It is difficult to define the boundaries of a political 
community in a globalised world. Citizenship is no longer the only foundation upon 
which rights are determined and restricted.181 The quality of citizenship is changing, with 
diaspora communities playing an important role in shaping ‘new shades of belonging 
and their legal expression’.182 As Addis notes: 
[T]he idea of limited and exhaustible loyalty is conceptually 
incoherent and at odds with the reality of a globalized world where 
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individuals are increasingly attached to varying communities with 
different commitments and loyalties.183 
In this part I discuss the challenges posed by globalisation processes to citizenship laws, 
with a particular focus on the legal status of diaspora communities.  
 
Modern states are organised as non-overlapping territorial jurisdictions. In the past, 
migration between states produced citizens who lived abroad, as foreign citizens in the 
foreign territory, with their original citizenship clinging to them as they moved across 
international borders.184 Today, international law and institutional changes enable 
migrants to claim rights and membership in several polities, moving away from 
traditional single-nationality approaches.185 The legitimisation and active promotion of 
plural nationality or plural citizenship is widespread, with more than half of the world’s 
countries now recognising plural-nationality.186 The granting of local voting rights for 
denizens and external voting rights for expatriates is similarly becoming more 
common.187 Immigration is widespread, and immigrants often maintain strong 
affiliations with their home countries. They are bilingual, comfortable in combining two 
cultures, and travel regularly.188 As Franck notes, what is new in our times 
[Is] not the re-emergence and tolerance of multiple loyalty 
references, but the acceptance of a right of persons (and other 
entities, including transnational corporations) to compose their own 
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identity by constructing the complex of loyalty references that best 
manifest who they want to be.189 
Interestingly however, despite globalisation processes and wider acceptance of dual 
nationalities, the world has also witnessed nationalistic resurgences among many 
communities that wish to express their unique identity through political independence. 
Never before have there been so many independent nation states. The trend is clearly 
one of further disintegration rather than unification. A short list of minorities that 
include members seeking some sort of autonomy or independence in past years (with 
various levels of success) include the Scots, Flemish, Catalonians, Basques, Quebeckers, 
Lombards, Corsicans, Kurds, Kosovars, Berbers, Chiapans, Chechens, Tibetans, Muslim 
Mindanaoans, Christian Sudanese, Abkhazians, Tamils, Palestinians and East 
Timorese.190 These examples suggest that despite globalising forces, people still highly 
value belonging to a particular culture, defined as a nation sovereign over its territory.191 
The Brexit vote was arguably another example of popular desire to resist globalisation 
forces.192 
While people today may move across borders more freely, they also tend to take their 
nationality with them. Anderson, for example, does not believe that nationalism is 
outdated in our global society, with more people living a transnational life. Anderson 
contends that nationalism is not disappearing; rather, it is maintained and cultivated in 
previously unimaginable ways:  
Think about long-distance nationalism, email/Internet nationalism. 
In my lecture I referred to exiled Argentinians’ websites. These are 
extremely nationalistic and are purely about Argentina. Think of the 
Norwegian schools in Spain, it’s crazy: The only reason for their 
existence is that people fear that their children will stop being 
Norwegian. The Norwegian schools take Norway to Spain. That is 
the best evidence available that nationalism has gone mobile.193 
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Diasporas are the main source of this kind of mobile nationalism. The existence of 
diasporic populations seriously undermines the traditional assumption that nationality 
and community are linked with territory.194 According to Cohen: 
The central idea is that transnational bonds no longer need to be 
cemented by migration or by exclusive territorial claims. In the age 
of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or 
re-created through the mind, through cultural artefacts and through 
a shared imagination.195 
Diaspora people conflate old concepts of identity, citizenship and nationhood and pose 
a problem to the old world order that was divided into well-defined nation states.196 As 
Shain notes, diasporas are ‘outside the state but inside the people’.197 But are diasporas 
really part of the people in the sense that would grant them the right to shape the laws 
of the kin-state?198 Some claim that allowing the involvement of diaspora people in the 
political and economic life of the country violates a basic principle of international law 
and democracy – that of ‘the ruled being the rulers’.199 A diaspora’s relationship with its 
kin-state defies a very popular dichotomy that is often employed in international law 
and political discourse, namely, the division between nationalist/localist views versus 
cosmopolitan/universalist views.200 Cohen argues that ‘nationalists cannot now return 
the genie of social identity to the bottle of the territorial nation-state. Globalisation has 
put paid to that possibility’.201 Addis points out that neither universal nor local accounts 
capture diaspora-kin-state relationships: diaspora people are neither strangers nor 
members, neither local nor cosmopolitan. Such complex relationships will increasingly 
occupy international relations and international law theorists.  
                                                     
194 See Addis, ‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the 
Diaspora’, above n 5, 988. 
195 Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers’, above n 26, 516. 
196 See Barabantseva and Sutherland, above n 37, 5. 
197 Shain, above n 5, 124.  
198 See Addis, ‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the 
Diaspora’, above n 5, 990; Song, ‘Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights’, above n 2, 616. 
199 Addis, ‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the Diaspora’, 
above n 5, 1009; Fitzgerald, above n 6, 107. 
200 Addis, ‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the Diaspora’, 
above n 5, 983. 
201 Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers’, above n 26, 520. 
48 
 
 
Social and legal scholars try to adapt to the changes in the boundaries of citizenship 
resulting from globalisation processes and the rise of diaspora populations. They 
acknowledge that there is a need to introduce new norms into international law in order 
to coordinate citizenship policies between states. Some political and social theorists 
contemplate whether citizenship can or should exist beyond the nation state and a 
defined territory. Concepts such as ‘global’, ‘transnational’ and ‘denationalized’ 
citizenship are being developed to replace old concepts, and some suggest a universalist 
position that places persons, rather than citizens, as the main proper subject of political 
rights and obligations.202 Indeed, some scholars go as far as advocating cosmopolitan 
democracy as a viable and humane response to the challenges of globalisation.203 They 
envision a world in which democratic participation by citizens is not constrained by 
national borders and local governments, and democracy spreads through dialogue and 
incentives rather than coercion and war.204 Some argue that the state should expand 
the relevant polity to include not only non-citizen residents, but also foreign non-citizens 
who live outside the state’s territorial borders such as citizens of neighbouring 
counties.205 For example, environmental theorists argue that democratic institutions 
should take into account the interests of non-citizens (as well as non-humans and future 
generations) in environmental decision making.206  
However, such theories must be capable of overcoming many difficulties before they 
can be realised. It is still difficult to imagine a real alternative to the current dominant 
system of separate and independent nation states. As Bauböck notes: ‘Political theorists 
have so far hardly ever attempted to specify and contextualise how norms of equal 
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citizenship apply beyond a single polity framework’. 207 One difficulty is how to maintain 
equality between individuals who are ‘positioned differently within a citizenship 
constellation’.208 As Bauböck argues, introducing ‘transnational citizenship’ perspectives 
means that we have to develop citizenship policies that not only respond to individuals’ 
claims but can also guide political decisions of different polities without conflicting with 
each other or producing unjustifiable burdens for other countries. 
Similarly, Addis asks whether the relationship between diaspora communities and their 
kin-states opens up ‘new forms of community and peoplehood worth cultivating’ or 
rather ‘undermine the possibility of developing any community of character and 
depth’.209 Addis argues that the strong relationships between diaspora communities and 
kin-states supports the cosmopolitan argument that territorial states are no longer the 
only source of peoplehood. He calls for a new theory of ‘peoplehood’ that is capable of 
capturing what he calls ‘the paradox of diasporas’.210 At the same time, he also believes 
that these relationships reinforce the fact that allegiances and obligations should be 
worked out in the context of specific historical narratives that involve ‘common 
sympathy and origin’.211  
However, all these new social membership descriptions remain too vague for real states 
to work with. While contemporary scholars can use terms such as ‘transnational social 
fields’212 or ‘networks’213 to describe multiple national affiliations, government and 
legislators need exact definitions that can be applied to actual cases. Fields and networks 
are not political entities that can serve to address claims to membership status and 
political rights. In contrast with societies, networks and fields, political communities are 
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demarcated by territorial jurisdiction or other legal mechanisms that must determine if 
a person is a member of community X or Y and is therefore entitled to a certain right or 
benefit. Apart from practical considerations, there are also normative reasons to prefer 
the division into modern states over a united world government.214 
Some scholars are aware of the normative trade-off between territorial autonomy and 
transnational citizenship.215 Bauböck and others propose ‘individual stakeholding’ in the 
future of a political community as a political criterion for membership claims.216 
According to this criterion, as different people have different stakes in a particular 
decision taken by the state, one’s influence should be relative to her stake in the 
decision.217 Adopting this term, Addis provides further details and divides the ‘individual 
stakeholding’ into three elements: cultural stake, economic stake and political stake.218 
Nino adopts a similar position, saying that ‘it may be necessary to use different changing 
gradations of citizenship’.219  
The problem with these kinds of criteria is that they are still vague and require further 
clarification in order to provide workable definitions for legislators and law enforcers: 
Who is going to decide what the stake is? What kind of different ‘influence levels’ are 
available and how should they match the corresponding ‘stakeholding’ level? Another 
problem created by these approaches is that a different constituency of voters will need 
to be identified for every decision, as different decisions affect different people in 
different ways.220 
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Moreover, the fact that one group is affected by a decision does not necessarily mean 
that this group must have a right to vote on the matter, as there are other considerations 
that may point against granting voting rights to that group.221 For example, many 
European countries refuse to grant voting rights to non-citizen residents in order to 
protect the ethnic and linguistic character of the state.222 
There should not be, it seems, too much controversy about the rights of diaspora people 
to maintain cultural ties and economic involvement with people in the kin-state. The 
question therefore remains as to what legal status should be granted to diaspora people 
who are part of the people, but live outside the country: ‘the categories of members and 
strangers in the traditional sense do not seem to capture the complicated relationship 
between diasporas and homelands’.223 
Take, for example, the question of external voting. The use of referendums in 
constitutional amendment processes became an almost universally adopted practice 
among countries emerging from undemocratic models of government.224 But how 
would one determine the boundaries of the group whose members are to enjoy political 
rights such as the right to vote? A territorial demarcation would simply include all those 
who would be directly affected by the results. This follows the core democratic principle 
that those who are subject to the law should also be its authors.225 Indeed, some states 
grant local voting rights to all long-term residents226 and some nation states’ 
constitutions cover all people residing within the territory and not just citizens.227 
However, territorial demarcation would exclude parts of the nation that were forced or 
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chose to live in the diaspora. As discussed above, external voting challenges norms of 
inclusion in the concept of transnational citizenship and creates political inequality.228  
As mentioned above, one can simply argue that diasporas are effectively not ruled by 
the laws of the kin-state, and so they should not take part in the process of designing 
them. However, some kin-state policies and decisions can affect diaspora people in 
various important ways. For example, if the Armenian government agrees to reconcile 
with Turkey this may have bearing on the entire national narrative regarding the 
Armenian genocide and on the rights of the Armenian diaspora;229 actions by the State 
of Israel may affect anti-Semitism in the Jewish diaspora; a new migration policy 
declared by country A with respect to foreigners can affect the way other governments 
treat country A’s migrants in their own territories. In all such cases, diaspora people have 
a legitimate interest in the decisions taken by the kin-state. The question remains, 
however, for which decisions should diaspora people be considered part of the people, 
and for which decisions should they not?  
On this issue, Gans and Addis argue that it seems reasonable to allow all the members 
of a national group, including members of the diaspora, to take part in the decision-
making process with regard to issues of national identity and membership that have 
little to do with everyday life in the kin-state.230 With regard to such decisions, diaspora 
people could be said to belong to the relevant demos that should vote on the issue, as 
they may be affected by the decisions. However, this approach is not sufficiently clear 
and raises further questions: How can one decide exactly what issues really concern 
‘national identity’ so as to allow diaspora people to participate in such decisions? For 
example, do decisions regarding which languages should be recognised as official 
languages involve practical or identity aspects or both? Also, how, and in what forum, 
would this decision be made? Currently there are no established institutions or 
principles of international law that are able to resolve disputes between diaspora and 
kin-states. Such questions are still waiting to be researched and addressed by legal 
                                                     
228 Fitzgerald, above n 6, 115. 
229 See Addis, ‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the 
Diaspora’, above n 5, 1006, 1013; Shain, Kinship & Diasporas in International Affairs, 120. 
230 Chaim Gans, The Limits of Nationalism (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 84; Addis, ‘Imagining the 
Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the Diaspora’, above n 5, 1024. 
53 
 
scholars and international relation theorists.231 This thesis offers a deliberative 
democratic approach to these questions. The case studies also provide practical 
examples of how to involve diaspora communities – namely, via deliberations in the kin-
state constitutional court.  
 
F. Summary 
In this chapter I examined diaspora communities and their relationship with their kin-
states. I described the different ways in which governments extend their actions beyond 
the state’s borders and reach out to their diaspora communities in order to promote a 
specific definition of the national community. I also described the various methods used 
by diaspora communities to participate and intervene in kin-state affairs. Despite the 
fact that diasporic activities take place outside the kin-state, they influence life in the 
kin-state. Thus, as Shain and Barth note, diasporas expand the meaning of the term 
'domestic politics' to include not only politics inside the state but also ‘inside the 
people’.232  
Such extraterritorial citizenship can sometimes violate territorial integrity and the ideal 
of the ruled being the rulers. Diasporas therefore pose a problem to the democratic 
ideal: they obscure and conflate the relevant demos so as to include people who are 
living outside the state, are only partly subject to the same rules, and often have 
different interests and aspirations from those held by the kin-state residents. This 
problem intensifies especially when certain minority groups in the kin-state feel 
marginalised by the state’s propensity towards a specific ethnic or religious 
denomination. It becomes even more complex given that often there are groups of non-
citizens who reside in the kin-state but are excluded from political participation (e.g., 
foreign workers).233 
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In the next chapters I address these challenges using deliberative democratic theory. I 
argue that by looking at the diaspora-kin-state relationship through a deliberative 
democratic lens, the challenges look less daunting, and modes of engagement emerge 
that offer solutions that are less drastic and problematic than, for example, external 
voting and preferential citizenship laws. I highlight examples from the Israeli Supreme 
Court, in which members of the Jewish diaspora challenged certain policies of the Israeli 
government in what can be described as an elite deliberative democratic engagement. 
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III. Theory of Deliberative Democracy 
 
In this chapter I examine whether deliberative democratic theory can accommodate the 
involvement of diaspora people in their kin-states. In the previous chapter I discussed 
the different kinds (and implications) of engagement between diaspora people and their 
kin-states. These issues should be discussed under a framework of democratic theory 
that can accommodate the involvement of non-citizens in a political community. In 
order to do this I delve into the theory of deliberative democracy. First, I introduce 
definitions and the major themes of deliberative democratic theory. I then explore in 
more depth the concept of legitimacy which is at the core of democratic theories and, 
as explained above, is at risk when diaspora people become involved in kin-state affairs. 
Understanding the different streams of deliberative democratic theory is important as 
deliberative democracy is a broad concept that includes many variants and sometimes 
even conflicting opinions. I provide a review of the major thinkers who contributed to 
the development of deliberative democratic theory and I explain the different attitudes 
and controversies one can find among deliberative democrats: for example, the 
difference between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ accounts; the difference between 
‘elite’ and ‘popular’ deliberation; and the different positions on what kinds of reason-
giving count as ‘deliberative’. I then explain which streams of deliberative theory I utilise 
and apply in this thesis, and why I think these streams are suitable when discussing 
diaspora-kin-state relationship, especially in divided societies with large diasporic 
populations. The next chapter builds on the theoretical framework outlined in this 
chapter and analyses the qualities of the judiciary as a deliberative democratic 
institution. 
 
A. What is deliberative democracy? 
Before discussing deliberative democracy in detail, it is useful to define the terms 
democracy and deliberation and explain how they act together. According to Christiano, 
the term democracy ‘refers very generally to a method of group decision making 
characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the 
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collective decision’.234 Note that the level of equality required by this definition may 
vary. For example, equality may mean simply formal equality of one-person one-vote, 
or it may be more robust, demanding equality in the processes of deliberation and 
coalition building, before and after the voting process.235 Dryzek defines deliberation as 
‘communication that induces reflection on preferences, values and interests in a non-
coercive fashion’.236 Deliberative democracy therefore is an idea that strives to combine 
these two concepts. It has gained popularity as a useful model to deal with problems of 
legitimacy in modern democratic societies. Deliberative democracy focuses on the 
quantity and quality of the communication among participants in a democratic process.  
The major criterion of legitimacy emphasised by deliberative democratic theory, as 
opposed to other models of democracy, is that legitimacy does not derive only from the 
act of vote counting, but also from reflective judgment practised by the participating 
citizens before the vote.237 While, for example, a liberal model of democracy emphasises 
the protection of personal freedoms and a populist model emphasises the expression of 
the popular will, deliberative democracy sees reasoned deliberation and persuasion 
among people as the best way to respect people’s autonomy and their ability to self-
govern.238 In other words, what is most important is not necessarily the fact that 
decisions are taken by a majority of the people; rather it is the process that precedes the 
voting and the protection of some basic democratic principles during that process. 
Although majority decision making is also a necessity in deliberative democracy, it is not, 
in itself, perceived as the true expression of the people’s will. The majority decision is 
seen merely as an unavoidable break in an ongoing discussion that records an interim 
result in the discursive process.239 A decision is binding for the relevant campaign, but 
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does not determine the result of future contentions (but note that this cannot always 
be the case, as some decisions have an immediate effect that cannot be reversed easily, 
as is usually the case with constitutional referendums).240 To some, the criterion that 
most clearly distinguishes deliberative democratic decision-making mechanisms from 
non-deliberative mechanisms is that no coercive power should exist in the deliberative 
process: ‘participants should not try to change others’ behaviour through the threat of 
sanction or the use of force’.241  
Through these principles, deliberative democratic theory deals with the question of a 
government’s legitimacy, that is, these principles explain why people should abide by 
the governments of democratic regimes (beyond naked force or majority rule).242 
However, as many deliberative democrats admit, at the end of the process there must 
be a way to ensure that people who disagree with the final decision will comply with it 
nevertheless. Sometimes this will inevitably involve some level of coercion.243 
The requirement that the process preceding the decision should be deliberative means 
that the people who are involved in the process should debate open-mindedly and 
exchange views with each other under principles of mutual respect, reciprocity and 
fairness.244 The process should improve the participants’ knowledge of the possible 
implications of the decision. Such process would ideally involve all the people who are 
going to be affected by the decision.245 Deliberative democratic theory therefore is a 
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theory that aims to promote elementary democratic principles, as democratisation 
involves ‘expanding the scope of issues subject to collective control, the effective 
number of people who can exercise influence over the content of collective decisions, 
and the competence with which such influence and control is exercised’.246  
 
B. Problems in modern democracies 
Having explained the basic principles of deliberative democracy, I will elaborate in this 
section on the problems that spurred the development of deliberative democratic ideas 
and how deliberative democratic designs have been implemented practically in an 
attempt to address these problems.  
Increasing concerns over the level of public trust in democratic institutions and public 
involvement in democratic processes helped to trigger the development of deliberative 
democratic theory.247 Even in many of today’s most robust democracies, where 
transparency is mandated by state institutions, the public is still subject to manipulation 
by different interest groups.248 Lobbyists hired by corporations, powerful political 
groups, unions and media tycoons cooperate behind the scenes and pressure legislators 
in order to protect their interests. Billionaires use media outlets to divert and shape 
public opinion and public broadcast is affected by the government that controls its 
budget. The general public is bombarded with political scandals circulated by spin-
doctors, and is only able to have a direct say in political affairs every few years through 
voting. The public often considers politicians to be more concerned with their image in 
the media, and how that image will affect re-election chances, than with what is best 
for the general public. Although some less direct means of participation are always open 
to active citizens – for example, public and legislative petitions, submissions to reform 
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commissions – these methods are not always available and are limited in their 
effectiveness.249  
A related problem that deliberative democratic theory aims to ameliorate is what is 
sometimes referred to as democracy’s ‘myopia’, that is, its inability to develop and 
implement long-term projects. There is ongoing concern that public representatives are 
not in fact free to pursue long-term solutions for public issues due to their need to 
secure their re-election in the next electoral cycle. Seeking short-term gains, public 
representatives are pushed to do things that would secure populist support, instead of 
doing what is actually needed.250 For example, reducing taxes on petrol and new cars 
will garner immediate support from the public (as well as car manufacturers and 
importers), while investing in efficient public transport infrastructure may require 
raising taxes and major traffic disturbances in the short-term, which are likely to be 
unpopular. So, despite public transport usually being the best long-run solution, 
politicians will often prefer the short-term solution. Pressure by specific interest groups 
is highly effective in ‘disciplining’ politicians, and majority interests are often 
compromised as a result. One of the reasons for this is that an interest group is well 
organised and each group member has a strong incentive to act and protest, while the 
majority of the population is less organised, and each member of the majority has little 
incentive to act and pressure its representative.251 For example, a car-manufacturing 
labour union has a strong incentive to request the government to subsidise its industry, 
while each member of the general public has very little incentive to oppose this move 
as the loss suffered by each citizen as a result of subsidising this specific industry would 
be very small.  
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All of these problems and practices lead to a dangerous decline in the public’s trust in 
democratic institutions.252 One consequence of growing distrust is that the legitimacy of 
such institutions and the decisions they produce are questioned.253  
 
C. Deliberative democracy in practice 
Deliberative democrats strive to address the problems discussed above through several 
methods. First, they try to encourage more citizens to engage in public policy debates. 
Second, they aim to include more representatives of marginalised groups in such 
debates. Third, they seek to improve the quality of the deliberation that precedes 
legislation, so that the people who deliberate over and legislate rules will be more 
informed and consider all relevant factors and views before enacting them. Lastly, some 
deliberative democrats argue that the process of deliberation and decision making 
should be more transparent, so as to make it easier for the general public, which usually 
does not directly participate in the decision making process, to follow it and identify the 
reasons and motives behind the different positions. 
How do all of these methods play out in practice? Scholars have proposed various 
innovative strategies to overcome the shortcomings of traditional representative 
models of democracy. Although no one seriously proposes to eliminate representative 
parliaments, some deliberative democrats propose to supplement existing institutions 
with new ones that better promote deliberative democratic goals. Many of these 
approaches involve the shifting of some legislative powers from professional politicians 
to ‘mini-publics’ (e.g., ‘citizens’ assemblies’, ‘citizen forums’) chosen by sortition. That 
is, such forums comprise a representative sample of ordinary citizens who are chosen 
by lot to serve a certain term as a kind of jury, deliberating over public matters.254 
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Another popular suggestion, advanced by Fishkin, is ‘deliberative polling’, which is a 
form of public consultation that engages random samples of the citizenry in weekend-
long information and deliberation sessions in order to survey how opinions would 
change if people were better informed.255  
These kinds of forums emphasise the importance of ordinary citizens and their 
contribution to the polity. Moreover, deliberative forums encourage citizens to 
participate in public debate and exchange reasons in a respectful way, acknowledging 
that each fellow citizen is a morally capable and autonomous person. All viewpoints 
should therefore be heard and considered, though not necessarily agreed with. By 
shifting responsibilities from professional politicians to ordinary citizens who are not 
concerned with their own re-election, long-term projects and policies that benefit the 
majority of the population may have a better chance of being pursued and realised.256 
If a certain politician’s re-election is dependent upon support from the car industry, for 
example, she might be disinclined to promote public transport solutions or cut subsidies 
to the car industry sector. In contrast, a member of a citizens’ assembly is free from such 
constraints, and is able to decide according to what she thinks is the best for the public 
at large.  
As Levy describes it: 
Running democracy through a more elaborate deliberative course is 
a strategy to encourage participants to consider policy options not 
from pre-formed factional or ideological positions, but with greater 
attention to perspectives other than their own. While no institution 
can guarantee its members will assume an enlarged and flexible 
view of their own and others’ interests, deliberative democratic 
bodies at least leave open this possibility by putting decision-makers 
in the position to learn from and cooperate with each other. 257  
Deliberative forums in the form of ‘citizens assemblies’ and other ‘mini-publics’ have 
been conducted in many countries, including Denmark, the United States, Australia, 
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Canada, Iceland and Ireland.258 In Iceland, citizens have actively participated in the 
process of constitutional reforms.259 In Ireland, a Constitutional Convention was 
established in 2012 to deliberate over and propose amendments to the Constitution of 
Ireland.260 Even in countries without a strong democratic tradition, we can find cases 
where the task of drafting or reforming constitutions is put in the hands of public 
representatives who are not always professional politicians. These representatives are 
then engaged in a (more or less) deliberative process that aims to achieve consensus 
over the new constitution. In recent years, public representatives have gathered in 
Yemen and in Tunisia as part of the ‘National Dialogue Conference’ and the ‘National 
Constituent Assembly’, respectively, assuming the task of drafting new constitutions 
following unprecedented steps towards democratisation in these countries.261 
However, one should keep in mind that the kind of deliberative processes that may work 
in liberal, Western democracies are not always relevant or applicable to divided or post-
conflict societies.262 I will elaborate on this point in part H of this chapter.  
The observed effects of deliberative processes that involve ordinary citizens differ and 
may include one of more of the following: better informed public; better media 
coverage and public debate; stronger sense of legitimacy and accountability for public 
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decisions and sometimes direct influence on the content of policy.263 However, some 
scholars identify potential problems with such deliberative processes and note that their 
positive assessments may be overstated.264 One common critique made against 
deliberative democracy is the problem of scale or ‘the problem of economy’.265 Many 
question the prospects of successfully transforming effective deliberation from small 
groups and local issues to large groups and national issues.266 It is practically very 
difficult for thousands of people to engage in deliberation and ‘reason together’.267 
Although attempts to address these problems have been made by various deliberative 
democrats,268 sceptics remain unconvinced. This problem of scale is one of the main 
reasons that elite models of democratic deliberation exist alongside popular models. In 
part F of this chapter I elaborate more on the difference between popular and elite 
models of deliberation. First, however, I address in more detail the concept of legitimacy 
and its special role in deliberative democratic theory. Understanding the role of 
legitimacy in deliberative democracy will clarify how diaspora participation in political 
processes in their kin-states can fit within deliberative democratic theory. 
 
D. Legitimacy  
In the previous section I outlined the basic principles of deliberative democracy and how 
deliberative democratic initiatives have been put into practice in the real world. In order 
to connect the diaspora issues discussed in the previous chapter with deliberative 
democratic theory, I will discuss in this part how deliberative principles are designed to 
enhance the legitimacy of the final decision and how inclusion of people from the 
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diaspora helps to achieve this goal. First I explore the concept of legitimacy and how 
deliberative democratic ideas are designed to address concerns over legitimacy 
deficiencies. I then explain how a given decision making body can enjoy a higher level of 
legitimacy compared to other decision making bodies in a political system. This 
discussion supports my overall argument that including diaspora people in deliberation 
processes in the kin-state helps to strengthen the legitimacy of such decisions.  
 
 
In today’s democracies, laws are often shaped by interest groups without much public 
awareness or influence, which leads people to question the legitimacy of such laws.269 
One of the main aims of deliberative democratic theory is to strengthen the legitimacy 
ascribed to decision making bodies. But what exactly is legitimacy in this context?  
Political legitimacy has both a descriptive aspect and a normative aspect. The descriptive 
aspect deals with different beliefs held by people regarding the nature of political 
authority; the normative aspect refers to the justification behind the use of political 
power.270 Some scholars combine the two aspects into one account of political 
legitimacy. Beetham, for example, holds that ‘legitimacy is determined by whether 
power is acquired and exercised according to established rules which are justifiable by 
reference to shared beliefs’.271  
One should also differentiate between the general question which asks whether political 
authorities may be legitimate at all (and if yes, under what conditions), and the more 
particular questions regarding the legitimacy of specific regimes or specific decisions. 
Anarchists, for example, argue that all authorities are always illegitimate. But most 
political theorists assume that at least some authorities, sometimes, are legitimate and 
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produce legitimate orders.272 In this chapter, I discuss the normative aspect of 
legitimacy: when are political institutions, and the decisions taken by them, legitimate? 
At its core, legitimacy is closely related to concepts of justice and fairness and is based 
on an assumption that the ruling authority has a right to rule and enforce its decisions, 
and that it generally acts fairly and diligently.273 A popular position among democratic 
theorists is that a decision is legitimate only if all those who are going to be affected or 
coerced by the decision have the opportunity to take part in the process that leads to 
that decision.274 Theorists such as Rawls and Raz see legitimacy as the feature that 
provides the moral ground for the requirement to heed the decision making body and 
follow its orders.275 According to Rawls: 
[E]xercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only 
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials 
of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the 
light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and 
rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.276 
A lack of legitimacy therefore has moral implications, as only a legitimate authority is 
justified in coercing its subjects to comply with its directives.277 As Michelman notes: 
To call … a system legitimate is to say that moral justification exists 
to enforce whatever laws may issue from that system against 
everyone alike, including persons who may deeply, considerately, 
and reasonably disagree with the justice or the prudence of some of 
those laws.278 
Therefore, in the background of almost every political authority (such as a king or a 
democratic government) a constant debate will take place among the subjects of such 
authority regarding the legitimacy of the regime. This debate may refer to the very 
nature of the body taking the decisions (e.g., ‘this royal family has no right to rule us’) 
                                                     
272 See Richard e. Flathman, ‘Legitimacy’ in Robert E Goodin, Philip Pettit and Thomas W Pogge (eds), A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (John Wiley & Sons, 2012) 527, 528. 
273 See Ibid 527. 
274 See Song, ‘The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the 
State’, above n 12, 51. 
275 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986).  
276 Rawls, Political Liberalism, above n 17, 217. 
277 See Peter, above n 270 [3.1]. 
278 Frank Michelman, ‘Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy, and the Question of Judicial Review: A Comment’ 
(2004) 72(5) Fordham Law Review 1407. 
66 
 
or to specific decisions (e.g., ‘the government has no right to decide on this matter’). 
While in democratic societies this debate is more open and public (e.g., the opposition 
can claim publicly that the government has lost its legitimacy to rule, for various 
reasons), in undemocratic societies this debate will be more secretive. On a practical 
level, an authority that lacks legitimacy will have to work harder in order to mobilise its 
subjects to follow its orders and will need to expend more effort enforcing its 
decisions.279  
Ideally, a legitimate authority will conduct its affairs with maximum diligence (e.g., 
making sure that decisions are aimed to serve the people; that everyone has a chance 
to participate and express their opinions prior to the execution of the decisions; and that 
actions respect basic human rights). However, it must be kept in mind that legitimacy is 
merely an ideal, and we will judge a decision or a regime according to how close it is to 
this ideal, keeping in mind that rarely, if ever, will a decision or decision-making body be 
perfectly legitimate.280 As Parkinson explains: 
[T]o pursue perfect legitimacy is to pursue a chimera: there is no 
such beast as a perfectly legitimate decision, a perfectly legitimate 
institution, or a perfectly legitimate regime, because legitimacy's 
elements cannot all be present at once.281 
 
In order to capture what confers political legitimacy on a democratic institution, it is 
important to understand the division in general democratic theory between 
instrumental and non-instrumental justifications for democracy.  
Attaching an instrumental value to democracy means that we justify democracy 
consequentially, by reference to the outcomes produced by democracy compared to 
other methods of political decision making. The idea behind instrumentalism is that 
political legitimacy is dependent upon the results the political authority produces. That 
is, the outcomes of the decisions taken by the political authority help us to determine 
whether this regime is legitimate. Therefore, according to this view, legitimacy is not 
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(only) about the process by which decisions are being taken, but also concerns the 
content of these decisions. Legitimacy cannot be sustained if decisions do not fulfil 
substantive goals such as answering the needs of the people who are being affected by 
the decision as well as promoting a morally sound goal in general.282 According to Raz, 
an authority’s legitimacy will primarily turn upon the authority’s ability to promote 
values and goals that the subjects of this authority want and should achieve, but cannot 
achieve on their own.283 Others hold that more normative conditions should be satisfied 
in order for a legitimate authority to create political obligations.284 Democratic decision-
making procedures are therefore selected as the preferable means to achieve these 
goals.  
On the other hand, non-instrumental accounts of democracy place the normative 
weight on procedural values. They hold that democracy is justified intrinsically, by 
reference to the inherent qualities of a democratic decision making process. Therefore, 
a fair and democratic form of political organisation and decision making is one that 
provides political legitimacy, independent of the instrumental value of the decision (i.e., 
its content and outcome).285 In the next section I discuss how this division between 
instrumental and non-instrumental models of democracy is expressed specifically in the 
context of deliberative democratic theory.  
 
Like other useful theories, deliberative democracy contains many contested variations, 
articulations and definitions.286 For example, theorists differ as to whether consensus 
should be the purpose of deliberation or whether the purpose of deliberation is merely 
to clarify positions and understand each other’s points.287 However, all theorists agree 
that deliberative democracy is primarily an account of political legitimacy.288 Many 
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theorists of deliberative democracy argue that legitimate decisions are those that 
‘everyone can accept’ or at least ‘not reasonably reject’.289 But how should we 
determine if a certain decision is indeed a decision that cannot be reasonably rejected? 
The answer to this question varies to some degree among different theorists. Although 
the exact form of deliberation is open to debate and refinement, two main deliberative 
democratic principles are adequate information and fairness. Fairness regards the 
process of deliberation, while adequate information is designed to improve the quality 
of the decisions. Deliberative democrats therefore argue that deliberative democracy 
has epistemic as well as procedural advantages. 290  
As Levy puts it, ‘Deliberative democratic bodies potentially accommodate key values 
that are otherwise in conflict: majoritarian democratic legitimacy, on the one hand, and 
well-informed or ‘rational’ decision-making, on the other’.291  
i. Epistemic approach 
An epistemic advantage exists when people, who are provided with relevant and 
adequate information, genuinely deliberate and exchange reasons with each other. 
Participants in this process are learning and improving their knowledge and 
understanding of the subjects at hand, and therefore are more likely to arrive at a ‘good’ 
or ‘correct’ decision, that is, a decision that best answers the situation and satisfies the 
interests of the most people. ‘Correct’ decisions can answer questions of fact (e.g., what 
is the best way to achieve higher school grades?) but also questions of social morality 
(e.g., should we aim to achieve higher grades or focus on behaviour and values?).292  
The epistemic advantage of the many over the few was expressed by Aristotle in 
‘Politics’: ‘as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet furnished 
by a single man, so a multitude is better judge of many things than any individual’.293 
This idea is supported also by Condorcet’s theorem, which holds that if one member of 
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a panel is more likely to take a right decision, then the probability of taking the right 
decision increases the more members there are in the panel.294 The arguments of those 
theorists who emphasise the epistemic value of deliberative democracy echo the 
arguments of those who hold to an instrumental account of democracy. They contend 
that good deliberation will lead to ‘right’ decisions and therefore a deliberative process 
is more legitimate than other, less-deliberative processes.  
Nino, for example, adopts an epistemic account of deliberative democracy because he 
regards the transformation of interests and preferences as a key element in a 
democracy. He claims that this makes deliberative democracy superior to other 
democratic theories (such as utilitarianism, elitism, pluralism and consensualism), which 
accept differences of interests and leave them as found.295 Fishkin is another example 
of a deliberative democrat who is interested in the epistemic advantages of deliberative 
democracy. Fishkin is not concerned with reaching a consensus at the end of the 
deliberation process. He holds that the primary goal of deliberative democracy is to 
include different perspectives, and to produce better-informed citizens. Fishkin states 
that ‘consensus usually distorts judgments because of the social pressure that is 
involved’.296 He promotes deliberative polling, in which representative groups of citizens 
are presented with detailed information regarding the pros and cons of different 
choices, discuss the issues in small groups, and eventually fill survey questionnaires. 
Fishkin argues that this method applies a ‘scientific approach’ to debates about public 
issues, which can produce better informed citizens and improve the quality of the 
decisions.297 Haidt holds a similar position, albeit from an evolutionary psychology 
perspective. He claims that bringing together people who can argue civilly from different 
points of view will end up ‘producing good reasoning as an emergent property of the 
social system’.298 
                                                     
294 See Nino, above n 2, 127. 
295 Ibid 70. 
296 James Fishkin, Most People Are Rationally Ignorant (13 August 2012) The European <http://www. 
theeuropean-magazine.com/783-fishkin-james/784-deliberative-democracy>. 
297 See Ibid. 
298 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (Penguin 
Books Limited, 2012) 105. 
70 
 
Pointing out that a certain decision is ‘correct, ‘right’ or ‘good’ is not enough to impose 
it on others. Rationalisation and justification of a decision may be very important, but it 
is not a sufficient moral justification for requiring a person to follow a decision she does 
not agree with, at least if we respect people’s autonomy to decide on their own what is 
best for them.299  
ii. Procedural approach 
Many deliberative democrats therefore emphasise the procedural elements of 
deliberative democracy, echoing the arguments of those who hold a non-instrumental 
account of democracy.300 Proceduralists acknowledge that citizens often disagree about 
fundamental values and courses of action, so their main concern is to find a fair and 
rational way to deal with conflicting views between fellow citizens. A procedural view 
holds that what confers legitimacy on decisions in a deliberative democracy is the kind 
of process that leads to the final decision. While in other democratic models legitimacy 
is based on the process of election, namely the fact that the people express their will 
through a fair system of ‘one person, one vote’, deliberative democracy puts the source 
of legitimacy in the process that precedes the act of voting.301 
The key principle in this approach is that decisions should be taken as part of a fair 
deliberative procedure; there should be no limitations on the content of these 
decisions.302 More accurately, it is up to the people, or their representatives, to decide 
whether the content of a decision is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.303 A legitimate decision is one 
that has been taken as a result of a fair process of deliberation: a process that took place 
among equals who are respectful of each other, and an inclusive process in which all 
people affected by the decision had a chance to participate and express their 
opinions.304 
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iii. Substantive approach 
Some deliberative democrats stress the importance of observing certain substantive 
principles when engaging in a deliberative democratic process. These substantive 
principles relate to fundamental values that any decision must comply with in order to 
be considered legitimate, no matter how deliberative the process leading to this 
decision was. Such values may include, for example, equality and individual liberty.305 
To illustrate and clarify this difference between ‘procedural’, ‘epistemic’ and 
‘substantive’ accounts of deliberative democracy, one can evoke Pettit’s distinction 
between institutions that honour a certain value, giving it a deontological standing, from 
those that are meant to promote a value, applying a consequentialist approach. For 
example, honouring liberty and freedom of speech as a deontological constraint would 
sanction even extreme religious views, while promoting liberty would mean that we 
should care about the consequences of certain speech acts, and perhaps ban some 
extreme views that, if allowed, may result in less liberty overall.306 In this sense, 
procedural views can be seen as granting deliberation a deontological status, asking to 
‘honour’ deliberation by adhering to deliberative principles under any circumstances. 
Such an approach considers a decision that was taken in a fair process as legitimate, 
regardless of its content. Substantive or epistemic views on the other hand have a 
consequentialist dimension. They are more concerned with ‘good results’ and 
promoting deliberation in the long run, so that they might favour relaxing a few process 
standards during the course of deliberation, or imposing other requirements that may 
seem not to be deliberative, if they think such requirements are necessary in order to 
safeguard other principles they deem essential. For example, a decision that was taken 
in an adequate deliberative process (and is therefore legitimate according to a 
procedural account) may still be deemed illegitimate by a substantivist if it encroaches 
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too much on individual freedom; and it can be also considered illegitimate by an 
epistemicist who thinks that this decision is manifestly ‘wrong’. 
Another way to describe the division between the procedural account and the epistemic 
and substantive accounts is to say that proceduralists treat deliberative democracy as a 
second-order theory. They concern themselves mainly with the procedure by which 
decisions are to be taken, and less with the content of the decisions. According to this 
view, deliberative democratic theory does not prescribe a comprehensive ideology or 
moral system, but aims to provide a way of dealing with conflicting claims of first-order 
theories such as utilitarianism, libertarianism and egalitarianism. The decision that is 
eventually taken following a deliberative process may still be in accordance with any of 
these first-order theories.307 On the other hand, an epistemic account of deliberative 
democracy requires it to produce better decisions than other forms of decision making, 
while a substantive account requires that the final decision will comply with basic 
principles of freedom and equality. 
iv. Combined approaches 
Ultimately, most theorists treat deliberative democracy as a convergence among 
epistemic requirements, according to which decisions should be ‘right’ or ‘good’; 
substantive principles, such as gender equality; and procedural views that emphasise a 
fair and inclusive decision making procedure. Estlund, for example, introduces an 
account of ‘epistemic proceduralism’ that highlights the epistemic superiority of the 
democratic procedure.308 As Gutmann and Thompson note, ‘[t]he most compelling 
theories of deliberative democracy combine both substantive and procedural principles. 
They also both recognize that all democratic principles require substantive defence’.309 
This approach, also called ‘rational proceduralism’, holds that the legitimacy of 
democratic decisions relies on both procedural values and on the quality of the 
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outcomes that these deliberative decision making procedures generate.310 Habermas 
for example claims that deliberative decision making processes are especially capable of 
reaching superior epistemic decisions and therefore contribute to the creation of 
legitimacy: ‘[d]eliberative politics acquires its legitimating force from the discursive 
structure of an opinion and will-formation that can fulfil its socially integrative function 
only because citizens expect its results to have a reasonable quality’.311 
Chowcat presents a moral argument for including diverse opinions in deliberations. He 
explains that discussions that do not include minority viewpoints defeat the very reasons 
that drive us to adhere to democratic decisions in the first place: first, such discussions 
violate the moral obligation to consider the views of all those who are affected by the 
decision; second, the arguments that usually justify following a majority opinion are 
weakened when dissenting views are not adequately considered.312  
One can therefore say that, according to deliberative democratic theory, when certain 
views are not taken into account during the decision-making process the legitimacy of 
the decision is undermined. Deliberative democrats therefore suggest to promote 
legitimacy in two main ways: the first is to increase the number of people who 
participate in public deliberation; and the second is to improve the quality of 
deliberation among citizens (and legislators) so that they deliberate in a more rational 
way, with reasons that (almost) anyone can reasonably accept. It may seem at first blush 
that the first way is linked to a ‘procedural’ view; while the latter is affiliated with 
‘substantive’ or ‘epistemic’ principles. However, a more careful look reveals that both 
approaches improve procedural as well as epistemic goals of democratic deliberation.  
An ideal deliberative process will therefore provide legitimacy by promoting a mutually 
respectful process of decision making while providing relevant information and 
improving the quality of the decisions so that they are more likely to be ‘correct’. It is 
also important for a deliberative process to be flexible enough to correct mistakes.313 
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The fact that decisions can be re-considered and changed if necessary also improves the 
chances of arriving at a just and right decision. However, in real-life politics we would 
rarely succeed in realising all the objectives of such an ideal deliberative process.  
v. Summary 
In this section I discussed different deliberative democratic accounts: the ‘epistemic’ 
account, the ‘procedural’ account and the ‘substantive’ account. I showed that these 
different views resemble the division between instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist 
accounts of democracy. Identifying the differences among these accounts is important 
in order to understand why one deliberative democrat will value some deliberative 
principles more than other principles. One should remember, however, that these 
different approaches are not mutually exclusive, and indeed many deliberative 
democrats support and combine elements from all of the three different accounts.  
We can understand now why including diaspora people in deliberation processes in the 
kin-state may improve the legitimacy of the final decisions. From a procedural view, the 
process will be more legitimate if people who will be affected by a decision take part in 
the process of deliberation that precedes it. From an epistemic perspective, including a 
group that may add different considerations and viewpoints increases the chances that 
the ‘right’ decision will be taken. This is especially true in cases that have relevance to 
diaspora people and may affect their rights and obligations. These advantages will 
become even clearer in the next section, which will add an international law perspective 
to the discussion.  
 
This part enriches the discussion of legitimacy in deliberative democratic theory with 
insights from theories of legitimacy in international law. This analysis is relevant and 
useful for two reasons: first, when we talk about diasporas’ involvement in their kin-
states’ politics, a major theme in international law theory is invoked, namely, the 
involvement of international actors who operate outside the state but affect legal 
institutions in the state. Secondly, one of deliberative democratic theory’s main 
principles is to conduct deliberation and reach decisions in an environment which is as 
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free from coercion as possible.314 Similarly in international law, coercion is not usually a 
real threat. There is no central body that can consistently and effectively enforce 
decisions made by international law institutions.315 Neither the United Nations (‘UN’) 
nor any other international governance body has concrete coercive powers to enforce 
its decisions. Unlike law enforcement bodies in independent states, there is no 
‘international police force’ whose job is to ensure countries abide by international law. 
Therefore, the international legal system relies on constructed norms of compliance 
rather than coercion when requiring member states to follow, for example, UN 
resolutions. In such cases, enforcement relies heavily on voluntary compliance with 
accepted norms.316 Norms of compliance are constructed through rhetoric and social 
practices that produce mutual expectation and understanding between the relevant 
actors.317 Practices and repeated interactions among different actors help to produce 
norms that most actors choose to follow.318 In this model, enforcement depends on 
social norms rather than brute force and the level of compliance depends on the level 
of legitimacy of the body that produces the decisions.  
Deliberative democrats hope that something similar will happen in the local sphere 
when societies exercise ideal democratic deliberation processes. A key principle of 
deliberative democracy is that people will not surrender their positions due to the threat 
of sanctions, but rather because deliberation helped them to understand the merits of 
the other side, as well as the reasons behind choosing a certain course of action. As is 
                                                     
314 See above n 241 regarding the definition of ‘coercion’. 
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the case in international law, deliberative democrats hope to create a sense of 
legitimacy through mutual interactions and understanding rather the threat of force. 
Following a deliberative democratic process, people will respect the decision and 
comply with it even though they might disagree with it; they will do so out of respect for 
a social norm that is created due to the existence of a fair process that precedes the 
decision.  
The similarities between theories of deliberative democracy and international law 
becomes more apparent when one takes a closer look at how theorists of international 
law view legitimacy and the ways in which it can be constructed and sustained. When, 
for example, Franck discusses legitimacy in the context of international law and 
institutions, he defines legitimacy as ‘that attribute of a rule which conduces to the belief 
that it is fair because it was made and is applied in accordance with “right process”’.319 
In the same context, Franck opines that a legal system will be judged: 
[F]irst by the degree to which the rules satisfy the participants’ 
expectations of justifiable distribution of costs and benefits, and 
secondly to the extent to which the rules are made and applied in 
accordance with what the participants perceive as right process.320 
This reflects the substantive and procedural elements of deliberative democracy 
discussed earlier. The first criterion Franck mentions is substantive; it refers to the 
inherent justice of the decision, to the fact that the decision is in some way ‘right’. The 
second condition Franck mentions is a procedural element that regards the correctness 
of the process. Franck sees legitimacy as expressing a preference for systemic order by 
which rules are to be made, interpreted, and applied fairly. Rules that are not produced 
by a uniform process nor enforced equally will not enjoy legitimacy.321  
Brunnée and Toope also present an account of legitimacy in international law which 
resembles deliberative democratic ideas. They agree that legitimacy depends greatly on 
the perceived fairness of the system as well as the subjects’ expectations with respect 
                                                     
319 Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press, 1995) 26. For more 
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Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Book Review: The Power of Legitimacy among Nations’ (1992) 86(1) American 
Journal of International Law 175. 
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to each other: ‘[f]idelity to law depends upon the reciprocal fulfilment of duties’.322 One 
has little incentive to adhere to the law if she sees that others, who do not follow it, 
remain unpunished. Toope and Brunnée argue that ‘the distinctiveness of law lies not in 
form or in enforcement but in the creation and effects of legal obligation’.323 By ‘legal 
obligation’ they mean the continuing interactions between the actors, and the 
reciprocal expectations that are created as a result of these interactions: ‘law is created 
and maintained through interaction. It is interaction … that is the core of “legal” 
legitimacy’.324 Again, this way of seeing the law as being shaped through public 
engagement fits well with deliberative democratic ideas. Deliberative democrats argue 
that actors’ identities change through the process of deliberation and that deliberation 
shapes law: in the process of communicating and interacting with each other, social 
norms emerge in a way that helps to shape future interactions and public policies. 
Dryzek, for example, defines ‘discursive legitimacy’ as ‘being achieved when a collective 
decision is consistent with the constellation of discourses present in the public sphere, 
in the degree to which this constellation is subject to the reflective control of competent 
actors’.325 
Similarly, Toope and Brunnée use the term ‘communities of practice’ to refer to the 
different actors that emerge through the communal practice of legal norms in the 
context of international law. Such communities can include both state and non-state 
actors operating transnationally and affecting each other. Participation by a diversity of 
players in the creation of practices of legality is a major contributor to the conferral of 
legitimacy. They emphasise that interactions between players leads to behavioural 
change and observe that a legitimacy deficit results from limited participation in the 
process of norm building.326 
Indeed, deliberative democrats have tried to envisage how deliberative forums can help 
to create new norms in international law. Goodin, for example, suggests convening a set 
of global ‘citizens’ juries’, tasking them with setting new norms that hopefully will be 
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accepted and followed by international tribunals.327 Another suggestion is a 
‘transnational deliberative forum’ that will create deliberation groups from a randomly 
selected sample of citizens from different countries impacted by a particular cross-
border issue.328 
This connects us back to the role of diaspora communities in creating legitimacy in their 
kin-state institutions. The previous chapter discussed in detail the different methods 
used by diaspora communities to become involved in and influence political and social 
affairs in their kin-states. At the end of that chapter, I pointed to the moral problem that 
arises when diaspora people intervene in their kin-state politics: diaspora people are 
able to affect laws and policies that they are not directly subject to, as they live in 
different countries under different jurisdictions. Seeing diaspora and kin-state activities 
in light of international law accounts mentioned above can alleviate these difficulties. 
The international law perspective helps to explain why diaspora involvement 
contributes to the legitimacy of laws in the kin-state, as well as why it is practically 
valuable. First, such diasporic engagement can be viewed as part of norm-building that 
contributes to the legitimacy of the final decision. This is true especially in cases where 
diaspora interests are affected in one way or another by the decision.329 If diaspora 
communities are affected by some decisions taken by the kin-state, it is often fair that 
they participate in the shaping of these decisions. When diasporas participate in political 
processes (or in legal proceedings that affect political processes, as we shall see later in 
the case study chapter), the final decision and the institutions in which such 
engagements take place (e.g., the court, the parliament) become more legitimate, not 
less. Second, accommodating diaspora interests often serves the interests of the kin-
state. As discussed above, under international law states choose to comply with some 
decisions not because they are forced to do so but because of social norms and fear of 
possible countermeasures by other states (e.g., economic or cultural isolation).330 
Similarly, when diaspora communities disagree with kin-state policies, they have no real 
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threat of sanctions against the kin-state. However, kin-states usually cooperate and 
accommodate diaspora concerns because they want to continue to use diaspora 
communities for their own benefit. The kin-state attends to the concerns of the diaspora 
in order to maintain the diaspora’s economic, political and cultural support (or simply 
because members of the diaspora are seen as a legitimate part of the polity). As 
explained in the previous chapter, kin-states use and mobilise their diaspora 
communities in order to lobby host-state governments and gain political and economic 
benefits (e.g., Turkish, Jewish, Armenian, Arab and Kurdish advocacy groups active in 
the United States). It may be appropriate therefore for kin-states to consider and accept 
diasporic views in order to maintain their valuable support for the kin-state. 
 
E. How deliberation should be conducted 
Having covered the major themes of deliberative democracy, I now explore deliberative 
democratic theory in more detail. The different theoretical approaches to deliberative 
democracy presented lead to different opinions as to how a deliberative process should 
be conducted. For example: should all deliberation sessions be transparent and open to 
the general public or is it better sometimes to conduct deliberation behind closed 
doors? How should participants in a deliberative process justify their positions? Can any 
kind of argument be considered ‘deliberative’? I discuss these differences and argue that 
elite models of deliberative democracy are more applicable to divided societies and 
societies with large diaspora populations. Insights from this part will be relevant to 
chapter V which discusses the deliberative qualities of courts and explains why courts 
are potentially suitable venues for democratic deliberation, especially in divided 
societies with large diaspora populations. 
 
As explained earlier, any concept of deliberative democracy is based on an ideal of 
political justification that relies on the free exchange of public reasons among equally 
placed citizens.331 An ideal deliberation process involves the exchange of reasoned 
                                                     
331 Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, above n 309; Jürgen Habermas, 
‘Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism’ (1995) 
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arguments that everyone can reasonably accept. But what kinds of arguments and 
justifications can be regarded as valid ‘public reasons’ in a deliberative process? Certain 
types of rhetoric will be more conducive to democratic deliberation than others. One 
can find different views among deliberative democrats regarding the kinds of arguments 
that should be used during deliberation in order to achieve its objectives. These 
disagreements are reminiscent of the divisions discussed above between procedural 
and substantive views of deliberative democracy.332  
Previously the dominant view was that public deliberation should rest only on the 
standards of ‘reason’. That is, arguments need to be justified in a rational and logical 
way and be subject to ‘the authority of the better argument’.333 This view relied heavily 
on Habermas’ earlier work and his theory of ‘communicative action’.334 This theory’s 
underlying premise is that the capacity for rationality is inherent in humans’ use of 
language. Communicative action is a cooperative action, undertaken by two or more 
individuals who interact with each other and ‘mobilize their potential for rationality’ 
through agreed interpretations of the situation and the circumstances.335 In this way, 
communicative action is based upon mutual deliberation and argumentation.  
In recent times, this Habermasian model has lost some favour due to criticisms by 
scholars such as Steiner, who argues that ‘the power of the better argument’ does not 
really work in real life, as even in the most developed and mature democracies (let alone 
divided societies) political rivals rarely change their minds due to the exchange of 
reasoned arguments and admit that the other side has a valid point. Steiner suggests 
that this standard should be relaxed, and that one should be content if each side at least 
recognises that the other side also presents a reasonable argument.336 
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Reflections on these issues can be found among other theorists who have contributed 
to the formation of deliberative democratic theory. For example, Rawls’ account of 
‘public reason’ requires that citizens present their proposals and arguments in relation 
to the common good.337 Rawls offers a ‘reciprocity’ criterion, relying heavily on 
standards of ‘reasonableness’. According to this criterion, exercise of political power, 
both on the institutional level and on the particular legal level, is proper only when the 
reasons offered for the political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as 
a justification for those actions.338 Some theorists think for example that religious 
arguments should not be allowed in public deliberation as they are not accessible to 
participants who do not share such views or lack ‘religious feelings’.339 Others disagree: 
Habermas for example previously contended that religious arguments should be 
translated to secular political claims. However, he later changed his mind, admitting that 
this excludes religious people from arguing their position in a deliberative process.340 
Similarly, Nino argues that only ‘genuine’ arguments (not necessarily ‘valid’ ones) should 
be allowed in democratic debates.341 He enumerates eight conditions for ‘genuine 
discussion’. For example, arguments should not be mere expressions of wants; should 
take into account the interests of others; should be practical; should be normatively 
general and apply to all people in similar circumstances.342 
However, reference to shared beliefs and accepted norms does not necessarily preclude 
arguments that rely on self-interest. When large numbers of people are involved from 
different groups, conflicts among different interests become inevitable. Mansbridge et 
al. argue that differences related to self-interest are not only inevitable but should even 
be welcome in order to recognise and celebrate diversity: 
Ideally, participants in deliberation are engaged, with mutual 
respect, as free and equal citizens in a search for fair terms of 
cooperation. These terms can include the recognition and pursuit of 
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self-interest, including material self-interest, and some forms of 
negotiation, constrained by the deliberative democratic ideals of 
mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, mutual justification, the 
search for fairness, and the absence of coercive power.343 
One particular line of criticism views deliberative democracy as yet another form of 
constraint imposed by elites to maintain and promote their prerogatives. The 
requirements that arguments should be ‘rational’ and rely on ‘acceptable reasons’ is 
seen as under-inclusive, as it excludes other means of discourse and reasoning used by 
the under-privileged such as story-telling and personal narratives.344 For example, 
according to Habermas, democratic communication is incompatible with plain 
rhetoric.345 However, O’Neill argues that rhetoric can also be subjected to rational 
analysis and is sometimes necessary for persuading and reaching final decisions.346 Nino 
acknowledges that although the presence of emotional factors can interfere with 
democratic discussions, emotions also assist in the progress of a ‘genuine process of 
argumentation’.347 These kinds of differences led Dryzek to write in 2000 that he prefers 
the term ‘discursive democracy’ over ‘deliberative democracy’.348 For Dryzek, this was 
not just a question of terminology but a distinction between deliberation, which is calm, 
reasoned and can take place in the individual mind; and a more expansive discursive 
process, which involves inter-subjective interaction and can include ‘unruly and 
contentious communication from the margins’.349 Dryzek contends that all forms of 
communication should be admitted into discursive democracy, including storytelling, 
testimony and greeting, provided that they are non-coercive and ‘capable of connecting 
the particular to the general’.350 However, Dryzek also notes that some kinds of 
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communication, such as lies, threats and commands, are intrinsically anti-
deliberative.351  
Gutmann and Thompson make two important points regarding these critiques. First, 
they note that the assumption that disadvantaged groups are less reasonable is 
misleading and prejudiced; second, they argue that passionate rhetoric can ultimately 
lead to rational deliberation.352 Stories, for example, usually cannot be considered as 
rational arguments per se, but they can help to demonstrate the complexity of a 
situation. However, some empirical evidence suggests that although story telling is 
potentially beneficial for deliberation, it can sometimes inflame rather than quell 
tensions.353 According to O’Flynn: 
The fact remains that public policy cannot be based on stories. What 
is more, narrative may itself be a source of unjust exclusion, since, 
in the hand of manipulative ethnic elites, it can be used as a means 
of enforcing internal conformity.354 
Even if one accepts stories as a legitimate means of argument in the process of 
deliberation, there is no reason why these stories themselves should not be subject to 
criticism and repudiation. 
 
Transparency is also considered an important element in effective democratic 
deliberation. Most deliberative democrats (including many of those who favour elite-
deliberation models) require that the deliberative process be transparent and public.355 
When discussions are open to the public, people can more easily follow the different 
reasons and arguments presented by the participants. People can then reflect on these 
reasons and arrive at their own independent conclusions. This process of public and 
transparant deliberation is sometimes called ‘external deliberation’, as opposed to 
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‘internal deliberation’ done behind closed doors.356 Contrary to this view, some theorists 
contend that deliberation can (at least sometimes) benefit from secrecy, especially in 
particular stages.357 Some argue, for example, that high-quality deliberation, such as the 
kind that is required in constitutional deliberation, is only possible if deliberation is 
conducted in secrecy, away from the public eye.358 According to this view, secrecy is 
needed in order to reduce the effects of demagogues who appeal to popular but 
unfounded sentiments. 
When deciding whether to conduct deliberation in public or in secrecy, there are 
additional factors to consider. On one hand, the quality of deliberation behind closed 
doors is sometimes lower because actors may take ‘shortcuts’ when justifying their 
decisions if the process is not exposed to public scrutiny.359 For example, a politician can 
simply state her inclination, without feeling an obligation to actually explain her position 
and justify it to her fellow politicians. When deliberations are open to the public, a 
politician may feel a greater obligation to explain why she has taken her position. On the 
other hand, evidence shows that behind closed doors people tend to act in a more 
‘civilised’ way, that is, people are more respectful of other people’s opinions and are 
less reluctant to change their old views.360 Secrecy allows the participants to be 
persuaded by counter-arguments and to change their minds without the fear of being 
heavily criticised for inconsistency and betrayal by their group members.361 In public 
deliberative forums, even when an individual is actually persuaded by other speakers’ 
arguments, it is hard for her to admit it, because she then risks losing her credibility in 
the eyes of the viewers. Changing minds is also more common in what Fung classifies as 
‘cold’ deliberative settings, where participants are less partisan and the forum is 
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classified as unofficial or advisory.362 Mackie argues that it is true that people tend to 
‘stick to their guns’ and avoid admitting to changing their minds in deliberative forums, 
but there is a greater chance that they will admit to changing their views subsequently 
under different conditions and among different participants.363 
As I discuss below, publicity and transparency are even more complicated in divided 
societies. In such cases, secrecy might assist representatives from opposing groups to 
negotiate an inter-group settlement without having to worry at every turn about their 
constituents blaming them for treason and trying to hinder the intended compromises. 
However, if the secret negotiations prove successful and the parties reach an 
agreement, leaders of both sides will often find it hard to convince the hard-liners within 
their group to accept a done deal, in which they (the hard-liners) were not involved.364  
 
F. Popular versus elite models of deliberation 
In this part I explore the differences between ‘popular’ and ‘elite’ models of democratic 
deliberation. The distinction between the two models is particularly important as it sets 
the background for the following chapters, in which I argue that constitutional courts 
can act as effective democratic deliberation bodies and promote deliberative democracy 
in divided societies with diasporic populations. 
Deliberative democrats differ on the specific roles that should be given to ordinary 
citizens and governing elites in deliberation. There are two main approaches on this 
issue: the ‘popular’ model and the ‘elite’ model of democratic deliberation. The label 
‘popular’ is not due to its popularity among scholars, but because it is concerned with 
involving as many individuals as possible in deliberation processes. Popular variants of 
deliberative democracy emphasise inclusiveness and hold that it is crucial to include 
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directly all those who are affected by a political decision in a deliberative process before 
the decision is taken. This principle is designed to countervail the financial and 
administrative powers concentrated in the hands of governmental and other elites.365 
Supporters of popular models aim to combine participative methods with deliberative 
designs to allow as many ordinary people as possible to participate in deliberation, while 
improving the level of deliberation among the participating citizens. The more people 
are exposed to, and participate in, public debate, the more transparent the process 
becomes; there is less chance for elite manipulation; and the final decision is rendered 
more legitimate. From an epistemic perspective, supporters of the popular model refer 
to empirical evidence that confirms the ‘wisdom of crowds’ hypothesis, namely, that 
often a large group of ordinary people can make better judgments than a small group of 
more informed people.366 
However, one cannot deny the unavoidable trade-offs between ordinary citizens’ 
participation and system effectiveness.367 Time and resources are not unlimited. Actions 
ought to be taken under limited time constraints, and it is often not possible to delay a 
decision until each person has enjoyed ample time to examine the facts, argue and 
convince. It would be unrealistic to expect that every single person affected by a decision 
will actively participate in prior deliberative processes. This is why many scholars argue 
that truly deliberative politics requires some form of representation.368 
Elite variants of democratic deliberation therefore focus on improving the level of 
deliberation among groups such as legislators, government officials, parliamentary 
committees and the judiciary.369 In contrast to popular models, elite models of 
deliberative democracy see elites as both capable and responsible for transferring the 
often vague and unrefined demands of ordinary citizens into practicable policy and 
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law.370 I will elaborate more on elite models of democratic deliberation in chapter IV, 
where I argue that elite models are more suitable for divided societies with large 
diaspora populations. 
 
G. The approach adopted in this thesis 
The previous parts reviewed deliberative democracy’s main ideas and principles and the 
different approaches within it. Before discussing more particularly how diaspora 
communities fit within a deliberative democratic framework, I will first clarify my 
position in relation to the different principles and approaches within the theory of 
deliberative democracy.  
My approach to deliberative democracy is more traditional: I tend towards the classical 
‘deliberative’ approach rather than the ‘discursive’ one. I therefore favour substantive 
and epistemic accounts of deliberative democracy over procedural ones. Deliberative 
democracy faces legitimacy problems if the decisions it produces violate substantive 
principles of freedom and equality. Deliberative democratic theory loses much of its 
appeal if it does not aim to produce epistemically superior results. It can succeed in 
doing so only if the process of deliberation consists of an exchange of reasoned and 
rational arguments.  
The very nature of deliberative democracy is based on the assumption that reason-
giving has the capacity to change minds.371 One of the main aims of deliberation is to 
induce citizens to reconsider their convictions by exposing them to other people’s 
arguments and claims. We all have a moral obligation to reconsider our positions 
honestly when others challenge our views and beliefs. As Rousseau said, what 
characterises an individual who is a part of a civil state is that he needs to ‘consult [h]is 
reason before listening to his inclinations’.372 Chowcat also states that ‘our orientation 
towards others must be one of openness to dialogue’.373 This is, I think, the central point 
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of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democratic theory is more convincing when it 
advocates deliberation among rational agents who recognise each other’s equal status 
and are committed to a reciprocal standard of reason-giving. A permissive approach, 
which requires merely the free exchange of opinions and narratives without a 
commitment to seriously reconsidering one’s position and changing one’s mind if 
needed, is not a truly deliberative approach.374  
It would be hard to achieve the aims of deliberative democratic theory if we expanded 
the scope of deliberation and treated a wide range of speech activities, such as story 
telling and narrative exchanges, as valid instances of democratic deliberation.375 A 
deliberative democratic process should end in a vote in order to be collectively 
binding.376 Clearly, an engaged and lively ‘civil society’ has important positive impacts 
on public policy.377 However, as desirable and beneficial as these activities may be, they 
are not part of a decision making mechanism. As such, they belong to a much broader 
concept of political engagements that include a diverse toolbox of political activism and 
social interactions.378  
It should be stressed that advocating reason-based deliberation does not exclude 
minorities, women or the poor. True, if we establish that reason-based arguments 
should be the main way through which to conduct deliberation, then it naturally follows 
that this will undermine the ability of some individuals to participate. However I agree 
with Gutmann and Thompson’s argument that assuming disadvantaged groups to be 
less reasonable is misleading and prejudiced.379 There are many women and minorities’ 
representatives who can talk convincingly and present compelling rational arguments in 
support of their causes. In fact, progress in these causes has been achieved due to such 
representatives making good arguments that succeeded at changing people’s views.  
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If we want to reduce majoritarian biases and give equal respect to minority groups and 
to less popular opinions, the power of the good argument will serve us better. A more 
permissive approach or purely procedural approach will be insufficient to achieve such 
outcomes. Such approaches may simply empower the majority, or the wealthy who can 
influence public opinion through expensive media campaigns. 
The mere fact that one group has a majority in a given population at a given time is a 
kind of unfair bargaining power. The most effective and long-term solution to such a 
problem can only come in the form of free exchange of opinions and reasons, through 
which the minority can win minds and hearts among the majority. The appreciation of 
good argumentation over majority voting is widespread among deliberative democrats. 
Mansbridge et al. opine that: ‘[t]he more an issue involves basic rights and fundamental 
justice, the less ought it to be decided by votes conceived simply as the exercise of power 
in a field of competing wills’.380 Similarly, O’Flynn notes that: ‘[p]ublic deliberation 
privileges reasoning over bargaining or the strength of the better argument over the 
sheer force of numbers’.381 Hansen and Rostbøll state that: ‘[t]he point of deliberative 
democracy is to reform society to conditions that approximate the situation in which 
political decisions are the results of good arguments rather than bargaining power’.382  
 
H. Deliberative democracy and diasporas 
Having reviewed the main principles of deliberative democratic theory and explained 
my approach, I now focus on the relevance of deliberative democratic theory to divided 
societies and address specific challenges in applying deliberative democratic theory to 
societies with large diaspora populations. The prospects of deliberative democracy in 
divided societies have been discussed in the literature to a limited extent, but without 
express attention to diaspora populations. The involvement of diaspora communities in 
democratic deliberation in their kin-states is therefore an important but unexplored 
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area in deliberative democratic theory. This chapter addresses this gap and connects 
deliberative democracy with diaspora theory. 
In many cases, a divided society has an influential external diasporic population. 
Conflicts between members of different ethnicities or religions often create large 
diaspora communities as people either are coerced to leave the conflict area or leave 
voluntarily in search of a better life. Diaspora communities also tend to be involved in 
their kin-state conflicts. It is therefore important to discuss the particularities of 
deliberative democracy in divided societies in order to understand the additional 
challenges created by the involvement of large and influential diaspora communities. I 
start by reviewing literature on deliberative democracy in divided societies. I then 
elaborate on the further challenges posed to such societies by large diasporic 
populations. After reviewing the difficulties raised by such societies for deliberative 
democratic theory, I argue in the next chapter that elite models of deliberative 
democracy are better suited than popular models to promote deliberative democracy 
in such societies. 
 
Deliberative democracy theorists have been slow to address the challenges of 
deliberative democracy in divided societies.383 Those who have done so have not always 
been clear about the definition of a ‘divided society’ and how it differs from other 
polarised societies.384 When I speak about divided societies in this thesis, I do not refer 
merely to societies where the population features large and distinct ethnic or religious 
groups who sometimes compete with each other in the public sphere over the share of 
goods. I use the term ‘divided societies’ to refer to societies where such divisions 
sometimes manifest in violence, and where there are serious attempts by members of 
the different groups to see the groups disengage from each other.385 For example, 
according to such definition, Ireland and Israel would be divided societies, while Canada, 
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despite its division between the French speaking and the English-speaking parts, would 
not fall under this category. Adopting a broader definition would include too many 
societies, as almost all societies are divided in one way or another (e.g., Republican vs. 
Democrat, liberal vs. socialist, etc.).  
This definition also highlights the importance and involvement of diaspora communities. 
Violent conflicts tend to mobilise diaspora populations to intervene in the affairs of the 
kin-state, where their respective group in the kin-state is threatened by inside or outside 
forces. For example, the conflict in Sri Lanka drove both Sinhalese and Tamils in the 
diaspora to take part in propaganda and fundraising in support of their respective 
groups in the kin-state.386  
The obvious problem when dealing with democratic deliberation in divided societies is 
how to bring about genuine and effective deliberation among polarised and sometimes 
violently conflicting groups. Most scholars agree that deliberation is more difficult to 
achieve when the issue under discussion polarises the participants, or when participants 
themselves come to the table already polarised.387 As O’Leary puts it:  
Those who embrace a politics of deliberative democracy as the 
prescription for conflict need reminding that deliberation takes 
place in languages, dialects, accents, and ethnically toned voices 
and that it is not possible to create ‘ideal speech situations’.388 
While even in stable democracies deliberative democracy needs further specification in 
order make it a tangible option, in societies divided in terms of class, ethnicity, language 
and religion, the grounding efforts are even more daunting.389 Conducting deliberation 
under such conditions over contentious issues can in fact cause more division than 
mutual understanding and heightened distrust between the parties. Representatives of 
both groups may be fearful of ‘losing’ and will try to gain benefits at the expense of the 
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other group rather than looking for a compromise.390 Constitutional deliberations in 
post-conflict societies can sometimes inflame passions and spark violence (as happened, 
for example, in Iraq, Chad and the Solomon Islands).391 Empirical evidence suggests that 
dialogue in divided societies can exacerbate existing conflicts, reinforce opinions or 
decisions made prior to the exchange of information, and have other negative 
consequences.392 Moreover, divided societies are often societies where conflict erupts 
sporadically between conflicting groups. This creates another barrier to the 
achievement of effective deliberation: in times of crisis and conflict, each group may feel 
threatened and so it is easy to label those who wish to compromise with the other group 
as unpatriotic and illegitimate participants in public debate.393  
Due to these problems, some scholars simply hold that deliberation is impossible in 
divided societies. Gilley for example opines that in deeply divided states racked by 
mutual animosities ‘legitimacy is impossible’.394 Lijphart argues that consociational 
design is the only viable option in a society divided along ethnic lines.395 Dryzek notes 
that those who believe in Rawlsian schemes of reasonableness fail to sufficiently 
appreciate just how difficult it can be to make political decisions in deeply divided 
societies, especially when those decisions are attached to issues of identity and 
competition for a state’s resources.396 As Dryzek notes, granting autonomy to each 
group in a divided society is one of the defining features of consociational democracy as 
it is conducive to stability in divided societies. The problem, however, is that it provides 
no opportunity for members of different groups to communicate with one another.397 
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Certain important conditions that are required in order for deliberative democracy to 
function effectively are often lacking in divided societies. Dryzek, for example, outlines 
favourable and unfavourable conditions for effective deliberation. Favourable 
conditions for deliberation include literacy and education; a shared language; and a 
preferential voting system that allows the expression of support for more than one party 
or candidate. Unfavourable conditions include religious fundamentalism; ideological 
conformity; and segmental autonomy for different groups.398 Looking closely at these 
factors, one can understand why the prospects of deliberative democracy in many 
divided societies are not promising, especially with regard to popular deliberation. 
Democratic deliberation cannot be conducted effectively where illiberal values are 
prevalent and literacy rates are low. First, illiberal values tend to exclude certain groups, 
for example religious minorities, women and LGBTI people, from fully participating in 
the democratic process. Second, it is very difficult for a citizen who is unable to read to 
expand her knowledge and become exposed to different viewpoints. Deliberation is not 
effective if one is not able to adequately learn about the subject matter. Unfortunately, 
Illiteracy is still prevalent in some areas of the world, especially among women in 
developing countries.399 The problem in some divided societies is that both institutional 
change and cultural change are needed. This is especially true in societies with no 
previous experience in conducting politics according to democratic principles of liberty, 
justice and equality.400 While institutional changes may be easier to construct, cultural 
changes require much more time and effort.401 In such places, deliberation must begin 
with the inclusion and education of women and other groups that are subject to 
discrimination.402 As Habermas notes: ‘[i]t is precisely the deliberatively filtered political 
communications that depend on lifeworld resources - on a liberal political culture and 
an enlightened political socialization’.403 
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Some scholars, however, are more optimistic regarding the prospects of deliberation in 
divided societies. These scholars have described what deliberative democracy in divided 
society may look like and have identified some key principles and conditions for such a 
process to succeed.  
O’Flynn, for example, emphasises principles of ‘reciprocity and publicity’ as necessary 
for deliberation in divided societies. The principle of reciprocity requires people to hold 
an opinion in full consciousness of the fact that it is just one among many opinions, and 
to aspire to justify their opinions accordingly.404 Reciprocity calls for a set of institutional 
mechanisms that make each position on the political spectrum take account of every 
other.405 In a divided society, each group needs to discuss what rights they should hold 
to and what interests they can share. Similarly, Dryzek states that: ‘[i]n a context that 
features myriad identities, religions, ethnicities, and nationalities, a speaker’s rhetoric 
can try to appeal to the symbols valued by these groups to induce reflection on their 
part’.406 By the same token, when public deliberations are open and transparent, 
deliberating representatives need to show that they take seriously not just the interests 
of their own ethnic group, but also the interests of the society as a whole. A group 
cannot just turn to its own interests in order to justify its rights, but it must appeal to 
common principles that also apply to other groups. To insist that people should provide 
principled reasons for their proposals is not to ensure that some positions will triumph 
over others, but to give expression to individuals’ standing as political equals.407 This 
shift is fundamental to the formation of a common civic identity that is able to bridge 
ethnic divisions.408 Representatives of each group are required to present their reasons 
in a transparent manner so that ordinary citizens are able to judge whether they would 
have arrived at the same decisions by a similar process of reasoning; ‘publicity so 
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conceived is crucially important to the development of trust in a deeply divided 
society’.409 
O’Flynn also notes that in cases where there is a general acceptance of the need to bring 
a violent conflict to an end, principled arguments become highly important and ‘mutual 
acceptance of reasonableness’ is a central feature of any successful and enduring 
democratic transition: 
To be sure, most, if not all, peace agreements begin life as pragmatic 
bargains. However, if those bargains are to provide a platform for 
sustainable peace, they must reflect something more than mere 
mutual advantage. In particular, they must also reflect a 
commitment to basic principles. This is not simply because bargains 
of this sort are prone to instability as balances of power shift. It is 
also because peace agreements are binding on citizens in general 
and hence, if they are to be considered democratically legitimate, 
must be justified on terms that everyone can broadly accept.410 
O’Flynn highlights the 1998 Belfast Agreement as an example of a pragmatic bargain: 
‘Irish nationalists endorsed it because it held out the promise of achieving a united 
Ireland, whereas British unionists endorsed it because it held out the best opportunity 
of reconciling nationalists to the union’.411 The important element that gave the 
Agreement its legitimacy in the eyes of both ordinary citizens and the international 
community, O’Flynn argues, is the commitment to principles of self-determination, 
democratic equality, tolerance and mutual respect. 
O’Flynn outlines the factors necessary in order for conflicting groups to deliberate 
together, but he does not elaborate on how precisely to achieve this. While O’Flynn’s 
insights are valuable, it is not clear if and how such constructive conditions can be 
replicated. First of all, it took several decades to reach a peace agreement in Northern 
Ireland. Second, the United Kingdom has an established democratic tradition, something 
that is lacking in many conflict zones. Another distinguishing factor is that in the 
Northern Irish case, the conflicting sides spoke the same language and shared a similar 
culture, while in other divided societies, conflicting groups often lack these similarities.  
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Another approach to democratic deliberation in divided societies is offered by Kanra. He 
suggests that in divided societies, instead of treating deliberation mainly as a decision 
making procedure (as most deliberative democrats do), deliberative democracy should 
be conceived more broadly, as a tool for ‘social learning’. That is, deliberative democracy 
should be seen as a process in which an individual’s autonomy is shaped through 
continuous mutual interactions. Deliberation so conceived creates a learning process 
between its participants, so that different groups learn from and about each other when 
deliberating together on common public issues.412 When divided groups are not pressed 
to reach agreement, they feel more comfortable listening to each other, thus developing 
mutual understanding which will eventually lead to agreement. Kanra bases his account 
of deliberative democracy on Habermas’ communicative action theory,413 and on the 
latter’s emphasis on the process of learning through deliberation. Kanra then combines 
this with hermeneutic theory414 to offer a ‘binary deliberation model’ which separates 
the social learning phase from the decision making phase of deliberation. This 
distinction, he claims, is essential for deliberation in societies divided along ethnic, 
religious and cultural lines. Kanra argues that in divided societies it is most important to 
develop a ‘deliberative environment oriented to learning in which the primary role of 
dialogue is hermeneutic understanding’.415 Kanra believes that a failure to distinguish 
between the social learning and the decision making aspects of deliberation does not 
assist divided societies, as different ethnic and religious groups cannot reach agreement 
under a ‘Rawlsian framework’ of deliberative democracy. According to Kanra, the 
Rawlsian justification for a deliberative framework: 
overlooks the social learning aspect of deliberation … undermines 
the actual potential of informal deliberative practices oriented to 
understanding and social learning more than decision-making … is 
deprived of the benefits of a more reflexive and discursive 
deliberative practice, which continuously reconstructs itself through 
an open-ended, continuing communication process.416  
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Kanra believes that ‘Rawlsian deliberation’ might work under circumstances where a 
practical solution is sought, but not in cases where foundational doctrinal views are 
disputed.417 
A similar approach is offered by Addis, who argues that questions of identity, not 
resources or power, are keeping groups in divided societies separated. Addis therefore 
offers deliberative democracy as a solution because: ‘what has been imagined through 
stories and discourses can partly be reimagined through discourse as well’.418 Addis 
views deliberation as a process ‘through which the identities of the participants, not just 
the policies and institutions of the polity, are constructed and transformed’.419 
One problem with the approaches offered by Addis and Kanra is that their accounts of 
deliberative democracy significantly downplay deliberative democracy’s aim to provide 
a method that can be used to arrive at legitimate and binding political decisions. 
Adopting Addis and Kanra’s positions makes deliberative democracy seem more like a 
form of social engagement rather than a political tool that can help governments in real 
law-making. As mentioned, some major theorists of deliberative democracy hold that 
only binding decision making processes are part of deliberative democratic theory.420  
In addition to theories and conceptions, empirical findings are also crucially important 
in discussing the prospects of deliberative democracy in divided societies. Few empirical 
studies have examined deliberative democratic initiatives in divided societies. In this 
regard, Steiner’s book provides important empirical findings from actual deliberative 
forums conducted in several countries.421 Some of these public forums took place 
among divided societies in Colombia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the results were quite 
positive, with people showing a willingness to listen to the other side and to arrive at 
practical solutions to common problems. However, it is difficult to apply findings from 
these experiments to real, large-scale deliberative forums. In Israel, evaluations of 
deliberative processes between Jews and Arabs have been mixed. While such 
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interactions may ease tensions in daily interactions, they fail to advance and have real 
impact on policies.422 The main problem with many of the studies conducted on 
deliberative democratic initiatives in divided societies is that participants in these ‘mini-
public’ forums were not truly representative of their respective group, but rather 
volunteers. It is plausible that individuals who volunteer to take part in such experiments 
tend to be more moderate than the average person.423  
Deliberative democratic theory therefore faces considerable challenges in divided 
societies. As Tierney summarises it: 
Even deliberative democrats with a republican commitment to the 
feasibility of popular participation within a diverse community, such 
as Dryzek, recognize that deep-seated antagonisms within divided 
societies do pose a considerable epistemic challenge to republican 
deliberation. And indeed it is the case that the very possibility of 
cross-community deliberation in divided societies is a surprisingly 
underexplored area.424 
The more divided the society in the kin-state is, the more likely it will attract the 
involvement of its diaspora communities. I will therefore explore the special challenges 
to democratic theories raised when diaspora populations are involved in divided 
societies. 
 
Divided societies often go hand in hand with large diasporic populations. Places that 
have experienced conflict between different ethnicities or religions often create large 
diaspora communities - people tend to leave the conflict area either forcefully or in 
search of a better life. This was the case for example with the Bosnian diaspora.425 Also, 
so long as the conflict that forced them out of their kin-state is prominent in the 
diaspora’s collective memory, people in the diaspora will feel emotionaly connected to 
the kin-state and try to effect changes to policies there. 
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Generally, deliberative democratic literature discusses deliberation by and among 
citizens of a defined polity in a defined territory. As discussed above, it is questionable 
whether deliberative democracy can be applied to divided societies where deep ethnic 
and religious conflicts prevent the emergence of common civic identity necessary to 
conduct productive deliberation. This challenge is further complicated when considering 
divided societies with large diasporic populations. What if the society in question is not 
only divided in its territory, but the divisions extend beyond the country’s borders, 
through different diaspora communities? It is also harder to construct a common civic 
identity when significant parts of the population live overseas.  
Diaspora populations complicate the already complex problem of defining the relevant 
polity. The question of how to decide who constitutes the demos (and what authority 
should make this decision) is a longstanding problem in democratic theory, sometimes 
referred to as the ‘boundary problem’.426 Few nations are ethnically or religiously 
homogeneous. Defining the relevant polity in a heterogeneous society raises 
controversial questions. Before initiating an election campaign or a referendum, one 
first must settle the fundamental question of defining the relevant polity in order to 
determine who will be entitled to vote in the process:427 As Tierney notes: 
By even the most optimistic civic republican analysis, a 
constitutional referendum faces considerable, and in some cases 
perhaps insurmountable, challenges, in a divided society, since a 
constitutional referendum implies a pre-existing demos, the 
absence of which is precisely the dilemma of the divided society. 428 
These questions have immediate and practical implications for the participation of 
diaspora populations originating from conflict zones in elections or referendums in their 
kin-states. For example, if a kin-state plans to hold a constitutional referendum, it must 
decide whether diaspora people form a part of the relevant polity that should be 
consulted and involved in deliberations preceding such a referendum. In the case of 
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countries such as Israel, Armenia and Ireland, the number of people who live in the 
diaspora is larger than the number of people who live in the kin-state. This means that 
questions of how to define the relevant demos and the inclusion of diaspora 
communities become even more important.  
Deliberative democracy is based on citizens deliberating with each other on an equal 
basis and under fair terms. If we endorse such principles with a view to establishing a 
common civic identity that will transcend ethnic lines, then giving voice to ‘outsiders’ 
who are not involved in everyday life in the kin-state, and do not have to face the 
consequences of their actions, seems counterproductive.429 How can diaspora and kin-
state people provide each other with reasons that ‘everyone can reasonably accept’?  
In the cases of the Jewish and the Armenian diasporas, for example, diaspora 
communities existed for centuries before the modern state was established, and so 
some diaspora communities exert substantial pressure and influence over politics in 
their kin-states.430 These states may want to leave some issues to be decided only by 
the people living within their borders, but it is unlikely that they can avoid the 
involvement of their diaspora communities. Diaspora communities should be engaged 
and involved, as they constitute a significant part of the people (as both diaspora 
communities and most people in the kin-state see it). As discussed above, diaspora 
communities may also be affected by certain decisions of the kin-state.431 However, it is 
not clear how exactly diaspora people who are not citizens of the kin-state can be 
involved in democratic processes in the kin-state.  
As Addis notes: 
[D]espite the widespread recognition of the important role 
diasporas play in conflict perpetuation as well as conflict resolution 
in their homelands, there have been no serious attempts 
intellectually or institutionally to focus on how diasporas could be 
included in the process of constitutional settlement. It is an essential 
part of the constitutional settlement of severely fractured societies 
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that there are institutional mechanisms of including diasporas in the 
process.432 
Even if cross-border deliberations can be designed and facilitated, questions arise as to 
whether they will be effective. Some argue that only when deliberation is restricted to 
a particular territory does it develop into mature and fruitful deliberation, as only people 
who live together and face common problems on an everyday basis can find common 
ground in addressing practical issues. Others argue, however, that territorially bounded 
deliberation is less important in today’s age of communication and social media.433  
One thing that can bring together people from the diaspora and the kin-state to 
deliberate together is a deep sense of solidarity. Some level of a sense of solidarity 
among citizens is necessary for a deliberative democracy to function.434 It is a sense of 
solidarity between people who hold different views that can convince them to come 
together, reason with each other, understand the other side’s perspective and possibly 
change their minds. Solidarity may play a role in positioning diaspora people on an ‘equal 
basis’ with people who live in the territory, despite not being subject to the same 
rules.435 
Some countries have already implemented methods to involve their diaspora 
communities in constitutional deliberations. For example, Mexico held an election 
among its diaspora population in order to assemble an advisory council of 115 people 
that would give advice to the Mexican government on a wide range of issues.436  
In Israel, the Jewish People Policy Institute was founded in 2002 as an independent NGO 
that aims to ensure the thriving of the Jewish People by engaging in professional 
strategic thinking and planning on various issues concerning Israel and the Jewish 
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diaspora.437 However, this body is merely a think tank that provides advice and 
recommendations. Surveys show that Israeli attitudes towards the involvement of 
diaspora Jews in Israeli politics are mixed. A 2012 poll showed that Israelis are in favour 
of founding an institution that will better represent diaspora issues in Israel: 56% of 
respondents were in support of creating a ‘Jewish Parliament’ that would represent 
diaspora Jews. Eighteen percent would give the body the right to propose legislation to 
the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament), 25% would give it mandatory consultative status, 
and 40% would give this body only voluntary consultative status.438 However, more 
oppose formal representation in the Knesset, with 63% opposing diaspora Jews electing 
‘a few’ Knesset Members to represent their interest and 49% opposed to establishing a 
mechanism that would require the Knesset to debate issues relevant to diaspora Jews. 
Interestingly, Israelis also strongly oppose enabling Israeli citizens living outside Israel to 
vote in Israeli elections.439 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the challenges facing deliberative democracy in divided 
societies, and in particular divided societies with large and influential diaspora 
populations. Despite some small-scale efforts,440 it is still largely the case that 
deliberation in divided societies is difficult and has not been established as a realistic 
and effective tool to overcome deep religious and ethnic divisions. In an attempt to 
address these difficulties faced by deliberative democratic theory, some deliberative 
democrats take a broader view of deliberative democracy and describe it as a 
constructive mechanism that can assist with facilitating social engagements in divided 
societies. However, such approaches neglect an important function of deliberative 
democracy – the ability to produce binding decisions.441  
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It is no surprise then that the few discussions about deliberative democracy in deeply 
divided societies have focused on enhancing deliberation among political elites.442 As 
Maddison notes: ‘for many divided societies, deliberation remains out of reach in all but 
the most elite and structured contexts’.443 In the next chapter I suggest that in cases 
where popular democratic deliberation is neither feasible nor desirable, elite 
democratic deliberation models play a more constructive role. I explain in detail how 
constitutional courts in particular can function as effective elite deliberation bodies that 
can embody deliberative democratic ideals and promote deliberative democracy in the 
society as a whole. More specifically, I explain how constitutional courts can serve 
deliberative democratic ideals by successfully involving diaspora representatives in 
binding constitutional deliberations. 
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IV. Elites, democracy and deliberation 
 
In previous chapters I examined different approaches taken by deliberative democracy 
scholars. As discussed, many scholars believe that deliberation should be inclusive and 
involve as many citizens and diverse opinions as possible. I also explained why popular 
deliberation among ordinary citizens is sometimes unrealistic and even undesirable, 
especially in divided societies.444 This, I concluded, should lead us in some cases to 
consider and encourage elite deliberation by public representatives rather than by the 
masses. The following chapters constitute an original contribution to the theory of 
deliberative democracy. In this chapter I elaborate on elite models of deliberative 
democracy and explain how in certain circumstances it is elites who can initiate and 
engage in effective democratic deliberation, which ultimately promotes deliberation 
among the general public. The next chapters explain how constitutional courts in 
particular are able to fulfil this function, by considering the interests of diaspora people 
and involving diaspora representatives in their deliberations. I first discuss the important 
role played by elites in promoting democracy in general. I then move on to discuss 
specifically how elites may contribute to the promotion of deliberative democracy, 
especially in divided societies.  
 
A. Elites and democracy 
In some longstanding, stable democratic societies, effective popular deliberation may 
be possible. However, as explained in the previous chapter, there are good reasons to 
believe that popular deliberation may be impractical in cases of divided societies. 
Countries that are divided along ethnic or religious lines, and especially those with 
diaspora populations abroad, often suffer from other circumstances that are 
unfavourable to deliberation, such as violence, political instability and religious tensions. 
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The challenges posed to accounts of popular deliberation in divided societies have led 
some scholars to stress the importance of elite modes of deliberation by public 
representatives.445  
The challenges deliberative democracy faces in divided societies derive from a more 
general problem: the problem of installing a fully-fledged democratic system in societies 
that are still recovering from years of conflict or despotism. In addressing this problem, 
one has to consider the crucial role of elites in promoting democracy in divided societies. 
I will therefore start this chapter by pointing out the positive role that can be played by 
local elites in establishing and maintaining democracy in divided societies. 
Understanding the role of elites in promoting democracy will also help to explain their 
role in promoting a deliberative democracy.  
An elite (French for ‘the chosen’) is a potent minority, whose power exceeds its relative 
size.446 In ancient times these elites included, for example, kings and aristocrats. In 
modern democracies, politicians, the judiciary, academics, media and business moguls 
are all examples of elite groups who exercise power and influence over the lives of 
ordinary people.  
From Ancient Greece through Medieval times and until today, scholars have regarded 
ruling elites as ‘good guardians’: that is, privileged agents who are more capable of 
attending to the people’s interests than the people themselves.447 The scepticism about 
ordinary people’s ability to participate in the deliberative processes echoes the 
traditional view of an ‘elitist democracy’ that was forcefully articulated by Joseph 
Schumpeter during the 1950s.448 Schumpeter viewed democracy as a ‘competitive 
struggle for the people's vote’.449 According to his view, in a democracy elite groups 
compete for people’s votes, with the winning elite being granted a mandate to rule for 
a limited period of time. If the public is happy with the current ruling elite, it re-elects 
that elite. If the public is not satisfied, it elects a different elite. The public’s influence is 
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thus limited to choosing the ruling elite by voting for its representatives every few years. 
This is not merely a descriptive account of democracy, but also a normative one: this 
account holds that governance and law making duties should be left to the elites 
because ordinary people are not qualified to carry them out properly.450  
Though the Schumpeterian view is less popular today, many scholars still highlight the 
important role played by elites in facilitating a transition to democracy in undemocratic 
countries as well as sustaining democracy in democratic countries. Higley, for example, 
argues that long-lasting democratic regimes usually develop as a result of dominant elite 
classes who initiate and support them. Higley laments the failure of Western political 
thought to recognise the elite basis of any stable and liberal democratic political system: 
Western political thought has generally failed to recognize the elite 
basis of democracy. Instead, it has naïvely urged democratic 
suffrage, free and fair elections, respect for personal liberties, and 
democratic constitutions on all countries of the world, most of 
which have deeply disunited elites that are engaged in dog-eat-dog 
political struggles. Much too blithely, in other words, Western 
thought has assumed that simply by adopting such measures 
countries will move from unstable and illiberal regimes to stable and 
liberal democracies. In particular, assiduous ‘democracy promotion’ 
efforts have tended to persuade policymakers in the United States 
and other Western countries that instituting competitive elections 
where they do not now occur is a relatively sure route to 
democracy.451 
Many examples from the last few decades support Higley’s point. The fall of communism 
allowed for free elections to be held in many former USSR countries, but holding free 
and democratic elections did not lead countries like Russia, Georgia and Ukraine to 
develop liberal democratic societies similar to Western democracies. Similarly, hopes 
that the Arab Spring would result in the establishment of democracies in the Middle East 
proved premature. For example, the first free parliamentary and presidential elections 
held in Egypt in 2011 and 2012 eventually led the country to turn back to dictatorial 
military rule. Similarly, the first free and democratic elections held in Gaza in 2006 were 
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also the last democratic elections to be held in Gaza to date, after the Hamas party won 
the election and took power. There are also more positive experiences, such as Tunisia 
and former communist countries such as Poland and Hungary, which managed to 
establish largely democratic societies soon after overthrowing former undemocratic 
regimes.452 But these examples only demonstrate that merely conducting a free and 
democratic election process is not enough to transform a society into a democratic one. 
Other factors must be responsible for the fact that some societies transform more 
smoothly into democratic societies than others. In particular, the role of local elites in 
such societies should not be underestimated.  
This is especially relevant in cases of divided societies or societies with large diaspora 
populations. Steen and Kuklys argue that in so-called ‘ethnic democracies’, where 
democracy legitimates the domination of indigenous majorities over ethnically distinct 
minorities, democratic elitism facilitates the co-option of minority leaders better than 
other, more participatory forms of democracy.453 Steen and Kuklys provide examples 
from Estonia and Latvia, where, similar to other newly independent countries in the 
post-Soviet era, the re-creation of a national identity has led majority leaders to portray 
ethnic minorities as disloyal and as endangering political stability. Both countries aimed 
in their early years of independence to segregate and repatriate Russian speaking 
minorities. Estonian and Latvian nationalists argued that after decades of what 
amounted in their eyes to ‘cultural genocide’ under Soviet rule, they had a right to 
protect their cultural heritages as Estonians and Latvians, respectively, from Russian 
influence. When these attempts to create a more homogeneous society proved 
unsuccessful, both countries attempted to reinforce a purer form of national identity by 
adopting restrictive citizenship laws. However, both countries fell under pressure from 
international organisations and eventually, the desire to join the European Union and 
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NATO led political elites in those countries to pursue less restrictive boundaries of 
citizenship, despite popular nationalistic views.454  
Based on empirical data, including interviews with Estonian and Latvian politicians and 
public servants, Steen and Kuklys suggest that: 
Instead of brusquely excluding minorities, thus raising human rights 
issues and international opprobrium, and instead of granting 
minorities full citizenship, thus aggravating majority fears, a middle 
or ‘third way’ is open to elites. This consists of socializing and co-
opting leaders of minority communities into power positions, in 
effect opening the practices and processes of democratic elitism to 
selected minority leaders.455 
Estonia and Latvia therefore provide an example of the constructive role elites can play 
in the inclusion of minorities in a divided society.  
Landau is another scholar who discounts the role of popular participation in 
democratisation processes. He argues that in some cases, popular participation in 
constitution making may hinder rather than help the constitutional process.456 Landau 
discusses examples of constitution making in Bolivia and Venezuela, where ‘[h]igh levels 
of civil society participation did not prevent the constitution from being used to impose 
a competitive, authoritarian regime’.457  
Another theory which recognises the vital role of elites in establishing democracy in 
divided societies is Lijphart’s ‘consociationalism’. This is a model of democracy that is 
designed to work even in societies that are deeply divided according to ethnic, religious, 
or linguistic lines. Lijphart’s model of ‘consociational democracy’ is based on the 
cooperation of elites from different groups through consociational structures (that is, 
power sharing structures). In such regimes, each group enjoys wide-ranging autonomy 
at the local level while state level institutions include representatives from different 
groups who share the power between them.458 These mechanisms are supposed to 
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create stable democratic regimes in divided societies. However, while such mechanisms 
worked in Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, they were less successful 
in countries such as Lebanon and Iraq.459  
In this part I have addressed the positive role elites can play in societies that are in the 
process of developing democratic institutions. But how do these general problems of 
democratisation relate specifically to deliberative democratic theory? I will elaborate on 
this in the next part.  
 
B. Elite models of deliberative democracy 
If, in some societies, elites play an important role in introducing and sustaining 
democratic practices, then elites can play a similar role in instituting deliberative 
democratic practices. In contrast to popular models, elite models of deliberative 
democracy focus on fostering deliberation among elite decision making bodies, such as 
the legislature and the judiciary. In societies where popular democratic deliberation is 
not practicable, elite deliberation can prove to be useful and promote popular 
deliberation in the long-run. 
In the previous chapter I outlined the limitations of popular models of deliberation. One 
key limitation is the amount of time and extent of resources that can be practically 
invested in bringing together ordinary people to deliberate effectively. When discussing 
elite versus popular deliberation we should also keep in mind the advantages of 
deliberating in small groups. Deliberation in small groups of people is easier and more 
productive than deliberation in large groups. As a group gets larger we can expect a 
lower quality of deliberation among participants, with deliberations taking a more 
conversational character and rhetoric winning over reasoned arguments.460 This is 
especially true in decision making processes that have specific deadlines. If we want the 
deliberative process to produce a final binding decision under time constraints, then a 
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small and experienced group of professional deliberators will be more able to achieve 
this than a large group of ordinary citizens.461  
Another criticism raised against the popular view of deliberation is that most ordinary 
people cannot be expected to effectively participate in public deliberation, as they are 
often ignorant of the subject matter and do not have enough time or resources to invest 
in studying the subject in depth. Elites, on the other hand, are more likely to have access 
to such resources and so are better positioned to exercise effective deliberation.462 This 
is part of the reason why democracies tend to adopt democratic models based on 
professional representative bodies rather than direct democracy. As Habermas notes, 
discourses and civilian groups, however desirable, cannot ultimately make decisions and 
so this important function is left to be executed by bureaucrats.463 
Some scholars dispute other basic premises of popular deliberative endeavours, arguing 
that many ordinary people are not necessarily incapable of effective deliberation, but 
simply uninterested in participative politics. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, for example, 
challenge the assumption that most people would want to participate in deliberations 
regarding public policy, referring to this assumption as an ‘elite interpretation of popular 
desires’.464 Based on results from surveys and focus groups across the United States, 
they argue that most citizens do not wish to be more engaged in politics, but rather 
prefer experts and professionals to act on their behalf in a ‘stealth democracy’ where 
input from lay people is limited to the occasional ballot or referendum.465 Scholars admit 
that representational political bodies are unavoidable, as ordinary people often lack 
time, expertise and power to get personally involved.466 Similarly, Cutler et al note that 
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‘populists’ who tend to oppose deliberation by elite bodies tend to be ‘less well 
educated, less well off, less attentive to politics, and more risk averse’.467   
That does not mean that people necessarily trust ruling elites. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
agree that there is great dissatisfaction with how politics is being conducted and that 
people often perceive elites as serving powerful interest groups rather than the interests 
of the general population. However, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue that rather than 
seeking more political influence for themselves, people want politicians to stop misusing 
their privileges, and promote the interests of the general public rather than yielding to 
pressure by lobbyists.468 For example, according to one survey, 62% of Americans agreed 
that their ‘basic governmental structures are the best in the world and should not be 
changed in a major fashion’.469 Other surveys suggest that although ballot initiatives and 
referenda enjoyed large popular support, initiatives of a more participatory nature were 
less popular. For example, when faced with opportunities to exercise direct democracy 
in the United States in a more ‘concerted and regularized fashion than the occasional 
ballot proposition’, focus groups ‘did not relish the prospects of being responsible for 
following and voting on all issues, and they had little faith that their fellow Americans 
could handle the task, either’.470 Interestingly, 65% of all respondents agreed that 
‘people just don’t have enough time or knowledge to make decisions about important 
political issues’.471  
Recent data regarding popular participation in European referendums support the 
conclusions of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse. While Europe is seeing an increase in 
referendums, the median turnout for nationwide referendums in European countries is 
declining, falling to below 45%.472 This is not only due to lack of time and knowledge. 
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People who participated in the surveys conducted by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse actually 
questioned the public’s intelligence and its ability to get deeply involved in politics; they 
also raised concerns regarding people’s motivations, claiming that many ordinary people 
are self-interested and narrow-minded.473 The barrage of public demonstrations and op-
eds critical of the Brexit vote demonstrate just how widespread is the general distrust 
of ordinary people’s ability to decide on major issues.474 
Some scholars argue however that concerns over the abilities of ordinary people to 
deliberative effectively are overstated. Levy, for example, argues that various methods 
of ‘deliberative voting’ can mitigate concerns regarding voters’ ignorance. For example, 
electronic voting can require a voter’s engagement with information tutorials before 
casting his or her vote.475 
Given the pitfalls of popular approaches to democratic deliberation, some theorists 
choose to emphasise the importance of ‘elite deliberation’ among judges and legislative 
assemblies over more popular and egalitarian approaches to deliberation.476 Even 
theorists who support popular models of democratic deliberation acknowledge the 
importance of elite models of democratic deliberation.477 
John Rawls, for example, emphasises that public reason should be exercised by judges, 
government officials, and candidates for public office who have to decide on matters of 
constitutional essentials and basic justice.478 Rawls explains that the ideal of public 
reason is realised differently by elites and citizens. It is realised by judges, politicians and 
candidates for public offices when they ‘explain to other citizens their reasons for 
supporting fundamental political questions in terms of the political conception of justice 
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that they regard as the most reasonable’.479 Ordinary citizens, on the other hand, realise 
the ideal of public reason by thinking of themselves as if they were in the shoes of these 
elites, and holding these elites accountable in the ballots.480 
 
C. A nuanced view of elite deliberation 
Many scholars highlight the limitations of elite democratic deliberation models. Levy, 
for example, examines a survey of attitudes and prejudices among constitutional elites 
in Australia and concludes that elites are ‘potentially disruptive to the aspirations of 
deliberative constitutionalists’.481  
Even those who believe that governing elites should deliberate over and shape general 
laws may argue that particular issues should only be decided by the public and not by 
public representatives. For example, constitutional issues that involve value or moral 
judgements (such as abortion rights or same-sex marriage) are not the kind of ordinary 
lawmaking that can be entrusted with elites.482 
Another main criticism of elite deliberation is that even if one acknowledges that it is 
superior to popular deliberation from a purely deliberative perspective, it still is not 
democratic. Elites may engage in better quality deliberations, for all the reasons 
discussed above, but can such deliberations be called ‘democratic deliberations’ if only 
a small number of people are able to participate in the deliberative process? 
It is important to note from the outset that the two deliberative democratic models – 
the elite and the popular - are not mutually exclusive and in fact can be combined in 
several ways. Habermas, for example, emphasises in his deliberative democratic theory 
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the role of the general public as well as that of existing representative institutions. He 
envisages deliberation as a ‘two-track’ model, where elites and ordinary citizens play 
complementary roles: ordinary citizens express opinions and deliberate over general 
values in the public sphere while elites follow up and put these opinions into law within 
formal bodies of decision making.483 Elite deliberative bodies therefore should not be 
seen as a threat to popular deliberation, but rather as complementary and necessary 
part of a whole viable deliberative democratic system.484 As Mansbridge et al. explain, 
a ‘deliberative system’ is one where ‘the entire burden of decision making and 
legitimacy does not fall on one forum or institution but is distributed among different 
components in different cases’.485 In such a system, a division of labour among different 
parts operates so that decisions are taken ‘in the context of a variety of deliberative 
venues and institutions, interacting together to produce a healthy deliberative 
system’.486 
Elite representative bodies should not be seen therefore as anathema to deliberative 
democracy but rather as a crucial part of it. Delegating public issues to be decided by 
professional representatives is potentially consistent with deliberative democratic 
ideals. According to Madison in the Federalist papers, elites, in the form of a senate,  
refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the 
medium of a chosen body of citizens … . [I]t may well happen that 
the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, 
will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by 
the people themselves.487  
Much more recently, Urbinati notes that a ‘deliberative form of politics favours 
representation’. She updates J.S. Mill to provide a representational deliberative 
democratic model in which legislators function as ‘advocates’ who deliberate and 
exchange reasons passionately.488 Urbinati argues that representational deliberative 
democracy benefits citizens in many respects and has both instrumental and intrinsic 
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value. It has instrumental value in that it enables people to engage in activities outside 
of political deliberation. But representation also has intrinsic value in that it gives people 
a chance to ‘step back from factual immediacy and to defer their judgment ... [It] enables 
critical scrutiny while shielding the citizens from the harassment of words and passions 
that politics engenders’.489  
Other than the obvious example of parliaments, other representative bodies are often 
established to decide issues of public policy. For example, many parliaments have 
designated committees that are responsible for overseeing specific issues such as 
foreign affairs, economics, transport, environmental or health issues. The European 
Parliament, for example, has 22 standing committees and other subcommittees and 
special committees to assist the European Commission in implementing European 
legislation.490 This practice is aimed at enhancing the quality of deliberation and 
producing more informed policy-making.491 Again, this process is justified by the 
argument that certain issues might be dealt with more rationally if detached from 
electoral considerations and handed over to experts who can deliberate these issues 
behind closed doors.492 Though this process is elite-driven, it is nevertheless deliberately 
designed to allow for intra-elite deliberation, consensus and compromise among 
different elite-groups at the national level.493  
When discussing popular versus elite models of democratic deliberation, it should also 
be noted that deliberative democracy does not necessarily require the active 
participation of every citizen, on every matter. As discussed above, it is often not feasible 
to engage large groups of people in effective and productive deliberation. A deliberative 
democratic initiative can only involve a limited number of people. The number of people 
affected by a decision will always be higher than the number of people who can actually 
take part in the deliberative process. We should therefore choose deliberators carefully, 
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making sure that they are able to engage in high-quality deliberation, consider different 
opinions and adhere to fair procedures.494 
Even citizens’ assemblies, after all, are just another form of representation, in this case 
based on random selection.495 In a sense, the participants of a citizens’ assembly become 
part of an elite group, as other members of the public are excluded from this assembly 
and are not able to influence its decisions. Moreover, as citizens’ assemblies are brought 
into existence by elites, they can be manipulated by elites, for example through 
guidance by the moderators as well as other design choices.496  
Just as elite bodies are not necessarily anti-democratic, large groups of ordinary citizens 
are not necessarily democratic, especially if we adopt some epistemic and substantive 
elements in our conception of democracy. For example, if a citizens’ assembly fails to 
consider all points of view or to safeguard basic human rights, then it loses much of its 
democratic legitimacy. I endorse the view that in order for governance to be 
‘democratic’, what is important is that a variety of positions and views held by different 
groups in society are discussed and addressed by the relevant representatives in their 
deliberations over a specific matter. This process should also be conducted in a 
transparent manner, as legitimacy is created when people who are unable to participate 
in the deliberative process can follow it and understand why the deliberative body 
arrived at a specific decision. As Steiner and Goodin each contend, deliberation does not 
necessarily have to involve an exchange of arguments between two (or more) people, 
but can also take place within oneself, away from social scrutiny, as an inward reflection 
on different arguments.497 This is why it is so important for deliberative sessions to be 
open and for the associated relevant material (such as transcripts, briefings etc.) to be 
available to the general public. In so doing, people who cannot attend the deliberative 
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sessions or follow them in real-time can examine the different arguments presented in 
the sessions at their own convenience.  
It is important however to ensure that different groups are adequately represented in 
the deliberative body, in order to increase the epistemic advantages of democratic 
deliberation. As Sunstein notes:  
A system of deliberation is likely to work well if it includes diverse 
people – that is if it has a degree of diversity in terms of approaches, 
information and positions. Cognitive diversity is crucial to the 
success of deliberative democracy … ’.498 
 Especially in cases of divided societies, diverse bodies help to create legitimacy, as a 
body that includes only members of a certain group is less likely to be seen as legitimate 
by members of the under-represented group.  
This leads us to consider the nature and composition of elite bodies themselves. 
Members of an elite class or group need not, and often do not, all belong to a particular 
ethnic or religious group. A body that contains members from multiple identity groups 
can still represent or reflect the different groups even though it is an elite body. In a 
proportional representation election system (for example, in Israel, Belgium, Germany 
and many other European countries), although members of parliament can be said to 
belong to an ‘elite’ group, they may effectively represent different groups in a society. 
Representational bodies can also sometimes include members of diaspora groups, as 
discussed above.499  
When each group is able to elect a person they deem as ‘their own’ to the parliament, 
the result is a diverse parliament, which is arguably more representative than a group 
of citizens in a citizens’ assembly, who are selected according to statistical methods. 
Both processes may be subject to manipulation. For example, the composition of a 
citizens’ assembly can be manipulated by those who control the selection process500 and 
parliamentary elections through gerrymandering. What is important, however, is that a 
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deliberative representational body has a diverse representation of ideas rather than just 
identities.  
 
D. Summary 
In this part I have discussed the advantages of elite deliberation over popular 
deliberation. My aim was not to dismiss popular deliberation altogether. Popular 
initiatives of deliberative democracy, such as citizens’ assemblies and deliberative 
polling, can be useful and effective. However, the effectiveness of any deliberative 
approach depends on the specific circumstances. In divided societies or societies 
undergoing democratisation processes, there may be valid reasons to prefer elite 
deliberation by a small group of experts or representatives over popular deliberation by 
lay people.  
It is also important to note that a tension between deliberative ideals and the praxis of 
deliberation will always exist: democracy cannot and should not consist only of 
deliberation, but rather deliberation should play an important role.501 Both normative 
principles and empirical constraints must be taken into account. As Goodin, Pettit and 
Pogge note: ‘what can feasibly be achieved in a certain area is just as central to 
normative concerns as questions about what is desirable in that area’.502 As Landau 
argues ‘constitution-making should often be dominated by a risk-averse calculation: 
domestic and international policymakers should focus on avoiding a worst-case 
outcome, rather than trying to reach an idealized first-best world of transformative, 
deliberative democracy’.503  
In the next part I discuss the deliberative qualities of constitutional courts which can 
make them effective elite deliberation bodies. I will explain how some constitutional 
courts are able to engage with the different segments of the community, including 
diaspora groups, and encourage deliberation among the greater public. I conclude that 
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in divided societies with large diasporic populations, where popular deliberation is 
difficult to achieve, judiciaries can potentially function as effective deliberative 
democratic bodies. 
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V. Courts as deliberative democratic bodies 
 
If we are looking for informed, trained deliberators who exchange carefully reasoned 
arguments in a non-coercive environment, then courts, especially constitutional courts 
in Western liberal democratic systems, immediately come to mind as natural 
deliberative bodies. Courts can embody most of the important deliberative principles 
discussed in the previous chapters: ideally, they deliberate in a mode committed in some 
respects to transparency, they hear expert opinions and have the opportunity to 
question them, and their rulings are based on exchanges of reasoned arguments. Given 
all of these deliberative qualities, many deliberative democratic theorists regard the 
court as a model for ideal deliberation.504 For example, Rawls described the US Supreme 
Court as an exemplar of public reason505 and Dworkin praised the Court’s decision 
making process as one that is ruled by reasons rather than power.506 However, the fact 
that courts are arguably better situated to conduct effective deliberation would, if 
proven, not mean that all courts live up to such expectations. Some scholars dispute the 
idealised view of the Court’s deliberative qualities, and others challenge the court’s 
democratic credentials. 
 
In this chapter I examine the deliberative advantages of constitutional courts as well as 
their deliberative weaknesses. I begin with broad observations and idealised points 
about how a court can be deliberative. I explain why constitutional courts in most 
Western liberal democratic systems are often more deliberative than other institutions. 
I contend that courts can be deliberative in two ways. First, the court as an institution is 
designed in a way that enables it to exercise a higher quality of deliberation, compared 
with other governance institutions, within its own processes. Second, courts often 
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instigate deliberation among the general public. I also address the issue of the courts’ 
democratic value. I then synthesise this analysis into a set of detailed criteria that help 
to evaluate a specific court’s deliberative level.  
 
This chapter touches on many important topics in judicial studies such as judicial review, 
judicial power and theories of judicial decisions. This chapter does not aim to provide a 
thorough analysis of such issues, as this would go beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
aim of the chapter is rather to explain specifically what features can be employed by 
constitutional courts to promote the aims of deliberative democratic theory, as 
presented in previous chapters. The deliberative criteria presented in this chapter will 
be applied later to the case studies to examine the deliberative features that enable the 
Israeli Supreme Court to include and involve diaspora populations in its deliberations 
and decisions. 
 
Although my analysis is relevant to different kinds of courts, my main focus will be on 
courts that act (or sometimes act) as constitutional courts. These are the courts that are 
or should be the most deliberative, as they deal with fundamental issues that concern a 
society as a whole. I will therefore refer mostly to constitutional courts in liberal 
democracies, or to high courts and supreme courts that act as constitutional courts in a 
specific jurisdiction.507  
 
A. The deliberative qualities of constitutional courts 
i. The role of constitutional courts 
In most Western liberal democracies, the very nature of a constitutional court puts a 
deliberative onus on it. In order to decide on the constitutional issues that come before 
it, the court needs to engage with different opinions that exist within a society regarding 
core principles and values. Unlike legislators or citizens, who are more concerned with 
choosing between different practical policy options, the role of a constitutional court 
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often includes engaging in questions of a political-philosophical character.508 We can 
therefore expect constitutional courts to exercise higher-than-average quality of 
deliberation than that of other public institutions. Indeed, the general attitude among 
both lay people and legal scholars is that constitutional courts should live up to such 
deliberative expectations.509  
ii. Small group deliberation 
As mentioned in previous chapters, small groups are generally more conducive to 
deliberation than larger groups.510 A constitutional court is usually composed of no more 
than a dozen or so professional judges. This low number makes it easier for participants 
to negotiate, deliberate and arrive at a decision. Compare this with the parliament of a 
mid-sized nation, where each member must negotiate with potentially hundreds of 
other parliamentarians. Small groups also enable expertise. Judges are usually 
knowledgeable and experienced in the areas for which they are responsible.  
One drawback of a small group of deliberators is that it is difficult to give voice to every 
viewpoint; some minorities may be underrepresented. A court that comprises judges 
from different segments of the society would be more deliberative than a court that 
comprises only members of one certain group.511 In order for a court to be able to 
produce a high level of deliberation, it needs to have judges from different backgrounds 
to allow for a plurality of viewpoints and perspectives.  
iii. Reasoning and transparency 
Another potentially deliberative advantage of the court is its transparent reasoning 
process. Courts partly deliberate in a forum committed to transparency, with some 
submissions and hearings open to the public. Court decisions are available to the public 
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(and often online) and journalists are usually allowed into the court room. This allows 
the media to report on ongoing sessions and deliberations, further increasing public 
access. As discussed, in divided societies, transparent deliberative processes are 
important in order to confer legitimacy on the final decision. While politicians are not 
obliged to justify their decisions, and some cabinet decision making processes remain 
secret, courts are usually required to publish and justify their decisions, revealing the 
reasoning behind them.512 It is mainly this characteristic of providing reasoned 
arguments that has led many scholars to regard the court as an example of sound 
deliberation.513 When reasons and explanations are provided, errors that were made 
during the process of deliberation and decision making can be discovered and 
challenged by future petitioners. Moreover, there is sometimes an option to appeal a 
court’s decision or to apply for an additional hearing. 
However, not all court processes are transparent. Deliberations and consultations 
between judges are generally not public. Also, in some sensitive cases, the whole court 
process is conducted behind closed doors. While this is the case, recall that under certain 
circumstances, there are possible advantages to conducting at least part of the 
deliberative process behind closed-doors.514 Moreover, in some cases, other interests 
may necessitate a discrete process (e.g., national security, protection of minors).  
The reasoning process employed by courts may differ across jurisdictions. Ferejohn and 
Pasquino differentiate between courts such as the US Supreme Court, which they deem 
as ‘externally’ deliberative, and European courts which they call ‘internally’ deliberative. 
An externally deliberative court means that deliberation is aimed at the general public, 
and consensus among the judges is not sought as a central aim. European courts are 
internally deliberative in the sense that judges make attempts to convince each other 
and produce ‘a collectively reasoned decision’.515  
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Another deliberative limitation of the courts is that judges, unlike politicians, are not 
formally accountable to the public and usually are not allowed to comment or give 
interviews regarding pending cases. This can be problematic from a deliberative point 
of view, as it limits the scope to challenge judges’ opinions. However, the court’s 
obligation to justify its decisions and the possibility of an appeal largely mitigate this 
problem.  
Most judges, unlike politicians, do not have to run for re-election and so are more likely 
than politicians to change their positions and engage in principled reasoning.516 In 
parliaments, a member of parliament representing a certain group in society who 
changes her mind and adopts a view different to that held by the majority in that group 
is often portrayed as a ‘traitor’. But in truly deliberative bodies, this phenomenon should 
be encouraged and appreciated.517 Changing one’s mind can suggest to other members 
of that group that they might have also changed some of their opinions had they also 
participated in similar deliberations, being exposed to counter arguments and different 
views. Judges have more scope to change their minds than members of parliaments. 
However, there are also dangers in judges’ lack of accountability, since a judge may 
become capricious or sluggish if she knows it is practically impossible to remove her 
from office.  
The court’s reasons must be linked to the facts of each case as well as to general legal 
rules, ensuring that a petitioner’s right to present evidence and make legal arguments 
is respected in making a final judgment.518 Providing reasoned decisions also fosters 
political participation, as members of the public can challenge a decision by submitting 
new cases based on the court’s previous reasoning. For example, the US Supreme Court 
decision in Brown v Board of Education519 encouraged more challenges to ‘separate but 
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equal’ policies through the courts.520 Especially when dealing with constitutional issues, 
if the reasons provided are capricious or unsatisfactory, the ruling may be subject to an 
appeal or reversal in a future case.521 For example, while the High Court of Australia will 
generally only overrule previous decisions in exceptional circumstances, it is much more 
inclined to do so in constitutional issues, especially when dealing with basic human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.522 
Another incentive for courts to use reasoned arguments lies in their lack of real political 
power. Unlike politicians, judges cannot claim legitimacy based on the fact that the 
general public voted for them. The court therefore has to rely on persuasion through 
reason giving in order to render its decisions legitimate and authoritative. 523 As Franck 
observes in the case of international courts:  
The power of a court to do justice depends, rather, on the 
persuasiveness of the judges’ discourse, persuasive in the sense that 
it reflects not their own, but society’s value preferences.524 … Like 
the law it applies, the Court’s ability to pull states to compliance 
with its opinions depends on the general perception of the 
legitimacy and fairness of its opinion-forming process.525 
However, due to its lack of political power, the court must be careful not to overstep its 
boundaries, otherwise it may be subject to attempts to limit the scope of its powers.526 
Some critics argue that a court’s ‘reasoned’ exchange of arguments sometimes consists 
of simple ‘give and take’ bargaining. However, much of the criticism laid against the 
process of ‘bargaining’ that takes place among judges is true of any group of deliberators 
that operates under time constraints and must produce a final and binding decision.527 
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There is no evidence that a group of judges is any worse in this respect than a group of 
ordinary citizens. On the contrary, judges are more likely to engage in ‘reasoning’ rather 
than ‘bargaining’ for the reasons mentioned above. Moreover, as Nino noted, 
bargaining can actually contribute to the impartiality of the deliberative process, as it 
forces participants to attend to others’ interests as well.528 Many courts also allow 
dissenting opinions, which means that there is less pressure to ‘bargain’ in order to reach 
a unanimous decision. 
Some scholars also point out that often the court uses a technical and legalistic form of 
juristic reasoning rather than principled moral political reasoning.529 The reasons behind 
courts’ rulings are also often hidden by professional jargon inaccessible to lay people. 530 
While it may be true that lower courts tend to rely more on technical legal reasoning, 
this is usually not the case with constitutional courts. For example, in many legal 
systems, a constitutional court must apply a tripartite proportionality test when deciding 
whether a certain law is constitutional: first, the court asks whether the law was 
established in order to achieve a legitimate aim; second, the court inquires whether it 
would be possible to achieve the same end through a less restrictive measure; and 
finally, the court balances the outcomes of the law against its possible costs.531 
Therefore, unlike lower courts, constitutional courts engage with moral and principled 
reasoning that involve normative and policy considerations.532 However, as a result of 
following this tripartite test, constitutional decisions are often long and difficult to read 
through. In some cases, constitutional decisions are written in inaccessible prose which 
makes it difficult for lay people to understand the court’s reasoning. A deliberative 
democratic approach requires that courts attempt to write clearly, concisely and 
simplify their decisions so as to make their judgments comprehensible to the general 
public.  
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iv. Public trust 
A constitutional court cannot maintain its legitimacy and remain effective in its review 
of government decisions without enjoying high levels of public trust. As Cutler et al. 
demonstrated, trust is a major issue when assessing the prospects of a deliberative body 
to achieve legitimacy and support for its decisions.533  
Critics of constitutional courts often portray them as distant ivory towers.534 Judges do 
not interact with the general public and, as mentioned, are often not allowed (according 
either to law or custom) to comment or give interviews about the cases they are 
involved in. In some countries, judges wear wigs that further separate them from 
ordinary citizens. These features are in contrast to politicians who are able to reach out 
and speak directly to their constituencies.  
However, constitutional courts generally enjoy higher levels of trust than parliaments 
among the public; these findings are consistent over time and across various 
countries.535 In the United States for example, the Supreme Court enjoys a far higher 
level of trust than the Congress.536 Similar results are observed in Canada537 and 
Germany.538 In Israel, which has a different system of appointing judges,539 the results 
are similar: the Supreme Court enjoys higher levels of trust than politicians.540 Notably, 
the Israeli Supreme Court is the most trusted government institute among the Arab 
minority.541  
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These results may be explained by several factors. First, it may merely reflect how poorly 
politicians are viewed in society, rather than an opinion about the judiciary.542 Judges 
are not perceived to engage in partisan politics like politicians, they are usually less likely 
to be bribed, and their tenure gives them the freedom to maintain their integrity and 
decide according to their conscience. Another possible factor is constitutional courts’ 
traditional function as protectors of basic human rights against government 
encroachments. The fact that constitutional courts usually enjoy high levels of trust may 
also indicate that the public appreciates the deliberative process that takes place when 
deciding constitutional cases.  
v. Impartiality 
Impartiality is another important element for creating an effective and successful 
deliberative process. Participants in a deliberative process should make decisions 
according to established principles and decisions should not change depending on the 
identity of the specific individuals affected by the decision. In a legal system, deviations 
from precedents require special justification, and so the risk that the court would be 
influenced by external or unjustified factors is diminished. The fact that a court is obliged 
to maintain coherence with the overall legal system and follow precedent therefore 
helps to maintain a certain level of impartiality which contributes to its deliberative 
value.543 The court is also separated, to some degree, from political constraints (the 
degree of such separation varies across different jurisdictions). Since judges do not rely 
on their constituencies for re-election, they are free to decide cases on their merits and 
not yield to changing public opinion. However, as discussed above, courts rely on public 
trust in order to maintain their legitimacy. Ruling consistently against popular public 
opinion may jeopardise the court’s legitimacy and also encourage politicians to suggest 
judicial reforms. 
Moreover, judges are not completely shielded from public opinion, and their decisions 
may be affected by current events. For example, a study by Hofnung and Margel 
examined the role of the Israeli Supreme Court in protecting human rights and limiting 
the state’s action in terror-related cases. This study revealed how different political and 
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security conditions, such as fluctuating public opinion or the occurrence of deadly terror 
attacks, affect judges’ tendencies to intervene with policies or actions of the state 
security authorities.544 These findings suggest that judges in the Supreme Court may not 
always adhere only to legal arguments and reasoning, but are also responsive to 
changing public opinion. 
Some critics also highlight the fact that judges are often appointed based on their 
political affiliations. For example, Sen argues that because of the politicised procedure 
by which judges are appointed to the US Supreme Court, judges are not willing to engage 
in reasoned, open-minded deliberative discussions. Judges are appointed by the 
President because of their existing views and not because the President thinks they will 
change their minds.545 This may be true with respect to some courts, but it is not 
necessarily the case for all courts in all jurisdictions, with different systems for electing 
judges.546 Moreover, any group of deliberators, regardless of its election process, will 
consist of people who already hold certain political views. It is not feasible to form a 
deliberative body that consists of persons who are ‘blank slates’, with no political 
predispositions. What is important from a deliberative point of view is to make sure that 
the deliberative body consists of persons who hold different opinions prevalent among 
the general population. Electing a Republican jurist to serve as a judge in the US Supreme 
Court, for example, is not in itself a problem from a deliberative point of view. A problem 
would emerge in the case where the Supreme Court consisted only (or mostly) of people 
who are known to hold Republican views.  
Participants in a deliberative body need to maintain an open mind and a degree of 
flexibility in order to be able to change their pre-disposed views in light of new evidence 
or arguments.547 As discussed above, judges may have greater flexibility to change their 
minds than, for example, parliament members, since they do not have to satisfy their 
constituencies in order to guarantee their re-election.  
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I do not contend that judges as individuals are inherently better deliberators than 
parliamentarians or citizens. I am also not arguing that courts are always more 
deliberative than parliaments. Rather, I contend that the court, as an institution, is in 
some cases a more suitable forum than parliaments or citizens’ forums to successfully 
deliberate constitutional issues.548 This is the case, for example, in some divided 
societies. Even Waldron, who is sceptical of the alleged superiority of judges as impartial 
deliberators, admits that in societies where liberal ideals and democratic institutions are 
not well entrenched, the court may be better positioned to respect and uphold the rights 
of minorities due to its predisposition towards impartiality.549  
 
B. Are courts democratic? 
In the previous parts I explained why, and under what conditions, constitutional courts 
may serve as effective deliberative bodies. This part addresses the question whether the 
court is a model of democratic deliberation. Most scholars would agree that courts in 
and of themselves are not democratic. After all, most judges are not elected by the 
people and it is very hard to remove them from office. However, courts are democratic 
in other senses. Most importantly, they are democratic in the sense that they form a 
vital part of any democratic system.  
A similar (though separate) line of criticism against courts is that they are non-
representational, or that judges represent only some elite sections of the population.550  
These criticisms echo the arguments raised against judicial review and therefore the 
responses to those criticisms are also relevant.551 Going into this issue in depth is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but I will briefly discuss some possible responses to these lines 
of criticism.  
                                                     
548 This point is related to the controversy over whether judges are evidently better than legislatures at 
protecting rights. See Lever, above n 511, 806. 
549 See Waldron, above n 18, 1401. 
550 See Nino, above n 2, 187-9. 
551 See Waldron, above n 18; Dimitrios Kyritsis, ‘Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial 
Review’ (2006) 26(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 733; Lever, above n 511. 
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i. Democratic system 
The court is indeed undemocratic in the sense that its judges are not chosen by the 
people. Unlike parliament members, judges are not directy and formally accountable to 
the public nor can they be replaced by the public if they become unpopular. However, 
the court is a democratic body in the sense that it is an integral part of a whole 
democratic system. Judges are usually appointed, albeit indirectly, by the 
representatives who themselves are elected democratically by the people. Many legal 
scholars have explained how constitutional courts fit well within a democratic system. 
Zurn, for example, defends constitutional review by the courts by reference to 
deliberative democratic theory: 
Constitutional review discharges the function of procedurally 
protecting the political structures and the system of rights that 
make deliberative democracy possible, that is, protecting 
constitutional structures that ultimately ground the supposition 
that the decisional outcomes of democratic processes are 
legitimate.552 
Most importantly, in democratic systems, the parliament is the body that is designed to 
be elected periodically by the people, as this is the body that is in charge of changing 
policies and enacting new laws. The court’s function, however, is different to that of the 
parliament. The court’s function is to safeguard against a temporarily over-zealous 
majority overstepping its authority and encroaching on basic rights and liberties that 
should be protected under a democratic political system.553 As some scholars note, the 
court acts as a necessary referee in the democratic process.554 The task of deciding 
whether a certain law conflicts with basic democratic principles has to be entrusted to 
a body which is situated outside the democratic election process. A court will not be 
able to fulfil its function and uphold the rule of law if its judges are elected in the same 
way as members of parliament.555  
                                                     
552 Zurn, above n 516. 
553 See Breyer, above n 534, 156. 
554 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust : A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 1980); 
Nino, above n 2, 200; Breyer, above n 534, 157. Note that this does not mean however that the court is 
necessarily an impartial referee – rather it fulfils a necessary function.   
555 See Michael Coper, ‘Court’s Role in Democracy’ in Michael Coper, Anthony Blackshield and George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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In this context, it is useful also to highlight the main arguments raised in support of 
judicial review. Some scholars argue that judicial majorities are sometimes more reliable 
protectors of basic rights than popular majorities.556 Ackerman, for example, sees 
judicial review as preserving the will of the people, as expressed in a constitution, 
against a lower form of politics which takes place in regular times without the express 
will of the people.557 Rawls holds that as long as judicial decisions ‘reasonably accord 
with the constitution ... and with its amendments and politically mandated 
interpretations’ then judicial review can be said to originate in ‘the higher authority of 
the people’.558 Dworkin rejects the ‘majoritarian premise’ – namely, that democracy 
means favouring the majority of citizens. He holds a ‘constitutional conception of 
democracy’, according to which decisions should be made by institutions whose 
structure, composition and practices treat all members of the community with equal 
concern and respect.559 Just as many other appointed officials may take decisions that 
affect society as a whole (like an ambassador or chief of staff), an arrangement that gives 
judges the power of constitutional adjudication is not necessarily inegalitarian.560 
Finally, even those who argue for legislative supremacy over judicial rulings 
acknowledge the important function played by the judiciary in a democratic system, 
namely, protecting fundamental rights.561 
The above arguments may help to explain why constitutional courts generally enjoy 
higher levels of trust than parliaments.562 Scheppele, for example, argues that 
sometimes strong constitutional courts are more democratic than elected parliaments 
                                                     
556 See Jr William J. Brennan, ‘The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification’ (1986) 
27(3) South Texas Law Review 433, 433–5; Michelman, ‘Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy, and the Question 
of Judicial Review: A Comment’, above n 278. 
557 See Bruce Ackerman, We the People (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991) 10–33; Nino, 
above n 2, 103-4. 
558 Rawls, Political Liberalism, above n 17, 234. See Michelman, ‘Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy, and the 
Question of Judicial Review: A Comment’, above n 278. 
559 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 1–38. 
560 Ibid 28. 
561 See Jason NE Varuhas, ‘Courts in the Service of Democracy: Why Courts Should Have a Constitutional 
(But Not Supreme) Role in Westminster Legal Systems’ (2009) 3 New Zealand Law Review 481. 
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and elected executives.563 She argues that constitutions often enjoy wider public 
support than later legislation by self-interested legislators, and so constitutional courts 
‘can be structured so that they have better access than the more conventional elected 
branches to what democratic publics want from democratic politics’.564 So even though 
courts are not are democratic in a literal sense, when considering courts as part of a 
broader system of the rule of law, one understands that courts exercise an important 
democratic function. 
ii. A reflective court 
As discussed above, courts are not necessarily representational, as this is not one of 
their roles in a democratic system. However, a court can aim to be reflective of the 
society it represents – that is, to include people from diverse backgrounds among its 
judges. A body that engages in deliberation can be democratic as long as it is diverse, to 
some degree, and represents a variety of opinions and people from different 
backgrounds in the population. Such a ‘responsive’ or ‘reflective’ court, which expresses 
different constitutional interpretations that can be found among the public, fulfils a 
necessary function in a democracy.565  
As members of parliament are elected by the public, they may claim that higher 
democratic legitimacy is attached to their decisions. But as Lever notes:  
[J]udges, as well as legislators, can embody and foster democratic 
forms of representation, accountability and participation. There is, 
therefore, nothing distinctively democratic in favouring the latter 
over the former when the two conflict.566 
Judges often represent important segments of the population. For example, a member 
of the Arab elite in Israel, who sits as a judge in the Israeli Supreme Court, can fulfil some 
of the required characteristics of a democratic representative: she shares some similar 
identity factors with her group members (religion, culture, language, history) and 
symbolises the group’s public presence in that particular institution. Moreover, she 
                                                     
563 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Democracy by Judiciary. Or, Why Courts Can Be More Democratic than 
Parliaments’ in Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier and Wojciech Sadurski (eds), Rethinking the Rule of Law 
After Communism (Central European University Press, 2005) 25. 
564 Ibid 26.  
565 See Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, above n 508, 57–60. 
566 Lever, above n 511, 807. 
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brings to deliberations views and perspectives unique to this group – a feature that adds 
to the epistemic advantage of the deliberative body.567 It may be true that this particular 
individual does not fully represent the common majority view among this group in the 
same way as a member of parliament may. However, from a deliberative perspective, 
this can count as an advantage. In a deliberative body, a group representative is not 
expected to hold the view prevalent among her group. In true and effective deliberation, 
one is supposed to be able to depart from one’s initial positions in the face of better 
arguments and new perspectives.568 
It should also be noted that problems of over and under representation accompany any 
deliberative or elected body. Even the carefully crafted citizen’s assembly in British 
Colombia was criticised for under representation of minorities.569 In parliamentary 
elections, representation can be dramatically skewed in some electoral systems. For 
example, the UKIP party that won 12% of votes in the 2015 elections in the United 
Kingdom ended up being represented by only one member of parliament.570 
Democratic forms of representation, accountability and participation will vary across 
different courts and parliaments and different legal systems, depending on the specific 
circumstances. For example, a court’s democratic value may be affected by the way in 
which judges are appointed. As Nino notes, a ‘European style’ constitutional tribunal 
with members who are periodically chosen by bodies that are representative of popular 
sovereignty is more democratically legitimate than a court whose members are only 
chosen by one branch of government.571 
However, diversity can be achieved under different systems of appointment. For 
example, the Israeli system of appointing judges prefers (from equally suitable 
candidates) those candidates who come from traditionally underrepresented sectors, 
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Assembly (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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like Israeli Arabs, new immigrants and women.572 In the case of the US Supreme Court, 
Justice Breyer argues that ‘[l]ength of term and the appointment process tend to 
guarantee diversity of constitutional views’;573 since judges are appointed by both 
Republican and Democrat presidents. 
iii. Giving voice to non-citizens 
When considering democratic principles, there is at least one important advantage 
courts have over most parliaments. A court can give voice to groups whose members 
are not citizens and therefore cannot vote. Recall that one of the deliberative 
democratic ideals is that all those who will be affected by a decision should take part in 
the deliberative process preceding that decision.574 A major problem with satisfying this 
requirement is that often people who will be affected by the decision include non-
citizens such as migrants (legal and illegal), citizens of neighbouring countries and 
diaspora people.575 Such people are not only unable to participate in elections, they are 
also unable to participate in deliberative democratic initiatives such as citizens’ 
assemblies, as it would be unusual to open such a process to them. A court, however, is 
able to apply a broad standing policy and thus accept petitions from any individual 
whose interest is affected by a specific decision made by the government. In addition to 
technical standing rules, judges can represent those who are not represented 
adequately in other venues. Unlike politicians, most judges do not rely on their 
constituencies for re-election and so they are more capable to address the concerns of 
people who cannot vote.576  
In this sense, the court may have a serious democratic advantage over other deliberative 
forums such parliaments or citizens’ assemblies. By including groups that otherwise are 
excluded from deliberations, the court expands the number of people who are able to 
                                                     
572 See Itzhak Zamir, ‘The Final Report of the Commission for Appointing Justices in Israel’ (Jerusalem, 
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affect government decisions. This feature is critical in divided societies with large 
diaspora populations. I will show the important implications of extensive participation 
by non-citizens when I later discuss cases from the Israeli Supreme Court, which applies 
a broad standing policy.  
 
iv. Summary 
Ultimately, the legitimacy of a deliberative body rests on two pillars: reflection or 
representation of society on the one hand, and the quality of deliberation on the other. 
As explained above, the court’s legitimacy does not emanate only from its deliberative 
quality, but also from the fact that it reflects the society it serves and enables groups of 
non-citizens who are not represented in parliament to be heard. Diversity is needed in 
order to represent different views and segments of the population. If people feel that 
no one in the deliberative body represents them, they will tend to distrust this body’s 
decisions. But equally important is high-level deliberation, that is, deliberation by 
members who are open-minded and well informed on the subject matter.577 A court in 
a deliberative system operates as part of a complex network of institutions aimed at 
fostering democratic deliberation (e.g., legislatures, executive agencies, the media, 
organised advocacy groups, private and non-profit institution).578 Different institutions 
in a democratic system can be positioned differently on the spectrum of representation 
versus quality of deliberation. While the parliament, for example, tends to be positioned 
more on the representational end of the spectrum, the judiciary is placed more towards 
the deliberative end. This does not mean that the court is not in any sense democratic; 
on the contrary, it fulfils a vital function in maintaining a democratic system.  
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C. The court’s role in promoting popular deliberation  
The court’s deliberative value extends beyond what takes place in the courtroom and 
among the judges. The counter-majoritarian power exercised by constitutional courts 
can potentially foster deliberation among the greater public.579 
Friedman, for example, argues that by ruling over controversial cases such as abortion 
rights and racial segregation,580 the US Supreme Court has promoted public awareness 
and engagement on these issues.581 By attempting to settle difficult political disputes, 
the US Supreme Court has revealed fundamental political and constitutional conflicts in 
society. Friedman argues that in many such cases, the Supreme Court’s decision sparked 
public deliberation and encouraged political activists to further challenge issues that 
concern constitutional rights and public values. Thus, the Court kept the discussion going 
until a new kind of consensus or resolution was achieved. For example, progress with 
respect to same-sex marriage in the United States and Canada was made through court 
rulings.582 The media plays an important part in this regard. Studies have shown that 
media coverage of the Supreme Court as an institution is largely favourable.583 Extensive 
coverage by the media of Supreme Court decisions can help to raise public attention to 
the issues deliberated over in court, which can promote further deliberation among the 
general public and result in further constitutional challenges and policy changes. Kong 
and Levy contend that exposing the arguments against same-sex marriage to judicial 
scrutiny in the United States and Canada helped to eliminate weak or unsupported 
arguments from public discourse: 
In light of the available information about the circumstances of 
couples in same-sex relationships and the consequences of 
recognizing same sex marriages, and after reflection and reciprocal 
discussion about these facts and the relevant ethical questions, the 
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arguments in support of bans could not be maintained. Moreover, 
the judicial reasoning in these cases shaped political deliberation 
across the polity, and this catalytic force of judicial review attracts 
the deliberative constitutionalist’s attention.584 
Ferejohn and Pasquino analyse this phenomena in the European context. They argue 
that in Germany, Italy, Spain and France, constitutional courts act in a deliberative 
manner by generating dialogue with other governmental departments and among the 
general public.585  
The court can also promote popular deliberation by producing rulings that safeguard 
political activism and freedom of speech. An example of this can be found in the position 
taken by the Israeli Supreme Court in several cases regarding Israeli election campaigns. 
Israel’s election laws forbid anyone who expresses opinions that negate Israel’s Jewish 
and democratic character or incites racism from running in parliamentary elections for 
the Knesset.586 The law was enacted in 1985 after the Central Elections 
Committee disqualified a far-right Jewish party and an Arab nationalist party from 
running for the Knesset. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, which ruled 
that the law at that time did not allow a political party to be barred on the grounds of 
racism.587 The Court suggested however that the law should be amended, and the 
Knesset amended it and added ‘incitement to racism’ as grounds for barring a party from 
participating in elections. Populist Knesset members have since made it a practice 
before each Israeli parliamentary election to try to disqualify some ultra-nationalist 
Jewish and Arab candidates and parties.588 Decisions to disqualify a candidate or a 
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political party are made by the Central Elections Committee, which is composed of 
Knesset members. However, these decisions must also be approved by the Israeli 
Supreme Court. The only political party that was ever banned by the Supreme Court 
from running in parliamentary elections under this law was the Jewish far-right Kach 
party which was disqualified from participating in the 1988 and 1992 elections.589 In the 
vast majority of cases, the Supreme Court has reversed decisions made by the Central 
Elections Committee and allowed extreme candidates and parties to run in elections for 
the Knesset.590 
In related decisions, the Israeli Supreme Court also set aside resolutions to lift 
parliamentary immunity from Arab Knesset members who allegedly expressed support 
for terrorist organisations.591 In his judgment, Chief Justice Barak noted that 
parliamentary immunity is essential in order to guarantee the right of all citizens to full 
and effective political representation. Barak stressed that this is essential mainly with 
respect to citizens who are members of minority groups, in order to guarantee a free 
marketplace of ideas and opinions: 
Substantive immunity protects the right of all citizens to have their 
opinions and outlooks heard, through their elected representatives, 
in the various frameworks of public debate in general, and in 
parliament in particular. This protection is essential mainly for 
citizens who are members of minority groups in society. In this 
sense, substantive immunity also furthers civil equality, in that it 
protects even the right of members of minority groups in society to 
full and effective political representation, and it protects them by 
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protecting the member of the Knesset, who represents their 
interests and their opinions, against the power of the majority.592 
The Court in these cases overruled resolutions made by the Central Elections Committee 
or the Knesset Ethics Committee (both are democratically representative bodies, as they 
are composed of members of the Knesset). The Court repeatedly took the position that 
political ideas that the majority may deem as extreme and disturbing are nevertheless 
legitimate in a democratic society: 
[S]ubstantive immunity is essential in order to guarantee a free 
marketplace of ideas and opinions. Here too this immunity is 
especially important when we are speaking of opinions and ideas 
that are offensive or outrageous, and it is especially required for 
elected representatives who express opinions that are regarded by 
most of the public as such. Indeed, ‘freedom of expression is also 
the freedom to express dangerous, offensive and perverse opinions, 
from which the public recoils and which the public hates’.593  
The Court has reiterated in these cases that laws that enable disqualification of a party 
or a candidate from election to parliament should be interpreted in a very narrow and 
limited way and applied only in the most extreme cases.594 One of the reasons the Court 
provided in justifying its position was that some minority groups may feel excluded from 
the political process if their favourite candidates are disqualified.595 By allowing these 
candidates to run and be elected, even people with extreme views are encouraged to 
take part in the democratic process.596 
Having interpreted the law very narrowly, the Court has made it practically impossible 
to disqualify a party or a candidate. By allowing candidates that hold extreme views, 
both from Arab groups and Jewish groups, to run for parliament, the Supreme Court has 
sent a message that the best way to address controversial ideas is through free speech 
and public deliberation. On one hand, it is questionable whether extreme political views 
are able to comply with the deliberative democratic requirements of reciprocity and 
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equality. On the other hand, this approach may be seen as deliberative in that it is more 
inclusive and allows more groups to take part in political deliberation.597 It also requires 
that extreme views be met by countervailing, more rational and deliberative ideas. 
Court decisions in controversial issues can also produce deliberative democratic 
initiatives among the general public. An example of such an outcome followed a series 
of rulings by the Israeli Supreme Court during the 1990s regarding the relationship 
between the Jewish state and the Jewish religion.598 Repeated petitions to the Court 
challenging religiously motivated laws and policies have led secular and religious Israelis 
to come together to try to reach an agreement over issues relating to the role of religion 
in the public sphere such as the opening of businesses on the Sabbath (Saturday) and 
Kosher food regulations. One such deliberative initiative culminated in the ‘Gavison-
Medan Covenant’ – an attempt for a social covenant between religious and secular Jews 
in Israel.599 This covenant was co-written by Ruth Gavison, a law professor from the 
Hebrew University, and Rabbi Yaacov Medan. This was a novel method of dialogue that 
took place between two persons working one-on-one rather than in a larger forum. 
Working together, Professor Gavison and Rabbi Medan were able to reach an 
agreement on all of the controversial issues regarding the relationship between the 
state and the Jewish religion. They compensated for the non-representation of other 
groups by sharing the details of their evolving agreements to various focus groups and 
public figures for feedback, incorporating comments into the final text of the 
Covenant.600 Although the Covenant was not adopted by Israeli politicians, it still inspires 
attempts to reach an acceptable compromise on this issue.601 
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In this part I have shown how the court can foster democratic deliberation among the 
general public. In the next part I will provide a list of criteria that can be used to assess 
deliberative levels of different courts.  
 
D. Evaluating the deliberative quality of courts 
I have explained how courts can play an important role in a deliberative democracy, 
especially when divided societies and diaspora populations are involved. However, the 
fact that courts are better situated to conduct effective deliberation does not mean that 
all courts live up to such expectations.602  
How exactly should one evaluate a specific court’s ‘deliberativeness’? Analysing whether 
a constitutional court is deliberative or not requires scrutiny of its structure, as well as 
the content and context of specific decisions.603  
Mendes, for example, offers a three-tier test to evaluate a constitutional court’s 
deliberative level. Each tier examines specific deliberative parameters in a different 
stage of a case proceeding before the court.604 As Mendes summarises: 
[A]n ideal-type deliberative court, put straightforwardly, is one that 
maximizes the range of arguments from interlocutors by promoting 
public contestation at the pre-decisional phase; that energizes its 
decision-makers in a sincere process of collegial engagement at the 
decisional phase; and that drafts a deliberative written decision at 
the post-decisional phase.605  
In the next sections I supplement Mendes’ three criteria to provide a comprehensive list 
of deliberative features that can be used to evaluate a court’s deliberative level. I use 
these evaluative criteria in the next chapter when discussing cases from Israeli Supreme 
Court. 
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i. Accessibility 
Standing requirements (locus standi) determine who can bring cases to the court and 
under what circumstances. For example, the Israeli Supreme Court standing 
requirements are much more liberal than that of the US Supreme Court: people do not 
have to prove that they have been personally injured in order to bring a case before the 
Israeli Supreme Court.606 The court’s accessibility also comes into play during 
proceedings, affecting, for example, how easy it is to submit expert or amicus curiae 
opinions. A more accessible court will in one sense be more deliberative. Mendes 
believes accessibility contributes to the stage of ‘Public Contestation’, when written and 
face-to-face interaction among interlocutors (such as lawyers, witnesses or experts) and 
judges takes place. In this stage, a deliberative approach aims to bring about the actual 
involvement of as many interested actors as possible in presenting arguments to the 
court. A deliberative court will pay close attention to such parties, listen to their 
arguments and discuss them seriously. 
It should be noted however that accessibility has its costs. Various problems may arise 
if the court takes on too many cases, especially on issues that are political in nature.607  
The court may become swamped with petitions, proceedings may take years to 
conclude and a court that encroaches too much on the executive and legislative 
branches may motivate politicians to limit its powers to intervene in policy issues.608 
ii. Reflective court 
For a constitutional court to be able to produce a high level of deliberation, it needs to 
be reflective of different groups in society. It can do so partly by having judges from 
different backgrounds so as to allow for a plurality of viewpoints and perspectives. A 
court that comprises judges from different segments of the society will be more likely 
to produce different viewpoints and fruitful deliberations among its judges than a court 
that comprises only members of one particular group.609 It will also be more likely to 
                                                     
606 See Emily Singer Hurvitz, ‘Future of the AUMF : Lessons From Israel’s Supreme Court’ (2014) 4(2) 
American University National Security Law Brief 43, 55, 59. 
607 See below p 162. 
608 See below n 716 
609 Lever, above n 514, 810. 
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produce dissenting opinions which are also important from a deliberative perspective 
(as discussed below).610 
iii. Style of the rulings 
A deliberative constitutional court will produce thorough and clear judgements that 
engage with different views, without needlessly resorting to legalistic language.611 It 
concerns the literary style of the final written decision delivered by the court. To accord 
with deliberative principles such as transparency and publicity, the court must 
communicate its decision clearly and coherently to the general public. It is not enough 
to say what the answer is according to law. The court should try to engage in its 
judgement with different points of view in a comprehensive way. The decision needs to 
acknowledge and respect dissenting opinions and leave room for ‘new deliberative 
rounds’ in case the circumstances change or new facts will be discovered.612 However, 
complying with all the above may result in long and complex judgments. This may be 
counterproductive, as long judgments may discourage laypersons from reading through 
and follow the court’s reasoning. The need for short, clear judgments must be balanced 
with the need to provide well-reasoned judgments. 
iv. Dissenting opinions and intra-court dynamics 
Effective deliberation requires judges to listen and address their peers’ arguments, and 
explain why they adhere or dissent from the views of their colleagues.613 In this context, 
dissenting opinions can play an important role in promoting democratic deliberation. 
Particularly in divided societies, the importance of dissenting opinions should not be 
underestimated. Dissenting views can give voice to minority groups and indicate to the 
majority that minority opinions can also be reasonable and legitimate. 
The power of one single judge to impede a decision may be obstructive and encourage 
bargaining rather than deliberation. It is also true that sometimes a dissenting opinion 
can provide the minority with the language of further resistance, especially in divided 
                                                     
610 For more on the benefits of ‘reflective’ courts see above p 133 and below p 164. 
611 Mendes calls this ‘Deliberative Written Decision’. See Mendes, above n 15, 103-7. 
612 Mendes, above n 15, 110. 
613 Mendes calls this ‘Collegial Engagement’ which refers to the interaction that occurs between the 
judges before making a decision (as opposed to the first stage where the judges collect arguments from 
outside players). See Mendes, above n 15, 103-7. 
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societies, and especially if the dissenting judge is affiliated with that minority group. 
However, allowing dissenting views can often alleviate the tension between different 
groups in a divided society. Dissenting voices also help to bolster the legitimacy of the 
majority opinion by showing that counter arguments were taken into account before 
being rejected. Sometimes, a dissenting view can sow the seeds for future reversal of a 
decision based on what was previously a minority view. For example, Justice John 
Marshall Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson614 inspired those who fought 
against racial segregation, ultimately leading to the reversal of Plessy v. Ferguson in 
Brown v. Board of Education.615 Dissenting opinions are examples of the deliberative 
principle that a majority decision is merely an unavoidable break in an ongoing 
discussion that records an interim result in the discursive process.616 Moreover, in some 
cases, a dissenting opinion in a judgment may reflect a majority opinion among the 
general public (for example, if a majority in court decides to limit the governments’ 
powers to surveil or punish terrorism suspects). In such cases, it is even more important 
to have such views expressed and acknowledged in a dissenting opinion.    
v. Dialogue between the court and other institutions  
Another deliberative tool that a court can use is to give the legislator a ‘second chance’ 
to deliberate over and change (or reaffirm) a particular law that may be deemed 
unconstitutional. This ‘weak-form’ of judicial review allows for an inter-branch dialogue 
between courts and legislatures. Various jurisdictions adopted ‘reasonable limitations’ 
or ‘legislative override’ clauses that allow legislatures to respond to judicial rulings.617 
As Nino argues, through such measures ‘judges would have an active role in contributing 
to the improvement of the quality of the process of democratic discussion and decision, 
                                                     
614 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896). 
615 See Charles Thompson, Plessy v. Ferguson: Harlan’s Great Dissent (1996) Brandeis School of Law 
Library <https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-john-marshall-harlan-collection/harlan 
s-great-dissent>. 
616 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 
above n 239, 179; Hansen and Rostbøll, above n 8, 508. 
617 For more on the subject of ‘weak-form’ judicial review see Mark Tushnet, ‘Dialogic Judicial Review’ 
(2009) 61(2) Arkansas Law Review, 205; Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Scott Stephenson, From 
Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights Constitutionalism (Federation Press, 2016); Janet 
Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996); Emmett 
Macfarlane, ‘Dialogue or compliance? Measuring legislatures’ policy responses to court rulings on rights’ 
(2013) 34(1) International Political Science Review 39, 40. 
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stimulating public debate and promoting more reflective decisions’.618 However, as the 
court relies heavily on public trust for its legitimacy, such measures should be used very 
cautiously and only on rare occasions. Otherwise, the court risks backlash from 
parliamentarians. 
vi. Effects on public deliberation  
As discussed above, the court is also able to promote deliberation among the greater 
public. This is more likely to happen when there is extensive media coverage of court 
cases, and so the relationship between the court and the media is an important factor 
when evaluating a court’s public deliberative effects. When court cases receive broad 
media coverage, there is more chance that public deliberation will ensue. To promote 
effective deliberation, the media should make an effort to provide the public with 
sufficient information through extensive, balanced and detailed coverage.619 News 
articles and opinion columns that cover the proceedings and the parties’ different 
arguments help the public to follow the reasoning behind the judges’ decisions. 
 
E. Summary 
In this chapter I argued that even though courts are far from perfect, constitutional 
courts in Western liberal democracies can and often do uphold a number of important 
deliberative qualities. Constitutional courts can be deliberative in two broad senses: one 
is the deliberation which takes place in the court itself, and the other is the deliberation 
which the court fosters inter-institutionally and among the general public. I have also 
set out a framework for assessing the deliberativeness of a court. In the next chapter I 
use the deliberative criteria presented in this chapter to examine the deliberative 
democratic nature of the Israeli Supreme Court.  
  
                                                     
618 Nino, above n 2, 216. 
619 See Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Deliberation and Mass Media Communication in Election Campaigns’ (2013) 
12(4) Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 435. 
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VI. Case study – The Israeli Supreme Court 
 
In the previous chapters I provided conceptual background. I outlined diaspora theory 
and explained what diasporas are, why diaspora people often identify with their kin-
states and how both diaspora communities and kin-states influence each other. I then 
reviewed deliberative democratic theory and explained its main principles. I identified 
gaps in the literature and problems associated with the implementation of deliberative 
democratic theory to divided societies and societies with large diaspora populations. I 
also discussed the roles of elites and courts in promoting and maintaining democracy. I 
further explained why elite models of democratic deliberation are perhaps more 
suitable than popular models when addressing divided societies with large diasporic 
populations. 
In this chapter I examine how the theories and ideas discussed in previous chapters 
might materialise in the real world. This chapter demonstrates in practice my analysis of 
diaspora theory and deliberative democracy through case studies from the Israeli 
Supreme Court. I look closely at the deliberative qualities (and faults) of the Israeli 
Supreme Court. I then show how these deliberative features have been exhibited in 
specific cases in which the Israeli Supreme Court dealt with constitutional issues that 
involved the Jewish diaspora and other groups of non-citizens. 
I start by providing relevant background on Israel’s relationship with the Jewish 
diaspora. I explain why Israel makes an interesting and relevant case study for 
demonstrating the different ways in which diaspora people can influence their kin-state 
politics. I also provide a historical overview of the Israeli Supreme Court in order to 
explain how it has developed certain unique deliberative features. I consider the 
deliberative democratic advantages of these features as well as their disadvantages. I 
explain how these deliberative features enable different groups of non-citizens, such as 
diaspora Jews, to effectively participate in constitutional deliberations and affect Israeli 
government policies. I also discuss the problems that arise as a result of such an 
involvement. I examine in detail specific rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court in 
constitutional cases that were of particular concern to members of the Jewish diaspora. 
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In some of these cases, Jewish groups from the diaspora were directly involved or 
represented in the proceedings either as petitioners or respondents. In other cases, 
Jewish diaspora organisations provided funding and support for Israeli NGOs to 
challenge legislation and government policies in the Supreme Court. I also demonstrate 
here how other groups of non-citizens, such as Palestinians and asylum seekers, have 
used the Court to challenge Israeli laws and policies. Finally, I explain how these different 
cases have contributed to deliberation among the greater Israeli public. 
The cases from the Israeli Supreme Court support several key points I make in this thesis. 
First, these cases show how diaspora communities can affect political life in the kin-state 
through legal activism620 rather than by voting. Second, the cases show how a 
deliberative court can embody principles of democratic deliberation within a divided 
society. Third, the cases show how the court fosters democratic principles by allowing 
groups of non-citizens to participate in deliberations regarding constitutional issues. 
 
A. Background – Israel and the Jewish diaspora 
i. Why Israel? 
There are a number of reasons why Israel is an interesting and relevant case study for 
demonstrating the different ways in which diaspora people can influence their kin-state 
politics. First, Israel is a relatively new country, albeit seen by its founders as a modern 
reincarnation of the ancient Jewish kingdoms that existed in the same area during the 
first millennia B.C.621 It was therefore established as a national home for all Jews 
worldwide and was consumed from its inception with its relationship with the Jewish 
diaspora.622 The fact that about half of the global Jewish population lives outside Israel 
makes the relationship between Israel and its diaspora significant and complex. Second, 
Israel was established as a democracy with liberal tendencies but with a significant 
                                                     
620 That is, the process of petitioning the Supreme Court in order to change certain government policies.  
621 See Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2001) 115. 
622 See The Declaration of The Establishment of The State of Israel May 14, 1948. English translation 
available at <http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm>. 
149 
 
religious character; it has always contained substantial religious and ethnic minorities.623 
As discussed above, the tension between the kin-state’s connection to its national 
diaspora and its accommodation of ethnic minorities within its borders is typical in 
countries with dominant diasporic populations.  
Finally, Israel presents a fully developed example of the range of permutations available 
in the evolution of the relationships between diaspora communities and their kin-
states.624 The interaction between the State of Israel and the Jewish diaspora is often 
viewed by other diaspora communities and their kin-states as a model to be 
emulated.625 For example, the Irish Minister for Diaspora Affairs has recently outlined a 
proposal for ‘an orientation course on what it is to be Irish’ aimed at young people from 
the Irish Diaspora, ‘similar to the Israel Taglit-Birthright scheme which has seen more 
than 400,000 young Jewish people visit Israel over the past 15 years’.626 Looking at the 
relations between Israel and the Jewish diaspora can therefore be useful in gauging 
future developments in other relationships between countries and their diaspora 
populations.  
ii. Israel as a Jewish state 
Israel was established as a national home for all Jews worldwide.627 As the putative 
nation state of all Jews, Israel’s commitment to the help and protection of Jews has been 
clearly manifested in several laws, for example: the ‘Law of Return’ provides 
immigration privileges to people of Jewish heritage;628 another law provides for the 
prosecution of crimes against Jews during the Nazi regime (before Israel was 
                                                     
623 When Israel was created in 1948, about 14% of its population was of Arab ethnicity. Today, the Arab 
minority amounts to about 20% of Israel’s population, most of them are Muslim (see The Arab Population 
in Israel (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistilite no. 27, 2002) <http://www.cbs.gov.il 
/statistical/arabju.pdf>.  
624 Shain, above n 5, 129. 
625 Ibid 130; Cohen, above n 621, 51; Safran, above n 31. 
626 Kenny, above n 157. 
627 See The Declaration of The Establishment of The State of Israel May 14, 1948. English translation 
available at <http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm>.  
628 Law of Return 5710-1950. An English translation available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-
archive/1950-1959/pages/law%20of%20return%205710-1950.aspx>.  
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established);629 and another law purports to apply Israeli penal law to acts outside Israel 
against the life, person, health, freedom or property of a Jew or the property of a Jewish 
institution.630 Such laws represent a commitment by the State of Israel to the Jewish 
people, wherever they reside. However, Israel has also always been a home to a 
substantial Arab minority, as well as other minorities.631 Israel’s declaration of 
independence promised to ‘ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all 
its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex’ and appealed to the ‘Arab inhabitants 
of the State of Israel’ to ‘preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State 
on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and 
permanent institutions’.632 
Originally, Israeli law remained silent with regard to the state’s official national 
character. However, in 1992, Israel was for the first time defined in one of its basic laws 
as a ‘Jewish and democratic state’.633 Rather than providing clarification, this newly 
introduced definition only raised questions and tensions regarding the relationship 
between the ‘Jewish’ and the ‘democratic’ elements of Israeli society.634 Over the years, 
right wing Knesset members have attempted to amend the basic law so as to strengthen 
the state’s Jewish character, while left wing Knesset members have tried to emphasise 
the state’s democratic character.635 
                                                     
629 Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law 5710-1950. English translation available at 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1950-1959/Pages/Nazis%20and%20Nazi%20Collaborators% 
20-Punishment-%20Law-%20571.aspx>.  
630 Penal Law 5737-1977, s 13(b)(2). 
631 See above n 623. 
632 The Declaration of The Establishment of The State of Israel May 14, 1948. English translation available 
at <http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm>. 
633 According to s 7A.A of Basic Law: The Knesset (1958): ‘A candidates list shall not participate in elections 
to the Knesset, and a person shall not be a candidate for election to the Knesset, if the goals or actions of 
the list or the actions of the person, expressly or by implication, include one of the following: (1) negation 
of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state … ’. Full English translation of the 
law is available at <https://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm>. 
634 For more on this, see Asher Maʻoz (ed), Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State (The Jewish Law 
Association, 2011). 
635 For recent attempt see Daniel Eisenbud, Hundreds Protest ‘Jewish State Bill’ at PM’s Residence in 
Jerusalem (29 November 2014) The Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-
Diplomacy/Hundreds-protest-Jewish-state-bill-at-PMs-residence-in-Jerusalem-383184>; Uriel Lynn, No 
to the Nation State Law (23 December 2014) The Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/No-to-
the-nation-state-law-385552>; Oded Revivi, What’s Wrong with the Jewish Nation State Law? (12 January 
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iii. Jewish diaspora and the State of Israel  
When Israel was established in 1948, only 650,000 Jews resided in its territory, most of 
them of European background. This number represented less than 10% of the global 
Jewish population at that time.636 Between 1948 and 1951, Israel’s population more 
than doubled as a result of massive immigration of Jewish refugees from Arab and 
Muslim countries in the Middle East.637 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s, around one million people of Jewish origin migrated to Israel from former 
Soviet Union countries.638 Today, 69 years after Israel’s establishment, Israel is home to 
more than six million Jews, which makes it the largest Jewish community in the world. 
However, just over 50% of the world’s Jewry still live outside Israel.639 The biggest Jewish 
communities outside Israel are in the United States (5,700,000), France (467,500) and 
the United Kingdom (290,000).640  
From their very early days in the 19th century, Zionist endeavours in Palestine received 
financial support from the Jewish diaspora.641 Today, many members of the Jewish 
diaspora see themselves as connected to Israel to various degrees.642 Generally, Jews 
who live in the diaspora are not Israeli citizens and therefore cannot vote in Israeli 
elections. To acquire Israeli citizenship and be eligible to vote in Israel, a Jewish person 
(or her spouse and children) must immigrate to Israel and be registered as an Israeli 
resident.643 Diaspora Jews are nonetheless involved in Israeli politics. For example, 
                                                     
2014) The Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Whats-wrong-with-the-Jewish-nation-state-
law-383365>. 
636 See Michael Lipka, The continuing decline of Europe’s Jewish population (9 February 2015) Pew 
Research Center <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/02/09/europes-jewish-population/>. 
637 See Danny Ben-Moshe, ‘Jewish Immigration to Pre-State and Modern Israel’ in Mark Avrum Ehrlich 
(ed), Encyclopedia of the Jewish diaspora : Origins, Experiences, and Culture, Volume 1 (ABC-CLIO, 2009) 
328, 329–30. 
638 Ibid 330. 
639 See Annual Assessment 2015-2016, Executive Report to the Government of Israel, above n 61, 16. 
640 Ibid 16–7. 
641 Shain, above n 5, 54. 
642 See Shmuel Rosner, Agreeing to Disagree : Jewish Peoplehood – Between Attachment and Criticism 
(The Jewish People Policy Institute, 2012) <http://jppi.org.il/uploads/Agreeing_to_Disagree-Jewish_ 
Peoplehood_Between_Attachment_and_Criticism.pdf>. 
643 See Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version) – 1969, s 26. For an English summary of Israeli 
election laws see <http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections16/eng/laws/summary_eng.htm.> Theoretically, 
any Jew (as defined by the Law of Return, see p 31) can immigrate to Israel, receive citizenship and vote. 
However, this process takes time, and one has to be registered as a resident in her local council to be able 
to vote. 
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numerous Jewish organisations (most notably the Jewish Agency, World Jewish 
Congress, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the New Israel Fund and J-
Street) donate money to Israeli NGOs and their representatives meet frequently with 
Israeli government officials. Jewish millionaires also provide financial support to various 
Israeli political groups.644 The involvement of Jewish organisations in Israeli politics will 
be discussed in more detail in the case studies section, where I focus on diaspora Jews’ 
involvement in constitutional cases deliberated in the Israeli Supreme Court.  
Due to historical, cultural and demographic reasons, the Orthodox Jewish religious 
streams gained a monopoly over the religious establishment in Israel and accumulated 
considerable political power domestically. On the other hand, liberal streams of Judaism 
such as the Reform and the Conservative movements (the ‘Progressive streams’) have 
dominated Jewish communities in the diaspora, but do not have a significant presence 
in Israel. For example, 53% of Jews in the United States identify as Reform or 
Conservative while only about 5% of Jews in Israel identify as either Reform or 
Conservative; and while Orthodox Jews make up 22% of Israeli Jews, the share of 
American Jews who identify as Orthodox is only 10%.645 
The reasons for this phenomenon are beyond the scope of this thesis, but are related to 
the fact that in Israel’s early days, the vast majority of Israelis were secular, with a small 
Orthodox minority. (Due partly to high birth rates, Israel’s Orthodox Jewry rose markedly 
in number in later years.) Most importantly, Jews in Israel do not need to be actively 
religious in order to feel ‘Jewish’. Because in Israel the majority of the population is 
Jewish, Jewish people living in Israel are already connected to Jewish tradition and 
culture. For example, Hebrew is the official language, Jewish holy-days are official public 
holidays and businesses are closed on Saturday (‘Shabbat’) and open on Sunday. 
Therefore, Jews in Israel who seek to be actively involved in religious communities tend 
to be Orthodox. In contrast, Jews in the diaspora need to be actively involved in a Jewish 
community in order to remain and feel Jewish, and so non-Orthodox Jews actively 
                                                     
644 See Shain, above n 5, 54–100. 
645 See American and Israeli Jews: Twin Portraits From Pew Research Center Surveys (27 September 2016) 
Pew Research Center <http://www.pewforum.org/2016/09/27/american-and-israeli-jews-twin-portraits-
from-pew-research-center-surveys/?utm_content=buffer77a78&utm_medium=social&utm_source= 
twitter.com&utm_ campaign=buffer>. 
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participate in Jewish activities that are normally affiliated with a Jewish synagogue or 
community. In other words, non-Orthodox Jews in Israel have the option to be secular 
Jews, while for Jews in the diaspora it is much more difficult to be secular and stay 
connected to Jewish tradition and culture. A ‘secular Jew’ in America or Australia, for 
example, will generally simply identify as an American or an Australian if she does not 
at least sometimes take part in Jewish community ceremonies and services, such as at a 
local Jewish community centre. In addition, as most Jews in the diaspora live in peaceful, 
well-established, Western liberal democracies, they tend to hold liberal values and so 
are more inclined to choose Progressive Jewish communities rather than Orthodox 
ones.646  
This incongruity, where most diasporic Jews belong to Progressive Jewish streams, while 
most Israeli Jews are either secular or Orthodox, is a source of tension and conflict 
between the Jewish diaspora and the Israeli government.647 This will be demonstrated 
in some of the case studies discussed below.  
Despite these tensions, both communities tend to feel a strong connection to each 
other. For example, a majority of American Jews say that they are either ‘very’ or 
‘somewhat’ attached to Israel and that caring about Israel is either ‘essential’ or 
‘important’ to what being Jewish means to them.648 In turn, most Israeli Jews say that 
American Jews have a positive impact on the way things are going in Israel and that a 
thriving diaspora is vital to the long-term survival of the Jewish people.649 
 
B. The Israeli Supreme Court  
In this part I provide background on the Israeli Supreme Court and explain its significance 
as a major political institution in Israel. Israel’s Supreme Court has played a key role in 
                                                     
646 See Shain, above n 5, 73, 78; ‘A Portrait of Jewish Americans - Findings from a Pew Research Center 
Survey of US Jews’ (Pew Research Center, 2013) <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/10/jewish-
american-full-report-for-web.pdf>; American and Israeli Jews: Twin Portraits From Pew Research Center 
Surveys, above n 645.  
647 See Shain, above n 5, 65; Rosner, above n 642, 8; Jeremy Sharon, Conservative Jewish Leader Says 
Israel Alienating Diaspora Jewry (18 May 2014) The Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-
World/Jewish-News/Conservative-Jewish -leader-says-Israel-alienating-Diaspora-Jewry-352621>. 
648 See American and Israeli Jews: Twin Portraits From Pew Research Center Surveys, above n 645. 
649 Ibid. 
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shaping the contours of Israel’s democracy. Since the 1980s, the Israeli Supreme Court 
has gained a global reputation for its ‘judicial activism’ and penchant for deliberating 
cases that involve not only legal, but also political and moral issues.650  
The Israeli Supreme Court has nationwide jurisdiction and receives thousands of 
petitions each year.651 In practice, the Court has almost no control over its docket, 
compared, for example, to courts in the United States and Canada where jurisdiction is 
mainly discretionary.652 Apart from being the highest court of appeals on rulings of lower 
tribunals, it also functions as a high court of justice, hearing petitions against any 
government body or agent as a court of first and last instance.653 In this capacity, the 
Supreme Court exercises judicial review over decisions of government branches. As 
Israel does not have a formal constitution, judicial review is based on certain ‘basic laws’ 
and Supreme Court case law.654 According to Israeli law, the Supreme Court has powers 
‘in matters in which it considers it necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice and 
which are not within the jurisdiction of any other court or tribunal’.655 Importantly, the 
right to petition the Supreme Court as a high court of justice in such matters is not 
limited only to Israeli citizens; any person whose right was violated by an Israeli official 
or authority can seek relief from the Supreme Court as a high court of justice.  
                                                     
650 Assaf Meydani, The Israeli Supreme Court and the Human Rights Revolution: Courts as Agenda Setters 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). By ‘judicial activism’ I mean that judges (especially in constitutional 
courts) are more willing to decide constitutional issues and to invalidate legislative or executive actions, 
sometimes by creatively interpreting laws according to their own views or preferences. See Kermit 
Roosevelt, ‘Judicial Activism’ (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013) <https://www.britannica.com/ 
topic/judicial-activism>. 
651 Bogoch and Holzman-Gazit, ‘Mutual Bonds: Media Frames and the Israeli High Court of Justice’, above 
n 583, 58. 
652 Keren Weinshall-Margel, ‘Attitudinal and Neo-Institutional Models of Supreme Court Decision Making: 
An Empirical and Comparative Perspective from Israel’ (2011) 8(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 556, 
566. 
653 See Suzie Navot, Constitutional Law of Israel (Kluwer Law International, 2007) 140–1. 
654 See Ibid 156. After Israel gained independence, the Knesset enacted a series of ‘Basic Laws’, relating 
to some fundamental features of the government. These laws were created with the intention that they 
would eventually form a Constitution. See Ibid 35–8. 
655 See s 15(c) to Basic Law: The Judiciary (1984). English translation available at <https://www.knesset. 
gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm>.  
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The Court is composed of 15 judges and it normally sits in panels of three. However, in 
matters that involve fundamental constitutional issues or other issues of particular 
importance it sits in panels of five, seven, nine or eleven judges.  
Historical and cultural circumstances gave rise to a dominant Supreme Court that has 
found itself well situated to deliberate over contested political issues.656 One important 
factor in this regard was that many of the first judges appointed to the Court were 
prominent Jewish legal scholars who were educated in Europe and wanted to 
implement in the young country the legal doctrines they absorbed from Europe’s 
established democratic institutions.657 Another reason for the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
gradual accumulation of power was the absence of a formal Israeli constitution. When 
the country was founded in 1948, Israel’s Declaration of Independence provided the 
basic formation of the new state and called for the drafting of a constitution. However, 
decades passed and, for various political reasons, a constitution was never drafted. The 
Israeli Supreme Court therefore often found itself responsible for shaping the young 
nation’s formative legal norms.658  
However, it was not until the 1970s that the Supreme Court became more heavily 
involved in controversies regarding public life. This process continued through the 1980s 
and climaxed in the 1990s, making the Israeli Supreme Court famous as a principal 
advocate of political pluralism in Israel.659 Studies have found a sharp increase in the 
volume and success of organised interest group litigation before the Court since the 
1980s.660 One study, for example, reviewed 2,869 petitions filed in the Supreme Court 
                                                     
656 See Hanna Lerner, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge University Press, 
2011).  
657 See Ido Porat, ‘The Use of Foreign Law in Israeli Constitutional Adjudication’ in Gideon Sapir, Daphne 
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against the government between 2000 and 2006, and found that the Court became 
involved in 18% of cases.661 Aharon Barak, who served as the President (Chief Justice) of 
the Supreme Court from 1995 to 2006 (having served as a Justice of the Supreme Court 
from 1975) was key in shaping the Supreme Court’s dominant role in Israel’s political 
culture.662 The Supreme Court under Barak as Chief Justice attracted international 
plaudits as well as criticism.663 Barak relied on certain ‘basic laws’ that the Israeli 
Parliament had introduced in 1992 to give semi-constitutional protection to basic 
human rights such as freedom of professional occupation or trade, human dignity and 
liberty.664 Barak considered the passing of these laws to be a turning point in Israel’s 
constitutional legal history, dubbing it a ‘constitutional revolution’. During Barak’s 
tenure as Chief Justice, the Israeli Supreme Court started to apply new standards of 
judicial review, based on the doctrines of reasonableness, rationality of the decision-
making process, and proportionality.665 Barak’s vision and leadership were instrumental 
in turning the Israeli Supreme Court into one of the most judicially activist constitutional 
courts in the world, challenging government regulations and parliamentary laws.666  
 
C. The deliberative features of the Israeli Supreme Court 
In this part I discuss the specific deliberative qualities of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
applying the criteria presented in the previous chapter. Analysing in depth the different 
features of the Israeli Supreme Court, their advantages and disadvantages and their 
transformation over the years is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather the object of 
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this part is to explain how certain features of the Israeli Supreme Court contribute to 
constitutional deliberations within Israeli society and make it possible for non-Israeli 
citizens to challenge Israeli laws and policies. 
i. Accessibility 
As discussed above, one may argue that the more people are able to participate and 
bring cases to the court, the more deliberative the court is. During the 1990s, access to 
the Israeli Supreme Court became fast, easy and inexpensive.667 This was enabled mainly 
through the broadening of standing and justiciability requirements so as to allow for 
more litigants and more issues to be brought before the Court.  
1) Standing requirements 
Probably the most conspicuous deliberative element of the Israeli Supreme Court is its 
very liberal right of standing (locus standi). Standing rules determine who can bring cases 
to the court and under what circumstances. In US courts for example, a plaintiff is 
required to show that she suffered personal injury caused by the defendant’s conduct 
and that this injury can be corrected with the requested remedy.668 
Until the 1980s, a similar approach existed in Israel. A petitioner against the State in the 
Supreme Court had to prove that she suffered a specific harm as a result of the State’s 
action in order to have standing before the Court; a personal interest in a public matter 
was not enough. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the Supreme Court expanded the right 
of standing to such a degree that some argue that the Court has essentially abolished 
any standing requirements.669  
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The Court now recognises ‘public petitioner’ standing in cases of public importance and 
receives petitions from NGOs and individuals even on matters of principle where there 
is no specific person who has suffered specific harm. As former Justice Procaccia 
explained in 2003: 
In our case law, we have greatly extended the standing of a public 
petitioner in matters of a public nature that concern the rule of law, 
the enforcement of constitutional principles, or where intervention 
is necessary to repair a substantial error in government operations. 
The status of the public petitioner has been recognized even where 
the public petitioner cannot claim to have been personally affected 
or harmed.670 
Importantly, one does not need to be an Israeli citizen in order to be able to seek justice 
from the Israeli Supreme Court. What is required in order to submit a petition is that the 
petitioner has an appropriate cause of action.671 That is, if a person’s rights under Israeli 
law have been violated by an Israeli government authority or official, that person can go 
directly the Supreme Court in its capacity as a high court of justice and seek a remedy. 
One obvious deliberative benefit of such standing rules is that it increases the 
accessibility of the Court and opens it to more individuals and organisations. Of course, 
the benefits of lax standing policies come at a cost. The judicial system can become 
overloaded and litigation can interfere with government policies and reduce efficiency. 
However, in cases of divided societies, the benefits of having an active court that gives 
voice to underrepresented groups and enjoys high levels of trust by all sectors of the 
public may be worth that price.  
For example, the broad standing approach taken by the Court also has what we may call 
a positive chilling effect on extreme political activists. Some radical political activists 
have realised they may get more media coverage and better practical results by 
submitting cases to the Court than by organising violent protests. An example of how 
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the accessibility of the Court helps to divert protest from violent to deliberative 
democratic avenues can be found in the legal battles surrounding the annual gay parade 
in Jerusalem: ‘Jerusalem Pride—Love Without Borders’.672 While gay parades in Tel Aviv 
have been held uninterrupted for many years, in Jerusalem gay parades faced strong 
opposition from religious groups. Over the years however, the battle over gay parades 
in Jerusalem was partly transposed to the Court, which ruled on several occasions that 
the parade should be allowed to take place, albeit in a specified area of the city.673 The 
fact that extreme religious activists chose to go to the Court, rather than trying to disrupt 
the parade violently, can be seen as a deliberative victory.674 It is difficult to imagine 
Ultra-Orthodox Jews sitting down together with gay activists in an attempt to reach an 
agreed compromise regarding the route of a gay parade in Jerusalem. Yet, this is 
effectively what happens in the Supreme Court each year, when both sides meet in 
Court before the parade takes place and eventually accept a compromise regarding the 
route and extent of the parade.675 
2) Amicus curiae 
The expansion of the right of standing was accompanied by a greater willingness by the 
Court to accept submissions and hear opinions of individuals who are not parties to the 
proceedings. In 1996, the Supreme Court started to accept submissions from third 
parties and NGOs as amicus curiae676 and even encouraged NGOs to join litigation and 
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present their perspectives on constitutional issues.677 In the words of former Chief 
Justice Dorit Beinisch: 
[I]n order to fulfil its role in a democratic society, the court needs to 
offer an effective, reliable address for those who seek justice. That 
is why I believe the court ought to open its gates to petitioners and 
allow relatively broad access. Standing requirements need to be 
liberal … . This is why human rights groups and other NGOs 
advocating for the rule of law have standing in our court … . [F]or 
the same reasons it opened its doors, the Supreme Court of Israel 
has avoided dismissing cases on grounds of threshold arguments, 
such as non-justifiability. 678 
 
3) Justiciability 
The concept of justiciability refers to whether a court, especially a constitutional court, 
considers a specific case as appropriate for judicial determination, based on the 
substance of the dispute. In some cases, a court may decide that an issue is non-
justiciable because it is political in nature and better fitted for determination by other 
bodies, such as the government or the legislator.679 
As mentioned above, since the 1980s, the Israeli Supreme Court has accepted cases that 
other courts may have found too political.680 It did so by using more flexible justiciability 
doctrines than those applied, for example, by the US Supreme Court.681 For example, 
the Israeli Supreme Court ruled over the question of whether there exists an ‘Israeli 
Nationality’.682 The Court also gave rulings in issues that concern military operations. For 
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example, the Court discussed the use of targeted killings.683 As Friedmann notes, 
although other countries use targeted killings, no court in any other country has seen fit 
to intervene in this issue.684 Overall, the Israeli Supreme Court decides on the merits of 
around 1500 cases a year, compared with only about 100 cases considered by the courts 
in the United States and Canada respectively.685 
4) The costs of accessibility  
The deliberative criterion of ‘accessibility’ requires that a court openly engage with as 
many interested parties as possible, and allow different kinds of petitioners to bring 
their grievances to the court. One can therefore argue that the more issues that are 
allowed before a court, the more deliberative that court is. Lax justiciability 
requirements will enable more democratic deliberation, as people would be able to 
bring before the court issues that otherwise may be deemed ‘too political’. However, it 
is impossible to thoroughly deliberate each and every case. Time and resources are 
limited and it is possible that the deliberative qualities of a constitutional court may be 
weakened if a court attempts to deal with too many cases.  
In the case of the Israeli Supreme Court, the changes in standing and justiciability 
requirement resulted in a variety of problems. For example, the broad standing and 
justiciability requirement caused the Court to be flooded with petitions.686 As a result, 
the time between the Court’s hearing of a case and its handing down of a decision may 
now take several years. The Court’s expansion into areas that were once considered 
non-justiciable has also caused backlash from politicians who in response have 
attempted to limit the Court’s power and influence.687 There are also those who criticise 
the broad standing and justiciability policies on normative grounds. Some argue that the 
Court’s intervention in military processes and operations has tied the hands of military 
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commanders and obstructed counter-terrorism efforts.688 Segev argues that by hearing 
‘public petitioners’ on issues of ‘general public importance’, the court deviates from its 
function as the protector of individuals, and transgresses into public debates that ought 
to be deliberated and decided by public representatives.689 
While there are challenges that may arise from an open court, one can still argue that 
the benefits of having an accessible constitutional court exceed the costs, especially in 
divided societies with large diaspora populations. As discussed above, the Israeli 
Supreme Court offers a place to sublimate violence and discord in Israeli society, which 
otherwise might be expressed through deeper, more violent, forms of division. The 
accessibility of the Supreme Court also allows for the inclusion of diaspora Jews in 
constitutional deliberations, as discussed in the next chapter.  
ii. Appointment of judges 
A court’s deliberative potential is also shaped by the system of appointing its judges. 
One can expect that a politicised appointment system will result in a more partisan 
court. Some argue that the unique system of appointing judges in Israel neutralises some 
issues that would otherwise undermine the deliberative qualities of a court.690 As noted 
by Edelman: ‘Israeli leaders have deliberately sought to create a judicial system 
insulated from an otherwise highly politicized society’.691 The independence of the 
judges in the Israeli Supreme Court is guaranteed by several features: (i) the process by 
which they are appointed; (ii) their term of office; (iii) the fact that they are not subject 
to any other authority or person; and (iv) immunity from criminal liability for any act 
performed under their judicial role.692 
 
Supreme Court judges are appointed with tenure, serving until they reach the age of 70. 
They are not dependent on the support of politicians for re-election. Judges are not 
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appointed directly by the executive or legislative branch, but rather by a special Judicial 
Selection Committee. This Committee is composed of nine members: three Supreme 
Court Justices, two cabinet ministers, two members of parliament (one from the 
coalition and one from the opposition) and two lawyers from the Israeli Bar Association 
(usually representing the largest parties of the Bar). Friedmann claims that the three 
Supreme Court judges hold too much power over the Committee appointments: 
[I]n practice the court’s sitting justices … served as a de facto 
nominating board that for all practical purposes usurped the power 
of the statutory committee. … [T]he justices were able to 
manoeuvre the nominating process in a way that allowed them to 
determine, in almost every case, who their colleagues would be.693 
… [I]t transpired that … the Judicial Selection Committee was not 
much more than a rubber stamp. The real decisions were made by 
the sitting justices.694 
However, the Committee’s composition makes it almost impossible for any particular 
group of members to promote appointments without gaining some support from other 
Committee members. The government controls only three seats (two cabinet ministers 
and one Knesset member), and the judges, even though in practice they always vote 
collectively as one block, do not have a majority and must form a ‘coalition’ with other 
members of the Committee in order to approve an appointment. This can cause 
problems, as occasionally the Committee is unable to reach an agreement and 
appointments of necessary judges become overdue. However the advantage of this 
method is that Committee members must reach a consensus and no political side is able 
to exclusively control the appointments.695 
iii. Reflective court 
I explained in the previous chapter why judges cannot fully represent all the different 
groups in a society. However, reflection of different groups and opinions within the 
society is important for effective democratic deliberation and for producing legitimacy. 
Although it is not a directly representative body, the Israeli Supreme Court is designed 
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to be reflective of the different major groups in Israeli society. As of March 2018, out of 
a total of 15 judges, four are women, four are religious Jews, and one is a Christian Arab. 
One judge, Neal Hendel, grew up in the Jewish diaspora before immigrating to Israel 
from the United States. Naturally, the bigger the quorum, the more reflective the Court 
can be of different viewpoints in society.696 
Edelman describes how, over the years, efforts have been made to appoint judges from 
different backgrounds. For example, as most judges were male and of Ashkenazi decent 
(that is, of European Jewish background), there were deliberate attempts to appoint 
women and judges of Sephardi decent (that is, Jews of Middle Eastern or North African 
background).697 However, judges and members of the Selection Committee always 
made it clear that ‘diversity’ considerations are subordinate to legal expertise and that 
all judges were appointed for being excellent jurists.698  
Friedmann claims that Supreme Court judges in the Judicial Selection Committee have 
treated the Court as a ‘family’ and blocked attempts to appoint to the Court judges who 
held different judicial philosophies to those held by Chief Justice Barak (e.g., 
conservatives who are against judicial activism).699 While this may have been true in the 
past, it seems that this is no longer the case. In the last round of appointments in 2017, 
the Committee approved the appointment of four new judges, two of which are 
considered to be conservatives.700 
iv. Dissenting opinions and intra-court dynamics 
Another deliberative criterion is the court’s incidence of dissenting opinions. Dissenting 
opinions give voice to minority views and remind the majority that other opinions are 
also possible and legitimate. Occasionally in constitutional cases, a minority view in the 
court may represent a majority view in society. 
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Studies have found a low level of dissent in the Israeli Supreme Court.701 Shachar et al. 
found dissenting opinions in 5.8% of cases, which they describe as a low rate of 
dissent.702 Eisenberg et al. have also found what they describe as a low level of dissent, 
albeit with higher levels of concurring opinions.703 These studies would suggest that the 
Israeli Supreme Court may – in one respect at least – be less deliberative than courts 
with higher rates of dissent. However, these studies need to be viewed in their context. 
The first study considered judgments dating before 1994, taking into account all cases 
that came before the Supreme Court, including criminal and civil appeals. In cases where 
the Court sits as High Court of Justice (which occurs in constitutional cases), the authors 
found a much higher dissent rate of 10.8%.704 Moreover, the second study examined 
only two years of data (2006-7) and while dissent rates were less than 2% overall, they 
were higher in discretionary cases.705  
There has been no examination of the dissent rate specifically in constitutional cases, 
which are the most relevant cases for this thesis’ assessment of the deliberativeness of 
the Court. As individuals and NGOs often try to challenge laws and policies of the Israeli 
government in the Supreme Court, many cases are dismissed at an early stage. I have 
examined the 15 cases in which the Supreme Court struck down a law (or a part of it) 
passed by the Knesset on the basis that it violated constitutional rights (see Appendix A 
at page 226). In nine of these cases there were dissenting opinions, which is a dissent 
rate of 60%. Seven of these cases had concurring opinions (46%) and only one case had 
neither a dissenting nor a concurring opinion. These findings suggest that one is likely to 
find dissenting and concurring opinions in major constitutional cases in the Israeli 
Supreme Court.  
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In this respect, the approach of the Israeli Supreme Court is significantly different from 
other constitutional courts. In Canada, for example, the practice of the Supreme Court 
is to attempt to reach a consensus and to present a unified position.706 In some 
European constitutional courts (for example in the Italian, French and Belgian courts) 
dissenting opinions are not allowed and judges are required to reach a unanimous 
decision.707 In some cases, there may be a deliberative advantage in finding an 
overlapping consensus among judges. However in divided societies, when consensus is 
often hard to reach, it may be more deliberatively beneficial to give voice to minority 
views, even if they are ultimately rejected.  
A study by Weinshall and Margel found that although court decisions in Israel generally 
correlate with the judges’ prior attitudes and ideologies, this correlation is weaker than 
the correlation among judges in the United States and Canada.708 This suggests that it is 
not as easy to predict the decisions of Israeli Supreme Court judges based on their 
background. It seems that deliberation that takes place in the Court succeeds, at least 
sometimes, at changing judges’ minds.  
v. Style of rulings 
Another deliberative criterion is that courts’ rulings should be written in a clear and 
engaging manner so that the general public can understand them. One criticism raised 
against the deliberative quality of US courts is that they often avoid difficult moral 
questions and favour technical and legalistic forms of reasoning over principled 
philosophical reasoning as required by deliberative theory.709 The Israeli Supreme Court, 
however, often delves into such questions, and has gained a reputation for engaging in 
moral and philosophical reasoning.710 Nevertheless, there are also those who criticise 
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the length and style of some of the Supreme Court’s rulings. Rulings are often hundreds 
of pages long and some judges tend to write in a poetic or academic style, using phrases 
and references to old Jewish texts that few in today’s society could follow easily.711 As 
one former judge of the Israeli Supreme Court described: 
Judges digress from what is needed to decide on the case. They 
write too much and unnecessarily overquote things that are well 
known and agreed upon. They also address subjects that are not 
necessary for the judgment (‘obiter’) and develop theories where it 
is unnecessary. I think that is a contagious disease. Judges learn this 
from each other and they think there’s something nice in it. 
Sometimes a judgment really is written nicely and interestingly, but 
it is not needed in order to deliver a ruling. If someone wants to 
write academic papers – go for it … . [S]ometimes there is no choice, 
but when rulings extend for hundreds of pages, even in major issues, 
it is unnecessary.712 
While the length of Supreme Court judgments has indeed expanded over the years, 
peaking in the mid-1990s, this trend started to reverse since the beginning of the 
2000s.713 The need for shorter judgments ought to be balanced against the need to 
provide well-reasoned judgments, particularly in constitutional issues. The judgments I 
review in the case study section, in my view, achieve this balance. The length of these 
judgments range between 10-80 pages. This seem reasonable considering the 
importance of the issues discussed and the desire to provide thorough justifications and 
allow for dissenting opinions. While long judgments in lower courts should be avoided, 
in constitutional courts there is often a genuine need to provide comprehensive reasons 
and detailed explanations.  
vi. Dialogue between the court and other institutions  
The Israeli Supreme Court’s ability to strike down laws of the Knesset is a source of 
constant tensions between these institutions. As discussed earlier, Justice Barak 
considered some Israeli ‘basic laws’ to be de-facto constitutional laws that allow the 
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Supreme Court to overrule legislation or government policies that contradict these 
‘basic laws’.714 Since the enactment of the basic laws for ‘freedom of occupation’ and 
‘human dignity and liberty’ in 1994, the Israeli Supreme Court has struck down 15 laws 
enacted by the Knesset, arguing that each law (or a part of it) unconstitutionally violated 
a protected human right under the basic law. The most recent example was in 
September 2017 when the Court struck down a law that exempted Ultra-Orthodox Jews 
from mandatory military service.715 There are repeated attempts by Knesset members 
to limit the Court’s power to disqualify laws enacted by the Knesset.716 The fact that 
politicians are aware of the Court’s power and willingness to disqualify unconstitutional 
laws forces them to consider more carefully certain laws before they enact them. 
However, in some cases, politicians enact a law despite knowing that this law is going to 
be disqualified by the Court. In this way, politicians can demonstrate to their 
constituencies that they have made an effort to satisfy them, and it is the Court that 
prevents the politicians from fulfilling their promises.717  
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s approach and its rulings were often met with 
harsh criticism from opponents of ‘judicial activism’.718 The battle between the Court 
and the executive branch peaked in 2007 when Professor Daniel Friedmann, a strong 
critic of the Court’s judicial activism, was appointed as Justice Minister. Friedmann was 
determined to promote certain reforms regarding the Court’s authority to strike down 
Knesset legislation and the method of appointing judges to the Court. Friedmann’s 
appointment and his plans were met with harsh criticism from both retired as well as 
                                                     
714 Aharon Barak, ‘A Constitutional Revolution: Israel’s Basic Laws’ (1993) 4(3) Constitutional Forum 83; 
Gideon Sapir, ‘Constitutional Revolutions: Israel as a Case-Study’ (2009) 5(4) International Journal of Law 
in Context 355. 
715 HCJ 1877/14 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v the Knesset (12.9.2017). See Yonah 
Jeremy Bob, Court Orders Government To Pass New Law Or Draft All Haredim (September 12, 2017) The 
Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Court-orders-govt-to-pass-
new-law-or-draft-all-haredim-504901>. 
716 So far, these attempts have been unsuccessful. See, for example, Jonathan Lis, Israeli Ministers Pass 
Buck on Bill to Restrict Supreme Court’s Power (23 November 2015) Haaretz Daily Newspaper 
<http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.687745>; Roni Sofer, Government Approves Motion 
to Limit Supreme Court’s Power (7 September 2008) Ynetnews <http://www.ynetnews.com/ 
articles/0,7340,L-3593071,00.html>. 
717 See, for example, Hezki Baruch, Liberman: Supreme Court will ‘100% Certainly’ disqualify Law (30 
January 2017) Israel National News <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/224103>. 
718 See Navot, above n 589, 198. 
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serving Supreme Court judges. Both the Court and the Justice Minister used the media 
in their public relations campaigns, and the Court’s image was damaged as a result of 
this conflict.719 For example, the then president of the Supreme Court, Dorit Beinisch, 
slammed Friedmann for his ‘attempts to hinder the moves’ of the Court, calling his 
proposals ‘superficial’ and arguing that the claim that the Court was trying to seize 
authority from the Knesset was baseless and misleading.720 Friedmann responded by 
saying that ‘in the judge’s eyes, the only legitimate form of intervention is “more power 
to them”’.721  
vii. Effects on public deliberation  
Despite the tensions discussed above, most of the time the Court enjoys the support of 
the media and the public. As Bogoch and Holman-Gazit show, coverage of the Israeli 
Supreme Court by both elite and popular newspapers ‘typically frames the Court as a 
powerful, rule-governed, effective protector of the citizen against corrupt, self-
interested, or merely incompetent politicians and bureaucrats’.722 They suggest that the 
supportive media ‘provides legitimacy for the expansion of the Court’s power at the 
expense of the other branches of government’.723 
Media coverage is vital in order to encourage public deliberations regarding the Court’s 
rulings. As discussed, cases deliberated in court can foster deliberation among the 
general public. Litigation before the Israeli Supreme Court is intensively covered by the 
media with reports and opinion pieces stimulating public debate over the issues being 
discussed at the Court. Due to such extensive media coverage ‘interest groups could 
derive significant symbolic benefit as well as public exposure even when they did not 
win the litigation itself’.724  
                                                     
719 See Friedmann, above n 669, 330–6. 
720 Friedmann under Fire for Plans to Cut Court Power (15 November 2007) The Jerusalem Post 
<http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Friedmann-under-fire-for-plans-to-cut-court-power>. 
721 Ibid. 
722 Bogoch and Holzman-Gazit, ‘Mutual Bonds: Media Frames and the Israeli High Court of Justice’, above 
n 583, 55. 
723 Ibid 4. 
724 Dotan, Lawyering for the Rule of Law: Government Lawyers and the Rise of Judicial Power in Israel, 
above n 660, 39. 
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D. Summary 
During the last 40 years, the Israeli Supreme Court implemented various practices that 
not only enabled but actually encouraged more individuals and organisations to bring 
their grievances to the Court. As a result of these legal policy changes, Israeli politicians, 
NGOs and individuals have increasingly turned to the Court, asking it to intervene in 
national affairs, government policies, and even parliamentary procedures.725 According 
to Dotan: 
It seems that in Israel of the twenty-first century no words can 
describe the important role the HCJ [High Court of Justice] plays in 
public life. I am doubtful if there is another community so affected 
by and dependent upon the decision making of a judicial forum as is 
the political community in Israel affected by the HCJ. Similarly, there 
seems to be no other judicial forum so deeply involved in the 
economic, political and social arenas.726  
Not everyone is convinced, though, that these changes are for the best. According to 
Friedmann: 
The entire legal system is paying a heavy price for the Supreme 
Court’s decision to assume, at its own initiative, a role entirely 
different from that assigned to it by the Knesset. It has presumed to 
become a constitutional court in a country that lacks a constitution. 
Despite its occasional confrontation with the elected branches (and some might say 
because of it), the Israeli Supreme Court enjoys high levels of trust from the Israeli public 
as compared to other institutions such as the parliament, the military and the media.727 
Notably, it is the most trusted institution among the Israeli Arab minority.728 Favourable 
media coverage of the Israeli Supreme Court and high levels of trust among the public 
                                                     
725 Dotan and Hofnung, ‘Legal Defeats--Political Wins: Why Do Elected Representatives Go to Court?’, 
above n 665; Dotan, Lawyering for the Rule of Law: Government Lawyers and the Rise of Judicial Power in 
Israel, above n 660, 39. 
726 Yoav Dotan, ‘Pre-Petitions and Constitutional Dilemmas Regarding the Role of Government Lawyers’ 
(2004) 7(1) Mishpat Umimshal 159 [in Hebrew] 159, 161. As translated and quoted in Meydani, ‘The 
Intervention of the Israeli High Court of Justice in Government Decisions: An Empirical, Quantitative 
Perspective’, above n 661, 175. 
727 See Hermann et al, above n 540, 161. 
728 Ibid 41. For more on the relationship between the Israeli Supreme Court and the Arab minority see 
Ilan Saban, ‘The Arab-Palestinian Minority and the Supreme Court: A Portrayal (and Prognosis) Not in 
Black and White’ (2005) 8 Mishpat U’Mimshal 23 [in Hebrew]. 
171 
 
help to maintain the Court’s image as an apolitical and independent watchdog of 
democracy and to reinforce its legitimacy. In this context, one can understand why so 
many individuals and organisations find the Israeli Supreme Court as a suitable arena for 
constitutional deliberations.  
In the next chapter I review cases in which different petitioners attempted to change 
public policies and government actions through litigation in the Supreme Court. These 
examples focus on cases where the petitioners included individuals or NGOs that 
represented groups of non-citizens, such as diaspora people or illegal migrants.  
 
E. Illustrative Cases 
In the previous part I reviewed the deliberative qualities of the Israeli Supreme Court. In 
this part, I discuss key cases from the Israeli Supreme Court that demonstrate how these 
qualities are applied in practice and how a constitutional court can serve as an effective 
deliberative democratic body in a divided society. This part will show how, by taking 
cases to the Supreme Court, diaspora Jews (and other groups of non-citizens) managed 
to draw public attention to, initiate debates among the Israeli public on, and eventually 
change, Israeli government policies. 
The issues raised in these cases concerned the interests and preferences of Jews who 
live in the diaspora, or other groups of non-citizens, and involved directly and indirectly 
individuals who were not Israeli citizens. They were involved in these cases as petitioners 
or respondents or by funding and assisting the individuals and NGOs who submitted or 
responded to the petitions. This involvement was made possible due to certain 
deliberative features of the Israeli Supreme Court. Although some deliberative features 
(such as accessibility) come at a cost, they have made the Court a largely effective 
vehicle for diaspora communities to influence kin-state policies.  
The case studies allow us to observe how different deliberative democratic principles 
can be promoted by a constitutional court in a divided society with a large and influential 
diasporic population. These deliberative democratic principles are manifested through 
these cases in three major ways. First, by the types of cases brought before the Court 
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(including cases that are arguably non-justiciable because of their political nature). 
Second, by the nature of the petitioners that brought these cases to the Court, that is, 
non-citizen individuals and foreign and local NGOs. Third, by the kind of deliberation 
that took place in the Court when dealing with these cases: for example, the interactions 
between the judges and the litigants, the different opinions presented by the different 
judges and the effect of the decisions on public discourse. Not all cases exemplify all the 
deliberative features discussed above, and I will only discuss the relevant criteria that 
apply to each specific case. 
Although I outline the relevant details of the various cases, the exact facts of each case 
and the content of the final rulings are not central for the contention of this thesis. 
Rather, the importance of these cases for this thesis is in demonstrating, first, the 
particular deliberative democratic features exercised by the Supreme Court when 
examining these cases; second, how due to these deliberative features, diaspora people 
and other groups of non-citizens were able to challenge Israeli laws and policies; and 
third, the effects of these cases on the relationship between Israel and the Jewish 
diaspora.  
 
The case that has perhaps caught the most attention among diaspora Jews in recent 
years is the Women of the Wall (‘WoW’) case. WoW is an international group of Jewish 
women that since 1988 has been fighting a legal battle, with significant religious and 
social implications, for what it asserts is the right of women to pray at the Western Wall 
in Jerusalem while performing some unorthodox religious rituals.729 Situated at the 
heart of Jerusalem’s old city, the Western Wall (the ‘Kotel’) is Judaism’s most sacred site 
and is managed by the Israeli Jewish Rabbinate. As such, its synagogue-like plaza is run 
according to the rules of the Jewish Orthodox denomination, which means that the 
prayer areas are segregated for men and women. Members of WoW wish to perform 
                                                     
729 See Women of the Wall website at <http://womenofthewall.org.il/about/>. See also Frances Raday, 
‘Claiming Equal Religious Personhood : Women of the Wall’s Constitutional Saga’ in Burger Winfried and 
Karayanni Michael (eds), Religion in the Public Sphere: a Comparative Analysis of German, Israeli, 
American and International law (Springer, 2007) 255; Pnina Lahav, ‘Up Against the Wall: Women’s Legal 
Struggle to Pray at the Western Wall in Jerusalem’ (2000) 16(1) Israel Studies Bulletin 19. For a collection 
of essays on the group and its battle, see Phyllis Chesler and Rivka Haut (eds), Women of the Wall: Claiming 
Sacred Ground at Judaism’s Holy Site (Jewish Lights, 2003). 
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certain rituals at the women’s section of the site which, according to Orthodox tradition, 
are reserved for men only. These rituals include, for example, wearing prayer shawls and 
reading from the Torah collectively and out loud. While WoW members perceive their 
right to perform such rituals at the site as a basic human right, many Orthodox Jews 
vehemently object to this and regard these acts as a provocation that amounts to 
‘blasphemy and a desecration of the holy place’.730  
 
What is particularly important in the context of this thesis is the fact that a substantial 
percentage of WoW’s original founders and many of its current members and 
supporters are Jewish women from the diaspora. The first service conducted by WoW 
occurred in 1989 following an International Jewish Feminist Conference held in 
Jerusalem. That group included American women and Israeli women who grew up in the 
diaspora (mostly North America) and only later immigrated to Israel.731 These women 
wanted to pray together at the Western Wall in Jerusalem, following the traditions of 
their own prayer groups in North America.732 However, when WoW members tried to 
conduct their services at the Wall, Orthodox men and women gathered around them in 
protest. In some cases, WoW activists were arrested and removed from the site by 
Israeli police for ‘disturbing public order’.733 
 
From the very early days of their fight, WoW saw the Israeli Supreme Court as the body 
that may be able to protect and guarantee their ritual rights. With the backing of major 
American Jewish organisations, WoW launched a series of legal proceedings designed 
to advance their cause and push the Israeli establishment to allow its members to 
                                                     
730 See ‘Women of the Wall’ Are Detained Praying at Kotel (19 August 2012) The Jerusalem Post 
<http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-News/Women-of-the-Wall-are-detained-praying-at-
Kotel>. 
731 See WoW website at http://womenofthewall.org.il/about/board-and-staff/. Although women who 
immigrated to Israel are no longer diasporic Jews, at the time when the first petition was submitted to 
the Court some of them were still American residents. Also, as will be described below, they continued to 
receive major support mainly from diaspora Jews.  
732 Norma Baumel Joseph, ‘Women in Orthodoxy: Conventional and Contentious’ in Riv-Ellen Prell (ed), 
Women Remaking American Judaism (Wayne State University Press, 2007) 181, 198. 
733 ‘Women of the Wall’ Are Detained Praying at Kotel, above n 730. The exact offence was violation of 
Protection of The Holy Places Law (1967) which requires visitors at the Western Wall to pray according to 
“local custom”. 
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perform their monthly rituals at the Wall. The Israeli Supreme Court ended up being 
heavily involved in their cause, giving three important rulings on the issue.  
i. First ruling 
The petitioners in the first case were four Jewish women residents of Jerusalem and six 
Jewish women residents of the United States who founded the International Committee 
for Women of the Wall. 734 In that case, the Court eventually reached a mixed conclusion: 
on one hand, the judges held that members of WoW have the right to pray according to 
their custom next to the Western Wall and that their freedom of religion must be 
protected. On the other hand, the Court dismissed the petitions as it believed it was not 
suitable for the Court to treat this case as a regular legal dispute. As the case concerned 
questions of constitutional nature such as gender equality and religious freedom, the 
Court asked the Israeli government and the Knesset to re-evaluate the situation and 
provide a solution that would take into account both WoW’s right to freedom of religion 
as well as the sensitivities of the Orthodox Jewish community.735 In accordance with the 
Court’s orders, the government set up a committee that attempted to come up with 
agreed arrangements as to where exactly and under what conditions WoW could pray 
and perform their rituals. The committee included representatives of all religious 
streams as well as a representative from the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs.736 The 
committee decided against allowing WoW to pray at the Wall, but allocated to them an 
alternative site nearby.  
                                                     
734 HC 257/89, 2410/90 Hoffman et. al. v. The Guardian of the Western Wall [1994] IsrSC 48 (2) 263 
(‘Hoffman v. The Guardian of the Western Wall’). 
735 One of the Judges in this case was Justice Menachem Elon, who was also an Orthodox Rabbi. Although 
all judges reached a similar conclusion, Justice Elon’s concurring opinion was ostensibly less supportive of 
WoW goals. 
736 See Additional Hearing HCJ 4128/00, Director of Prime Minister’s Office v. Hoffman [2003] IsrSC 47(3) 
289 (‘Additional Hearing’) Justice Cheshin [32]. An unofficial English translation of the ruling is available 
at <http://www.womenofthewall.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Unofficial-Translation-BAGATZ-
Decision-April-6-2003.pdf>. 
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ii. Second ruling 
Unhappy with the decisions of the committee, WoW petitioned the Supreme Court 
again. As in the first petition, Israeli petitioners joined forces with American 
petitioners.737 This time, the Court ruled more clearly in favour of WoW: 
The first decision recognized, in practice, the basic rights of the 
plaintiffs to pray according to their custom in the prayer area near 
the Kotel, and the committees that dealt with the matter following 
the first decision did not do what was asked of them, according to 
the terms of the decision … .738 
However, the judges handed the matter over to the government yet again, ordering it 
to find a solution that would allow WoW to perform their rituals at the Wall within six 
months. Some Ultra-Orthodox Knesset members tried to counter the Court’s orders by 
proposing a law, in 2001, which would make it illegal for women to perform religious 
practices at the Western Wall. In the meantime, it became clear that the government 
and the Court had underestimated just how popular this case was among diaspora Jews. 
Although the law proposed by Ultra-Orthodox parliamentarians failed to pass in the 
Knesset, members of WoW continued to be detained by the police while performing 
religious rituals at the Wall.739 Such arrests caused anger and concern among some in 
the Jewish diaspora, which led Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to 
intervene and ask the Chairman of the Jewish Agency740 to find a way to make the site 
more accessible to all streams of Judaism.741 
iii. Third ruling 
The continued actions of WoW angered some Orthodox groups and a few Orthodox 
Knesset members pressured the State Attorney to appeal the second ruling and ask the 
                                                     
737 HCJ 3359/95 Hoffman v Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office [2000] IsrSC 54(2) (‘Hoffman v 
Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office ‘), 345. The petitioners were Annat Hoffman, Haia 
Backermann and the International Committee for Women of the Wall.  
738 Hoffman v Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, above n 737, p 366.  
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Jewish Agency see below p 203. 
741 See Jodi Rudoren, Israel to Review Curbs on Women’s Prayer at Western Wall (25 December 2012) The 
New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/26/world/middleeast/israeli-law-curbing-womens-
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Supreme Court to hold an additional hearing. Leave to appeal was granted in 2003.742 
Interestingly, in the next hearing on the merits, an NGO named ‘Am Ehad’ (Hebrew for 
‘One People’) asked to join the proceedings as amicus curiae in support of the State’s 
appeal against WoW. This organisation claimed to represent a variety of Orthodox Jews 
living in Israel and in the diaspora who are concerned by WoW’s intention to change 
‘well established prayer customs at the Western Wall’.743 By a slim majority of five 
against four judges, the Supreme Court ultimately overturned its previous decision and 
decided to endorse the State’s solution, according to which WoW would not be allowed 
to hold their services at the Wall, but rather at a site near the Wall known as ‘Robinson’s 
Arch’. 
iv. The battle continues 
Despite the Supreme Court decision in the additional hearing, the legal battle continued. 
Members of WoW regularly continued to attempt to pray at the Wall and were arrested 
on several occasions. In 2013, WoW won an important ruling when the Jerusalem 
District Court held that the police had no cause for arresting WoW activists.744 Efforts to 
reach an agreement were finally successful in 2016, when the government decided to 
formally establish and recognise a pluralist prayer section at the Western Wall (albeit 
not in the main plaza) where women and men could pray together and perform non-
Orthodox rituals (the ‘2016 compromise’). This decision was a compromise between 
Orthodox Jews that demanded that no non-Orthodox services should be held at the 
Western Wall, and WoW supporters who demanded that WoW members should be 
allowed to hold their services at the main plaza. Although the exact terms and schedule 
for implementing this arrangement remained unclear, it was undeniably a great 
achievement for WoW and their supporters. Leaders of WoW and other Jewish 
                                                     
742 Additional Hearing, above n 736. 
743 See ibid, Justice Cheshin [37-8]. The Court rejected the request to join the additional hearing as the 
court found ‘Am Ehad’ arguments are similar to the State’s arguments.  
744 CA 23834-04-13 State of Israel v. Ras et al. (24.4.2013). English translation available at 
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that the section of the Law of Holy Places, which requires visitors at the Western Wall to pray according 
to ‘local custom’ should be interpreted pluralistically and not in a strict Orthodox Jewish manner (see 
sections 7-9 of the judgment).  
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progressive movements have declared that it was a ‘historic’ step to greater equality for 
non-Orthodox Jews, whether living in Israel or in the diaspora.745 However, in June 2017, 
following pressure from ultra-Orthodox parties in the coalition, the Israeli government 
decided to freeze the implementation of the 2016 compromise.746 
v. Deliberative features 
This case presents a good example of how the deliberative features of the Israeli 
Supreme Court discussed in the previous parts came into play and allowed diaspora Jews 
to influence Israeli politics and policies – albeit not necessarily with a clear ‘win’ for their 
own perspective or interests.  
Standing requirements 
As discussed above, broad standing rules increase the accessibility of the Court. They 
open the gate to more individuals and organisations who are able challenge government 
policies. In this case, the Court allowed non-Israeli residents and a foreign NGO (the 
International Committee for Women of the Wall) to be part of the proceedings and to 
petition against various Israeli officials and authorities.747 Even though the Court did not 
allow all NGOs to formally join the petition, it reviewed their submissions and addressed 
their arguments.748 
Justiciability 
As discussed, permissive justiciability requirements enable more issues that otherwise 
may be deemed ‘too political’ to be disused by a court. The WoW case is an example of 
such an issue, as it was apparent that accepting the petitioner’s position would anger a 
large group of Orthodox Jews and might cause a backlash from their representatives in 
                                                     
745 See Jeremy Sharon, State Recognition of Rights of Non-Orthodox Won at Cost of Original Fight of 
Women of the Wall (1 February 2016) The Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/State-
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the Knesset. Indeed, the Court was at first reluctant to intervene. Even though the Court 
heard the petitioners in the first ruling and was sympathetic towards their claims, the 
Court eventually chose not to issue explicit orders to the government and preferred to 
allow the government some time to reach a solution. The Court took unusual steps in 
order to try and reach a compromise that would relieve it from the uncomfortable 
situation of having to rule in favour of the petitioners, knowing that this would anger 
many public representatives in the government and in the Knesset. For example, during 
court proceedings in 2000, three judges of the Supreme Court joined representatives of 
WoW, the Israeli government, the police and the Antiquities Authority for a tour around 
the Wall in Jerusalem, trying to find an alternative suitable site for WoW.749 Only after 
the government failed to make any progress and the attempts to reach an agreed 
compromise failed did the Court start to actively intervene to rule on the merits of the 
case. The Court kept stressing that compromise was the preferred solution, and that the 
Court would have preferred to avoid ruling in favour of one of the parties, for example: 
In the course of our deliberations we tried to bring the litigants’ 
positions closer together; we tried but did not succeed.750 
From our strong desire to attempt to find an appropriate solution, 
and a peaceful one, to the continuing dispute between the litigants, 
we decided that we too will visit ‘Robinson’s Arch’.751 
It saddens us that the litigants could not find a way to bridge over 
the gap between them and could not walk on the narrow bridge. It 
would have been possible and it would have been appropriate to 
find a suitable arrangement.752 
We can see therefore that in this case the Court was somewhat ambivalent on the issue 
of justiciability. On one hand it accepted the petition and assumed justiciability, but on 
the other hand it tried to press the parties to reach a compromise so that it would not 
have to rule in one of the parties’ favour. This approach is deliberative in the sense that 
it gives the parties a chance to present their arguments before the Court and encourage 
public debate. On the other hand, when a case is settled outside the courtroom, it gets 
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less attention and media coverage, and there is no published ruling that explains how a 
decision was reached based on the different positions.  
Dialogue between the court and other institutions 
The Court gave three different rulings on the case, including one additional hearing – a 
rare process that is only reserved for highly sensitive cases. It reversed previous 
decisions and changed its position in response to government actions. By such 
measures, the Court actively contributed to the improvement of the process of 
democratic discussion and decision making.753 In the first ruling the Court asked the 
government to find a compromise that would take into account both sides’ aspirations 
and sensitivities. As a result of the Court’s orders, the government set up a special 
committee that included representatives from various Jewish streams, in Israel and the 
diaspora, in an attempt to find an agreed solution.754 As a result of the second ruling, 
Ultra-Orthodox parties in the Knesset attempted to change the law so as to completely 
forbid WoW activities at the Wall. It is possible that some Judges were concerned by 
these attempts, and these concerns led them to reverse the second ruling.  
Style of the rulings 
The rulings of the Court were long and the Court considered at length the arguments 
raised by both the petitioners and the respondents. Although long judgments may 
discourage ordinary people from reading them, in cases such as these it is important to 
balance length considerations with the need for each judge to engage respectfully with 
different viewpoints. The Court repeatedly stressed the importance of the Wall as a 
place of unity and worship for all Jews.755 The first ruling, for example, was 58 pages 
long. In his judgment, President Shamgar reiterated the importance of exercising 
patience and tolerance from both sides: 
[W]e have repeatedly emphasized that the sons and daughters of a 
free society, which has dignity of humanity as a basic rule, are called 
upon to honour the personal feelings and sensitivities of the 
individual ... [W]e have stated that a free society limits setting 
restrictions on the serious choices of the individual and behaves 
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with patience and tolerance and even attempts to understand the 
other, even regarding matters that do not seem to be acceptable or 
desirable in the eyes of the majority.756 
This quote provides an example of how, in his ruling, Shamgar signalled to both 
communities that they need to be more considerate of each other. Shamgar asked the 
Progressive community to be more aware of Orthodox community sensitivities, while 
asking the Orthodox Community to be more tolerant of so-called ‘undesirable’ activities.  
Dissenting opinions and intra-court dynamics 
There was no consensus among the judges in the first and third rulings, which included 
concurring and dissent opinions. The second ruling was exceptional in that all three 
judges agreed that the government failed to provide a suitable solution within the 
timeframe set by the first ruling. The panels in the first and third rulings included 
religious judges (Orthodox Jews), who unsurprisingly took a different view to that of the 
other judges. This shows the importance of having a reflective Court that includes judges 
from different backgrounds. In their judgements, the Orthodox judges gave voice to 
views held by substantial parts of the Israeli society (albeit minority views), and so other 
judges had to address these views in their judgments. In addition, the fact that there 
were dissenting and concurring opinions is another indication of the Court’s deliberative 
qualities. 
Effects on public deliberation  
The Court’s rulings fostered deliberation over many issues, including the conflict 
between diaspora Jews and Israeli Orthodox Jews; gender equality in the religious 
context and religious pluralism in general. As litigation continued, public debate ensued 
and the rulings were widely discussed in the media. Numerous articles, radio interviews 
and television segments were and still are dedicated to the issues raised by this case.757 
The continuous coverage in the media of the Court’s rulings resulted in increased 
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support for WoW from ordinary Israelis and politicians, as well as more demonstrations 
against them.758  
vi. Diaspora influence on Israeli politics 
It was clear from the start of this dispute that there was a huge difference in the 
attitudes towards WoW between diaspora Jews and Israeli Jews. For example, in a 
meeting with progressive Jewish Rabbis in the United Kingdom, the Head of the Jewish 
Agency759 said that since he had been tasked with tackling the issue of WoW, he had 
received tens of thousands of letters and emails from Jews in the diaspora, and less than 
a hundred letters from Israelis.760  
Interestingly, Israel’s secular society failed to support WoW, at least during the first 
years of their battle. Most Israelis remained indifferent to the legal battle that took place 
in the Israeli Supreme Court between groups of liberal diaspora Jews and Ultra-Orthodox 
Jews. Many Israelis saw this issue as an internal disagreement among religious 
communities and simply considered WoW and their battle as irrelevant to the daily lives 
of ordinary, secular Israelis.761 As one WoW activist described it with frustration: ‘secular 
Israelis do not see this as their problem; to them it’s a bunch of crazy American ladies’.762 
While failing to gain substantial support from the general Israeli public, WoW enjoyed 
significant support from the Jewish diaspora, especially in North America, where the 
International Committee for Women of the Wall (ICWoW) was established. American 
Jewish feminists became key activists in the campaign to create a space for WoW 
members to worship publicly at the Wall.763 Even Supreme Court judges involved in the 
case were surprised to discover just how important and sensitive this issue was to 
                                                     
758 See, for example, Loud protests as Women of the Wall mark 25th anniversary (4 November 2013) The 
Times of Israel <https://www.timesofisrael.com/women-of-the-wall-to-mark-25th-anniversary-amid-
protests/>. See also WoW website at <http://www.womenofthewall.org.il/full-history/>.  
759 The Jewish Agency is the largest Jewish NGO in the world, see below p 205. 
760 Reform Rabbis Meet with Natan Sharansky (25 April 2013) Press Releases - The Movement for Reform 
Judaism <http://news.reformjudaism.org.uk/press-releases/reform-rabbis-meet-with-natan-sharansky. 
html>. 
761 See Renee Ghert-Zand, Where ‘Rock Star’ Anat Hoffman Turns Raging Feminist (20 April 2013) The 
Times of Israel <http://www.timesofisrael.com/where-rock-star-anat-hoffman-turns-raging-feminist/#!>. 
762 Jodi Rudoren, At Western Wall, a Divide Over Prayer Deepens (22 December 2012) The New York Times 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/world/middleeast/at-western-wall-a-divide-over-prayer-
deepens.html>. 
763 Riv-Ellen Prell (ed), Women Remaking American Judaism (Wayne State University Press, 2007) 4. 
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diaspora Jews.764 For many American Jews, WoW members became very well-known 
and were seen as heroes of Jewish religious pluralism. Israel’s Ambassador to the United 
States was flooded with complaints from diaspora Jews.765 As Rosner observed, the 
battle for religious freedom at the Western Wall is an ‘Americanized and American-
imported battle for religious moderation and tolerance’.766 According to one Jewish 
activist: 
Diaspora Jews are more outraged by the treatment of Women of 
the Wall than Israelis, because they feel a deep connection to the 
Kotel, and they have grown up in countries with greater religious 
freedom… [O]ne expects Jews all over the world to support Israel 
[but] Israel must understand what’s important to them, and this is 
important to them: the Kotel and women’s rights.767 
It is clear that the 2016 compromise came as a result of the extensive legal pressure 
exerted by WoW and their supporters in the diaspora.768 The Court was responsive to 
the significant attention this case received in the Jewish diaspora. The continuous 
support WoW received from North American Jewry and the Progressive Jewish 
movements around the world countered the political power of the ultra-Orthodox 
Jewish political parties in the Israeli government and forced Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s hand. As Sharon noted: 
The prime minister realised that the denial of rights and standing for 
non-Orthodox Jews at the Western Wall was an open and festering 
wound in Israel-Diaspora relations that threatened, along with 
other issues, the critical support of North American Jewry for the 
Jewish state … . [T]he feelings of alienation felt by significant 
elements of Diaspora Jewry when they came to the Western Wall, 
and their outrage at the treatment of non-Orthodox Jews in Israel, 
was ultimately something Netanyahu could not ignore.769 
                                                     
764 Interview by Shay Keinan with former President of the Supreme Court, Dorit Beinisch, 17.6.2015 [on 
file with author]. 
765 See Rudoren, above n 762. 
766 Ghert-Zand, above n 761. 
767 Melanie Lidman, ‘Diaspora Jews Show Solidarity with Women of the Wall with “Shema Flashmob”’ (23 
October 2012) The Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-News/Diaspora-Jews-
stand-with-Women-of-the-Wall>. 
768 See Sharon, above n 745. 
769 Ibid. 
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The ultra-Orthodox political parties managed however to push back, and to achieve the 
freezing of the 2016 compromise. This decision angered Jewish diaspora communities, 
and led the board of the Jewish Agency770 to cancel a gala dinner scheduled with 
Netanyahu in Jerusalem.771 Dozens of Jewish Diaspora leaders vowed to fight the Israeli 
government’s decision to retract its commitment to build an egalitarian prayer pavilion 
at the Western Wall.772 
The WoW case is therefore an instructive example of how the Jewish diaspora used the 
deliberative features of the Israeli Supreme Court to promote interests and rights of 
diaspora Jews, despite strong resistance from powerful Orthodox politicians within the 
Knesset and the Israeli government. Through litigation in the Court, diaspora Jews 
managed to raise awareness of issues of religious pluralism in Israel. Due to the ongoing 
protests by diaspora Jews, and despite initial indifference, many Israelis have eventually 
joined in support of WoW.773  
 
Another sensitive issue that divides Israelis and diaspora Jews is the question of how 
one can become a Jew and join the Jewish people. This is an important issue as according 
to Israeli law, Jews and their families are entitled to immigrate to Israel and receive 
support and benefits from the government. 
i. Background 
The questions of ‘who is a Jew’ and how a non-Jew can convert to Judaism have been 
discussed among Jewish scholars for thousands of years and are still fiercely debated.774 
                                                     
770 The Jewish Agency is the largest Jewish NGO in the world, see p 205. 
771 See Harriet Sherwood, Jewish diaspora angry as Netanyahu scraps Western Wall mixed prayer plan’ 
(26 June 2017) The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/26/jewish-diaspora-angry-
as-netanyahu-scraps-western-wall-mixed-prayer-plan>.  
772 See Raphael Ahren,’In Knesset, Diaspora leaders vow to undo Western Wall decision’ (27 June 2017) 
The Times of Israel <http://www.timesofisrael.com/in-knesset-diaspora-leaders-vow-to-undo-western-
wall-decision/>. 
773 See Judy Maltz, The New Orthodox Face of Women of the Wall (19 April 2013) Haaretz Daily Newspaper 
<http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-features/the-new-orthodox-face-of-women-of-
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774 See, for example, Maimonides, Isurei Biah, 13:14. For recent discussions see Leonard J Greenspoon 
(ed), Who Is A Jew?: Reflections on History, Religion, and Culture (Purdue University Press, 2014). 
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In modern times, the debate has gained new significant ramifications. The ‘Law of 
Return’ provides that every Jew is entitled to immigrate to Israel, including the son, 
daughter or grandchild of a Jew (and their non-Jewish spouse).775 But the Law of Return 
is more than merely an immigration law; it has a constitutional status in Israel’s legal 
system. The first Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, said during a debate on the 
Law of Return in the Knesset in 1950: 
The Law of Return has nothing to do with immigration laws. It is the 
eternal law of Jewish history. This law establishes the national 
principle that led to the founding of the State of Israel. 776 
And as Justice Barak noted: 
The Law of Return is one of the most important laws in Israel, if not 
the most important … . This is the key to entering the State of Israel, 
which constitutes a central reflection of the fact that Israel is not 
merely a democratic state, but also a Jewish state; it constitutes ‘the 
constitutional cornerstone of the character of the State of Israel as 
the state of the Jewish people’[;] … it gives expression to the 
‘justification… for the existence of the Jewish state’[;] … it is an 
expression of the right of the Jewish people to self-
determination.777 
Due to its importance and significance, the Law of Return has been subject to numerous 
challenges and debates. For example, the term ‘Jew’ was originally not defined in the 
Law. This was due to the great difficulty in producing a unified definition of a ‘Jew’ that 
would be accepted by all Jewish religious denominations. This ambiguity eventually 
found its way to the Supreme Court. One seminal case involved a Catholic priest of 
Jewish origin, who challenged the government’s refusal to recognise him as a Jew for 
the purpose of the Law of Return.778 In response to the Court’s rulings on this issue, and 
in an attempt to resolve ambiguities, the Law of Return was amended by the Knesset so 
as to define the term ‘Jew’ as ‘someone who was born to a Jewish mother or who 
                                                     
775 Law of Return, 5710-1950.  
776 Knesset Proceedings, vol. 6 (1950), p 2036 (in Hebrew). 
777 HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of Interior [1999] IsrSC 53(2) 728 [18].  
778 See, for example, HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior [1962] IsrSC 16 2428; HCJ 58/68 Shalit 
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converted, and who is not a member of another religion’.779 This definition only opened 
the door to more controversy. The Israeli Supreme Court inevitably had to consider the 
meaning of the term ‘converted’ and to decide what kind of conversion entitled the 
converted person to the right of immigration to Israel under the Law of Return. As Justice 
Barak explained: 
Conversion for the purposes of the Law of Return is not merely a 
private action of a person vis-à-vis his Creator; it is not merely a 
private action of several people who wish to convert someone. 
Conversion for the purpose of the Law of Return is an act that 
enables a person to join the Jewish people. It has public 
ramifications in regard to the right of return and citizenship.780 
In order to decide what kind of conversion is acceptable for the purpose of the Law of 
Return, the Court had to consider the different views among the main three Jewish 
denominations – the Orthodox, Conservative and Reform streams.  
This task was not easy, as a key conflict between the different Jewish denominations 
revolves around the refusal by Orthodox Jews to recognise the Conservative and Reform 
streams (the ‘Progressive’ streams) as legitimate Jewish movements that have the 
authority to lead Jewish communities and convert non-Jews. While Progressive Jewish 
streams recognise conversions made by any Jewish Rabbi,781 Orthodox Jews recognise 
only conversions made by Orthodox Rabbis. Due to the influential position of the 
Orthodox movement in Israel,782 the traditional position of the Israeli authorities has 
been to recognise only Orthodox conversions. Unhappy with the status quo, new 
converts and diaspora organisations used the Supreme Court to pressure the Israeli 
government to change its policy and recognise Progressive conversions.  
                                                     
779 See Law of Return (Amendment no. 2) 5730-1970, which amended s 4B of the Law.  
780 HC 1031/93 Pessaro (Goldstein) v. Minister of Interior P.D. 49(4), 661 (1995) p 747 [9]. This case 
involved a non-Jew who converted in Israel in the reform movement and later asked to immigrate to Israel 
based on the Law of Return.  
781 Although some Conservatives may not recognise Reform conversions. 
782 As explained above on p 152. 
186 
 
ii. Rodriguez case 
The most notable case decided by the Supreme Court on the issue of non-Orthodox 
conversions was in 2005 in the Rodriguez-Tushbeim case (‘Rodriguez’).783 This case dealt 
with a group of non-Jewish individuals who studied Judaism in Israel and went abroad 
for a short period during which they completed their conversion in a Jewish community. 
Upon their return to Israel, they applied to the Ministry of the Interior to be recognised 
as Jews so that they could immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return.  
The Ministry of the Interior refused to recognise these conversions on the grounds that 
the converts did not join the community in which they finalised their conversion, but 
rather returned immediately to Israel after the conversion ceremony. However, the 
Supreme Court held, in a majority of seven against four, that the petitioners in Rodriguez 
converted outside Israel in a manner that satisfied the definition of the term ‘Jew’ under 
the Law of Return and therefore were entitled to immigrate to Israel. The Court did not 
decide the question of recognition of Progressive conversions that took place in Israel. 
With regard to conversions outside Israel, the Court decided that a conversion 
conducted in a recognised Jewish community in accordance with its own rules should 
be recognised for the purposes of the Law of Return, regardless of whether the convert 
joins that community after the conversion, whether she goes to another Jewish 
community outside Israel and afterwards immigrates to Israel, or whether she 
immigrates to Israel shortly after the conversion. In its decision, the Supreme Court 
essentially forced the government to recognise non-Orthodox conversions that were 
performed in the diaspora. It did not address, however, the issue of non-Orthodox 
conversions performed in Israel.  
iii. Deliberative features 
As with the WoW case, many deliberative features discussed in the previous chapter 
manifested in this case. 
                                                     
783 HCJ 2597/99 Tais Rodriguez-Tushbeim v. the Minister of Interior [2005] IsrSC 59(6) 721 (‘Rodriguez’) 
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Standing requirements 
The petitioners in Rodriguez came from various communities in the Jewish diaspora and 
were aided by Israeli NGOs supported by the Jewish diaspora. For example, one of the 
petitioners in Rodriguez was an NGO named the Israel Religious Action Centre (IRAC). 
This legal advocacy group is funded and supported by Jewish Progressive streams in the 
United States.784 This case is therefore another example of how the Court’s expansive 
right of standing allowed non-citizens to challenge government policies.  
Justiciability and interaction with other institutions 
The Court decided on the subject matter even though this case clearly involved sensitive 
political issues. However, the Court also demonstrated an awareness of the Knesset’s 
exclusive role. Justice Barak noted that the Court recognises that the questions raised in 
this case were not strictly legal questions but fundamental constitutional questions that 
ought to be deliberated further by public representatives: 
[A]s long as the Knesset has not lawfully said anything on the 
subject, the problem of recognising conversion for the purpose of 
the Law of Return should be resolved within the framework of the 
interpretation of the Law of Return … . The main task of resolving 
these problems lies with the Knesset as the legislature … . The 
Knesset has adopted no position on this question … . We had no 
choice but to decide them.785 
This declaration can be seen as a deliberative engagement with public opinion and 
potential objections to the Court’s ruling. Critics of the court often argue that it 
improperly intervenes in moral issues, which, in a democratic society, should be decided 
by public representatives. In the excerpt above, Justice Barak addressed potential critics 
of the decision among the public and explained that the Court did not intentionally 
choose to intervene and change social norms. Rather, the Court merely fulfilled its 
designated role in interpreting the (possibly intentional) ambiguity in the law drafted by 
the public representatives.  
                                                     
784 See Israel Religious Action Centre website at <http://www.irac.org/MovementPartners.aspx>. 
Interestingly, the current executive director of IRAC, Anat Hoffman, is one of the founding members of 
‘Women of the Wall’. 
785 Rodriguez, above n 783, 301.  
188 
 
Style of ruling  
Justice Barak’s ruling was a breakthrough ruling in that for the first time it gave official 
recognition to Progressive conversion. Justice Barak knew very well that any decision in 
this case would result in part of the Jewish people being disgruntled and critical of the 
Court. Accepting progressive conversions would anger the substantial and politically 
strong Orthodox groups in Israel, while rejecting the converts’ petition would create 
serious tensions with the Jewish diaspora. While Justice Barak chose a compromise that 
was closer to the petitioners’ position, he tried in his judgment to explain to the 
Orthodox group the reasons for the Court’s decision. Barak decided to recognise 
progressive conversions that took place outside Israel, but remained silent on the 
question of recognition of progressive conversions that took place in Israel. To date, the 
legal status quo remains that only Orthodox conversions are legally available in Israel,786 
but non-Orthodox conversions done overseas are recognised for the purpose of the Law 
of Return.  
Dissenting opinions 
Eleven Judges sat on the panel in Rodriguez. Most judges went to great lengths in the 
judgment to explain their reasons and engage with the positions of the other judges. 
While four Judges joined Justice Barak’s judgment, two wrote concurring opinions and 
four wrote in dissent. The four dissenting Judges opined that the Court should not 
interfere with the Ministry of the Interior’s decision. Justice Procaccia, for example, held 
that the government should be given more time to adopt a comprehensive policy that 
could regulate the conditions for recognising conversions outside Israel. Other 
dissenting Judges expressed the opinion that this was a matter better left to be decided 
by public representatives, rather than the Court. Justice Türkel, who was often perceived 
to be a ‘religious’ Judge, echoed some of the deliberative principles discussed in previous 
chapters when he called for extensive consultation with all sectors of the public: 
The very important questions that have been brought before the 
court lie entirely within the spiritual realm, the sphere of religion 
and belief, and they are national and historical concerns. These 
                                                     
786 It is possible to convert with non-Orthodox communities in Israel, but these conversions are not 
recognised by the State of Israel for the purpose of the Law of Return.  
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questions have no legal solution and they cannot be resolved by a 
judicial determination … . [W]ere my opinion accepted, we would 
refrain from making a decision, and we would declare, as I proposed 
in Naamat v. Minister of Interior, that the decision ought to be made 
as ‘a result of a thorough study of all the opinions and beliefs of all 
the sectors of the public, and with a joint effort to reach a broad 
consensus’.787 
The dissenting judges in this case gave voice to those who thought that some issues are 
better deliberated by the public, or by its elected representatives, than by the Court. 
Even though their opinions were ultimately not decisive in this case, they prompted the 
other judges to engage with these arguments and justify their decision (as we saw above 
in the excerpt from Justice Barak’s ruling). 
Effects on public deliberation  
As in the WoW cases, the proceedings and rulings in the conversion cases were 
extensively covered by the media and promoted public debate not only with respect to 
the specific conversion issue, but also with respect to other religion vs. state 
controversies and the broad relationship between Israel and the Jewish diaspora.788 This 
again shows the effect of Court proceedings in terms of sparking public debate over 
issues that may not otherwise be discussed or adequately covered by the media.789  
Public debate over these issues helped to clarify the differences as well as the 
commonalities shared by Jews from different religious streams, and encouraged people 
to take an active part in supporting either one of the perspectives involved. Bogoch and 
Holzman-Gazit argue, however, that despite extensive coverage, some media outlets 
failed to present all possible angles of the issue. Bogoch and Holzman-Gazit sampled 40 
articles, reports, editorials and opinion pieces that appeared in two Israeli newspapers 
during the weeks before and after the Rodriguez ruling. In their study, Bogoch and 
Holzman-Gazit found that while Haaretz, the elite newspaper, emphasized the idea of 
                                                     
787 Rodriguez, above n 783, 348. 
788 See, for example, Bryna Bogoch and Yifat Holzman-Gazit, ‘Clashing Over Conversion: “Who Is a Jew” 
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Israel as a civic state, Yediot, the popular newspaper, emphasized the religious 
dimension of Israeli nationhood. Moreover, Yediot presented a wider range of views 
than Haaretz, which tended to support the Court’s decision. According to Bogoch and 
Holzman-Gazit, both papers ‘avoided addressing the basic question of whether religious 
authorities should control the definition of the character of Israel as a Jewish State’.790 
iv. Diaspora influence on Israeli politics 
The controversy over non-Orthodox conversions has been a source of tension between 
the Israeli government and Jewish communities in the diaspora for many years. In the 
late 1980s it led Conservative and Reform Rabbis in the diaspora to call for Jewish 
organisations to withhold donations to Israeli causes, and even to divest from Israeli 
bodies that do not recognise non-Orthodox movements.791 The ruling in Rodriguez was 
welcomed by Jewish diaspora communities and was regarded as an important step 
towards equality and recognition of non-Orthodox Jewish streams. But even after 
Rodriguez, which recognised non-Orthodox conversions that were performed in the 
diaspora, the conversion issue remains a source of tension between Jewish communities 
in the diaspora and the Israeli government. Progressive Jewish communities in the 
diaspora still demand recognition of non-Orthodox conversions performed in Israel for 
the purpose of the Law of Return.792 
The Judges in Rodriguez were well aware that the case had significant ramifications for 
the connection between the Jewish diaspora and the state of Israel. As Justice Barak 
said: 
The term ‘Jew’ in the Law of Return gives rise to difficult problems 
... . The recognition of conversion that is performed outside Israel 
and in Israel gives rise to fundamental questions concerning the 
character of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. It 
concerns the relationship between the Jewish people in the 
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Diaspora and the State of Israel and the relationship between 
religion and state in Israel. 793   
Justice Barak referred to an earlier case, Naamat v. Minister of Interior, in which the 
Court had to decide who was entitled to be registered as a Jew in the Population Registry 
according to the Population Registry Law: 
There is no importance to the connection between the convert and 
the community in which he converted. The relevant matter is that 
the Jewish community abroad carried out its accepted conversion 
practices with regard to the applicant. Indeed, what underlies the 
ruling in Federation of Sefaradim Torah Guardians — SHAS 
Movement v. Director of Population Administration, Ministry of 
Interior is the approach that the Jewish people is one people. A part 
of it is in Israel; a part is in one Diaspora community; a part is in 
another Diaspora community.794 
The conversion cases demonstrate two key points. First, these cases demonstrate how 
the Court applied deliberative democratic principles in addressing the interests and 
opinions of diaspora people versus the conflicting opinions of powerful groups in Israeli 
society. Second, they show how the Jewish diaspora managed to promote its goals 
through litigation in the Supreme Court, against the position of the Israeli government.  
 
This series of cases also concerns the Law of Return. However, while the previous two 
cases involved mainly North-American Jews fighting for their rights, these cases involve 
diaspora (and Israeli) Jews fighting for the rights of African Jews. 
i. Background 
A Jewish community has existed in Ethiopia for more than a millennium. Like Jewish 
communities elsewhere, the Jews in Ethiopia (known as ‘Beta Israel’) have suffered 
discrimination and persecution. In modern times, the Ethiopian government prevented 
Jews from leaving the country and immigrating to Israel.795 During the 1980s and early 
1990s, the Israeli government ran two major clandestine operations that smuggled out 
                                                     
793 Rodriguez, above n 783, 301.  
794 HCJ 5070/95 Naamat, Working and Volunteer Women’s Movement v. Minister of Interior [2002] IsrSC 
56 (2) 721, 751. 
795 See David F Kessler, The Falashas: A Short History of the Ethiopian Jews (Routledge, 2012).  
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thousands of Ethiopian Jews to Sudan, from where Israeli planes were able to fly them 
to Israel.796  
 
Members of the Beta Israel community have been recognised by the Israeli government 
as Jews. Another group in Ethiopia, called ‘Falash Mura’, have also claimed they are Jews 
by ancestry and thus entitled to immigrate to Israel.797 The Falash Mura are generally 
believed to be Jews who over the centuries converted to Christianity, disengaged from 
Beta Israel and assimilated to various degrees in Ethiopian society. Israel did not 
consider the Falash Mura as Jews since, unlike members of the Beta Israel community, 
Falash Mura people did not practise Judaism. Israeli authorities claimed that members 
of the Falash Mura, despite having some Jewish roots, were simply practicing Christians 
claiming Jewish heritage for the opportunity to immigrate to a developed country. The 
Israeli government was afraid that allowing immigration of the Falash Mura would 
encourage thousands of Ethiopians to claim Jewish heritage in an attempt to immigrate 
to Israel. Activists arguing for the rights of the Falash Mura claimed that the Falash Mura 
were Jews who were forced to convert to Christianity or had done so for pragmatic 
reasons without ever really abandoning their Jewish faith.798 
 
What is particularly relevant for the purposes of this thesis is that the process of assisting 
Beta Israel as well as the Falash Mura communities and bringing them to Israel was 
facilitated and supported by a plethora of Jewish organisations from the diaspora, in 
particular the North American Conference on Ethiopian Jewry (NACOEJ).799 Over the 
years, organisations such as The Jewish Federation and the American Jewish Joint 
                                                     
796 See Stephen Spector, Operation Solomon: The Daring Rescue of the Ethiopian Jews (Oxford University 
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798 For more on this issue see Tudor Parfitt and Emanuela Trevisan Semi, The Beta Israel in Ethiopia and 
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Distribution Committee (JDC) have donated millions of dollars in aid, medical care and 
education to Falash Mura transit camps in Ethiopia.800  
ii. Court cases 
The support provided by various Jewish diaspora organisations to Ethiopian Jews 
included legal counselling and funding for Supreme Court petitions. In a number of court 
cases, Ethiopian citizens who were denied the ‘right of return’ by the Israeli Ministry of 
Interior on the basis that they were not Jews, challenged the decisions in the 
administrative court and in the Supreme Court as the High Court of Justice.801 These 
cases provide further examples of individuals using the Supreme Court to dispute their 
categorisation by the Israeli government as ‘non-Jews’ as opposed to ‘diasporic Jews’.  
 
One of the most important cases in this regard was the case of Ambao, in which the 
Supreme Court exercised judicial review over government decisions regarding the 
operations to bring the Falash Mura people to Israel.802 The petition was submitted by 
Mr. Ambao and 379 other individuals – all Falash Mura people who were still in Ethiopia. 
The petitioners also included Struggle to Save Ethiopian Jewry (SSEJ), an international 
organisation that lists among its goals urging ‘the State of Israel to allow these Jews [in 
Ethiopia] to make Aliyah,803 reuniting them with their families in the Jewish 
homeland’.804 In addition to Israeli public figures, SSEJ includes many prominent 
diaspora Jews among its executives. For example, its Honorary Chairman was the 
political activist and Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel and its legal counsel forum is headed by 
Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz and the former Canadian Justice Minister Irwin 
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Cotler.805 The pressure that the petitioners exerted on the government through 
litigation in the Supreme Court resulted in a number of decisions by the Israeli 
government that allowed thousands of Falash Mura members to immigrate to Israel on 
humanitarian grounds.806 
 
iii. Deliberative features 
Dialogue between the court and other institutions 
The key deliberative element in this case was the dynamic between the Court and the 
government. Over the course of seven years, the petitioners in Ambao continuously 
sought orders from the Supreme Court that would force the government to implement 
policies to resolve the status of the Falash Mura people remaining in Ethiopia. The Court 
responded by pushing the Israeli government to address the petitioners’ concerns.807 In 
a series of rulings, the Court ordered the government to set deadlines for the completion 
of the review of requests by Falash Mura members to be brought into Israel and for the 
completion of transfers of those whose requests have been approved. The Court also 
ordered the government to provide details regarding the conditions in the Falash Mura 
camps in Ethiopia.808  
 
These court cases also helped to raise media awareness and public debate over a subject 
that was not popular and would not normally have been extensively covered by the 
media.809  
                                                     
805 Ibid. 
806 See Ambao, above n 802, (ruling from 21.3.2011); Israel to Allow in 8,000 Falash Mura from Ethiopia 
(14 November, 2010) BBC News <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11753909>; Pfeffer, 
above n 800; Omri Efraim, 64 Ethiopian Immigrants Brought to Israel (11 October 2016) Ynetnews 
<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4865617,00.html>. 
807 See Dan Izenberg, Falash Mura Aliya Finished, State Tells High Court (January 13 2008) The Jerusalem 
Post <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Falash-Mura-aliya-finished-state-tells-High-Court>; Ruth Eglash, 
Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Petition on Falash Mura Aliya (1 January 2008) The Jerusalem Post 
<http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Supreme-Court-agrees-to-hear-petition-on-Falash-Mura-aliya>. 
808 A list of these decisions is cited by the court in Ambao, above n 802, for example, decisions given on 
11.2.2007, 13.1.2008 and on 21.3.2011. 
809 See for example Ilan Lior, Israel Set to Greenlight Final Aliyah of Ethiopia’s Falashmura Community (14 
November 2015) Haaretz Daily Newspaper <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.685833>; 
David M Elcott, Enough Delays: It’s Time to Bring the Falash Mura Home (26 July 2016) Jewish Telegraph 
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iv. Diaspora influence on Israeli politics 
The actions of the North American Jewish NGOs caused a rift between the Israeli 
government and some Jewish diaspora organisations.810 One Israeli Minister said that 
American Jewish groups lobbying for increased immigration of the Falash Mura to Israel 
are doing so ‘to earn money, collect donations and justify their existence’ but are 
unwilling to bring these Ethiopians to their own communities in America.811 
The legal pressure from international Jewish organisations was very effective in causing 
the government to change its policy and allow more Falash Mura people to immigrate 
to Israel.812 The case of the Falash Mura is therefore another example of the influence 
of the Jewish diaspora and their use of the Supreme Court to advance their interests. In 
this case, Jews from one diaspora community (North America) used the Israeli Supreme 
Court to pressure the Israeli government to change its policy with regard to another 
Jewish diaspora (Ethiopian Jews).  
 
The petitioners in this case were a group of Israeli citizens who asked the Court to order 
the Israeli Population Registry to register them as having ‘Israeli nationality’.813 This case 
did not involve the Jewish diaspora directly, as the petition was submitted by Israeli 
citizens. However, the issues raised in this case had ramifications for the rights of the 
Jewish diaspora.  
i. Background 
The Israeli Population Registry collects all kinds of information for statistical purposes. 
One of the categories used by the Registry is a person’s ‘nationality’ (which, as discussed 
                                                     
Agency - The Global Jewish News Source <http://www.jta.org/2016/07/26/news-opinion/opinion/ 
enough-delays-its-time-to-bring-the-falash-mura-home>; Timna Jacks, Israel Says There Are No More 
Jews in Ethiopia. Thousands Left behind Disagree. (28 August 2013) Tablet Magazine 
<http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/142440/left-behind-in-gondar>. 
810 See Israelis and Jewish Groups Talk Numbers and Dollars on Falash Mura (27 November 2003) Jewish 
Telegraph Agency - The Global Jewish News Source <http://www.jta.org/2003/11/27/archive/israelis-
and-jewish-groups-talk-numbers-and-dollars-on-falash-mura>. 
811 Haviv Rettig, Rebecca Anna Stoil and Ruth Eglash, Boim, US Jews Won’t Accept Falash Mura (23 July 
2008) The Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Boim-US-Jews-wont-accept-Falash-Mura>. 
812 See Israel to Allow in 8,000 Falash Mura from Ethiopia, above n 806; Pfeffer, above n 800; Efraim, 
above n 806; Jacks, above n 809. 
813 Ornan, above n 682, English translation available at <http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/ornan-v-
ministry-interior>. 
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above, is different from a person’s citizenship status). This category relates to the 
person’s religious or ethnic affiliation (i.e., Jewish/Arab/Muslim/Christian/Druze). The 
petitioners, 21 Israeli citizens with various religious and ethnic affiliations, asked to be 
registered as ‘Israeli’ nationals, instead of being registered as either Jewish, Muslim, 
Druze etc. The main petitioner was Uzzi Ornan, a 90 year old professor of computational 
linguistics at the Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa who ran an organisation devoted 
to the official recognition of Israeli nationality.814 It was not the first time Ornan asked 
the Court to recognise an ‘Israeli nationality’ for the purpose of the population registry. 
As with previous cases, the Ministry of Interior denied the request on the basis that it 
did not recognise an Israeli nationality.815  
The petitioners claimed that with the establishment of the State of Israel, an Israeli 
nationality was created, and that this nationality does not include the Jewish diaspora. 
They argued that without a secular Israeli identity, Israeli policies inevitably favour Jews 
and discriminate against non-Jewish minorities. The petitioners referred to Israel’s 
Declaration of Independence, according to which, they argued, diaspora Jews are not a 
part of the nationality established in Israel as the nationality comprises only members 
of ‘the independent Hebrew nation in their land’ and ‘members of the Arab nation who 
reside in the State of Israel’. 816 
The State (as the respondent) claimed that the question touches on deep academic and 
public controversies regarding the existence of a ‘Jewish’ nationality that is separate 
from Israeli citizenship. It argued that this issue should be resolved in public and 
academic discourse, and the Court was not the appropriate forum to discuss it. The State 
also added that the request was entirely symbolic and had no de-facto significance. The 
State’s position was that there exists only Israeli citizenship, which is common to all 
Israelis, but there is no Israeli nationality. The State also argued that adopting an ‘Israeli 
                                                     
814 See Tia Goldenberg, Supreme Court Rejects ‘Israeli’ Nationality Status (4 October 2013) The Times of 
Israel <http://www.timesofisrael.com/supreme-court-rejects-israeli-nationality-status/>. 
815 It should be noted that this was not the first time this issue was brought before the Supreme Court. 
Others have tried in the past to ask the Court to register them as having Israeli nationality. See for example 
CA 630/70 Tamarin v. State of Israel [1972] IsrSC 26(1) 197. 
816 Ornan, above n 682, Justice Vogelman [3]. See The Declaration of The Establishment of The State of 
Israel May 14, 1948. English translation available at <http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat 
_eng.htm>. 
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nationality’ might upset Arabs and other minorities that do not wish to be classified as 
part of an ‘Israeli nationality’. 
The Court ruled that the petitioners did not prove the existence of an ‘Israeli’ nationality, 
detached from Israeli citizenship. The Judges also noted that deciding that there is an 
‘Israeli’ nationality would force different groups within Israeli society (such as Christians, 
Druze and Arabs) to adopt a foreign identity to which they may not wish to belong. 
ii. Deliberative features 
1) Justiciability  
The petitioners were ordinary citizens, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding a 
political issue that had no real practical implications for them. The District Court of 
Jerusalem ruled that the issue was ‘not judicial’ and should be left to the legislators. The 
petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, which unanimously declared that it was 
authorised to rule on the issue as it was in the realm of ‘normative judgment’. Although 
the Supreme Court could have easily dismissed their claims on procedural grounds (as 
the District Court did), it chose to address the merits. This is another example of the 
Court’s broad standing policy, but more importantly, it demonstrates the Court’s 
willingness to participate and contribute to public debate in issues that some (including 
the lower court) argued belong to the legislative or academic realm. Even though the 
petitioners were not successful, the fact that these questions were deliberated in the 
Court attracted media coverage and encouraged public debate regarding these 
questions.817 For example, Yedidia Stern (the Vice President of Research at the Israel 
Democracy Institute and a professor of law at Bar-Ilan University) and Jay Ruderman 
(prominent Jewish-American activist and philanthropist) have published an op-ed 
explaining why it was ‘imperative for the State of Israel to distinguish between 
citizenship and nationality’.818 Anita Shapira, a professor emeritus of Jewish history at 
                                                     
817 See, for example, Revital Hovel, Supreme Court Rejects Citizens’ Request to Change Nationality from 
‘Jewish’ to ‘Israeli’ (3 October 2013) Haaretz Daily Newspaper <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-1.550241>; Goldenberg, above n 814; Jay Ruderman and Yedidia Stern, Why ‘Israeli’ Is 
Not a Nationality (3 March 2014) Jewish Telegraphic Agency <http://www.jta.org/2014/03/03/news-
opinion/israel-middle-east/op-ed-why-israeli-is-not-a-nationality>; Dan Izenberg, Supreme Court to 
Decide If There Is an ‘Israeli Nation’ (7 March 2010) The Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/ 
Supreme-Court-to-decide-if-there-is-an-Israeli-nation>. 
818 Ruderman and Stern, above n 817. 
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Tel Aviv University, described the attempt to claim a separate Jewish nationality from 
the Jewish religion ‘very revolutionary’ and cautioned that if an Israeli nationality is 
recognised in Israel, its Jewish essence will be lost and it could estrange diaspora Jews 
whose connection to Israel is based on religion.819 Others criticised the Court’s ruling. 
The prominent Israeli writer A.B. Yehoshua wrote that ‘[w]hen Israeli citizens define 
themselves as Jews - instead of Israelis - they weaken their link to the country and bar 
national identity from flourishing … [w]e are only at the beginning of the struggle for the 
place of an Israeli identity in our lives’.820 One columnist even wrote that ‘[t]he verdict 
gives the impression of being ultra-conservative and the Supreme Court justices give the 
impression of being out of touch with the spirit of the age in which they live’.821 
2) Style of ruling 
The Court discussed the petitioners’ arguments at length and showed sympathy towards 
the arguments, despite ultimately rejecting them. As Justice Vogelman concluded in his 
judgement: ‘I will clarify that denial of the appeal in no way detracts from the principled 
battle of the appellants, born of their personal convictions, and from the discourse that 
will continue in the public domain’.822 Justice Melcer repeated the District Court’s words 
with regard to the petitioners: 
There is nothing in this decision to say that there is no Israeli 
nationality – in a person’s heart, in the platform of a group of 
people, amongst a particular sector in the state. On the contrary, 
Professor Uzi Ornan, like the other petitioners, believes that he is a 
member of the Israeli nation. This belief deserves respect and 
appreciation from those who share his view and those who oppose 
it’.823 
Also, despite denying the appeal, the Court decided to give no order for costs.824 
                                                     
819 See Goldenberg, above n 814. 
820 A.B. Yehoshua, Defining Who Is an Israeli (12 September 2013) Haaretz Daily Newspaper 
<http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.546697>. 
821 Rachel Neeman, On Being an Israeli in Israel (11 October 2013) Haaretz Daily Newspaper 
<http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.551731>. 
822 Ornan, above n 682, Justice Vogelman [27]. 
823 Ibid, Justice Melcer [11]. 
824 Usually, the Court orders the party who loses to pay the other party’s legal costs. Sometimes the Court 
does not order to pay costs if it thinks that the losing party acted in good faith and raised valid points.  
199 
 
They style of the ruling in this case showed the Court’s willingness to engage with a 
range of opinions and acknowledge that even small minority opinions are legitimate and 
deserve consideration. The judges also left the door open for future developments, 
namely, that over time circumstances may change and it might be possible then to prove 
that an Israeli nationality has been created.825 
This case is an example of how the Court used deliberative principles to deal with a case 
that involved the interests of the Jewish diaspora and the interests of the State in 
maintaining its ties with diaspora communities. By choosing to take on the case and 
seriously discuss the petitioner’s claims, the Court gave voice to minority views and 
helped to encourage public deliberation.  
iii. Diaspora influence on Israeli politics 
It was clear that accepting the petitioners’ request would, at least on a symbolic level, 
disconnect the Jewish diaspora from the part of the Jewish people living in Israel. The 
Court was well aware of such implications. As Justice Vogelman said: 
We are dealing here with a sensitive and moot issue which has 
accompanied the Jewish people for many years and the Zionist 
movement from its inception … . The implications of this discussion 
are immensely wide. This pertains to Israel’s relations with diaspora 
Jews, and also to perceptions among the various groups within the 
State of Israel and the relations between them.826 
This, among other reasons, led the Court to reject the position of the petitioners. As 
Ruderman and Stern wrote ‘if the nationality of Jewish Israelis is defined as Israeli rather 
than Jewish, then the national bond we believe binds together Jews in Israel and Jews 
in the Diaspora would be severed’.827 This case is therefore an example of how the Court, 
in its deliberations, took into account the interests of diaspora communities, even 
though diaspora people were not part of the proceedings.  
 
The cases I have analysed involved the Jewish diaspora, either directly or indirectly. In 
the first three cases, diaspora Jews were parties to the proceedings, either as petitioners 
                                                     
825 See Ornan, above n 682, Justice Melcer [8]. 
826 Ibid, Justice Vogelman [18]. 
827 Ruderman and Stern, above n 817. 
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or as respondents. In the last example, the issues raised in the case concerned particular 
questions that directly affect diaspora Jews. These cases demonstrated how the court 
engaged in deliberation that gave voice to diaspora Jews, who are non-citizens and who 
have no official direct way to participate in political processes in Israel.  
However, Jews in the diaspora use the Israeli legal system to become involved in Israeli 
society and promote their views and values in other areas that are not related to 
diaspora issues per se. The following cases provide examples of how Jewish diasporic 
communities and Israeli political NGOs have joined together in using the Court to 
challenge various Israeli laws and policies. The cases I discuss in this section show how 
Jewish organisations in the diaspora fund and support Israeli NGOs in submitting 
petitions to the Supreme Court in order to intervene in issues that do not directly 
concern the Jewish diaspora, but rather touch on Israeli society in general. These 
interventions are possible due to the fact that Israeli NGOs and political activists have 
access to the Court because of its broad standing and justiciability policies and its 
receptiveness of amicus curiae submissions.  
i. Background 
As discussed above, some NGOs are the most experienced and successful litigators in 
the Israeli Supreme Court.828 International Jewish organisations donate millions of 
dollars each year to a plethora of Israeli NGOs. This provides invaluable support to the 
activities of these NGOs. One noticeable example is the New Israel Fund (NIF). The NIF 
is a left-leaning Jewish NGO based in New York that aims to ‘promote a vision of Israel 
as a just, democratic and egalitarian society’.829 Over the past 30 years, it has granted 
more than 250 million US dollars to more than 850 organisations in Israel.830 As the NIF 
states on its website: ‘there is hardly any significant socially oriented organisation today 
in Israel that does not owe its existence to the New Israel Fund’. 831  
                                                     
828 See above p 155.  
829 See New Initiatives for Democracy on NIF website <http://www.nif.org/what-we-do/new-initiatives-
for-democracy/>. 
830 A detailed breakdown of NIF grans to Israeli NGO’s based on NIF financial statements can be found on 
NGO Monitor website at <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/new_israel_fund/>. 
831 See New Israel Fund of Canada website at <https://www.nifcan.org/issues-projects/civil-human-
rights/>. 
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Submitting petitions to the Israeli Supreme Court has become one of the most common 
and effective means of political activism employed by Israeli NGOs that are NIF grantees. 
As discussed earlier, the Israeli Supreme Court has in recent decades adopted a very 
permissive, even encouraging, approach towards submissions from NGOs and human 
rights groups. Indeed, these organisations have submitted numerous petitions to the 
Court challenging various laws and government practices that allegedly violate 
constitutional rights. For example, one NIF grantee ‘Rabbis for Human Rights’ has been 
involved in many petitions representing Palestinians on various issues such as access to 
private lands, policy planning and home demolitions.832 Another NIF grantee - ‘Kav 
La’Oved’ (‘the Worker’s Hotline’ in Hebrew) - has submitted many petitions concerning 
the protection of workers’ rights. One of the cases it submitted to the Supreme Court 
resulted in the granting of social and health benefits to foreign workers in the nursing 
care sector.833 Notably, the Israel Religious Action Centre, which was one of the 
petitioners in the conversion cases discussed above, is also an NIF grantee.834 In fact, NIF 
grantees often collaborate in submitting joint petitions to the Supreme Court.835 In the 
next sections I will provide examples of such cases. First, I discuss a key case in which an 
NIF grantee assisted an Israeli Arab citizen to challenge the Israeli government and a 
major international Jewish organisation. Second, I discuss how other NIF grantees 
assisted Palestinians and illegal migrants, who are not Israeli citizens, to challenge Israeli 
policies at the Supreme Court. 
                                                     
832 See Rabbis for Human Rights website at <http://rhr.org.il/eng/about-legal-department-2/>. 
833 HCJ 4542/02 Kav LaOved Worker’s Hotline v. Government of Israel (30.3.2006). English summary 
available at <http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/kav-laoved-worker%E2%80%99s-hotline-v-governm 
ent-israel>. 
834 See the Israel Religious Action Centre website at <http://www.irac.org/OurSupporters.aspx>. 
835 See for example HCJ 2072/12 The Coalition of Women for Peace, et al v. The Minister of Finance 
(15.4.2015) challenging a law that imposed sanctions on those who call for an economic boycott of the 
settlements or of Israel; HCJ 8276/05 Adalah et al v. The Minister of Defence (12.12.2006) regarding 
compensations for Palestinians who were injured in military conflicts; HCJ 9132/07 Gaber Albasiuni 
Ahmed et al v. the Prime Minister (30.1.2008) regarding the limited supply of fuel and electricity to the 
Gaza Strip (English translation is available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/07/320/091/n25/ 
07091320.n25.pdf). For more on the involvement and effects of Israeli NGOs in petitions to the Supreme 
Court see Meydani, above n 650, 73. 
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ii. Ka’adan case 
This case involved Adel Ka’adan, an Israeli Arab who had been barred from joining Katzir, 
a cooperative Jewish community settlement in the south Galilee in the north of Israel.836 
The land on which Katzir was built was allocated by the State of Israel to a major 
international Jewish organisation, the Jewish Agency for Israel (‘Jewish Agency’), which 
in turn transferred it to an agency that only sold plots to Jews. Ka’adan challenged this 
policy in the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, by arguing that this was 
unlawful discrimination. In response, the Jewish Agency (and other respondents) claimed 
that the Jewish settlement was a ‘link in a chain of lookouts, intended to preserve Israel 
at large for the Jewish people’ and that its existence is set to promote Jewish settlement 
in Israel, particularly in areas such as the Galilee where the Jewish population is sparse, 
thereby ensuring population dispersal and generally increasing Israel’s security. The 
respondents also claimed that allowing Arab residents to join the community settlement 
would likely cause Jewish residents to leave, thereby effectively converting what was 
intended to be a Jewish settlement into an Arab settlement.837 
 
In March 2000 the Supreme Court ruled that the Israeli Land Authority could not 
discriminate between Jews and Arabs in the allocation of state lands, even if the 
discrimination was made through the Jewish Agency, which leased the land from the 
Israeli Land Authority. The landmark decision came after more than four years of 
hearings and was hailed as an important step toward full equality for Israel's Arab 
citizens.838  
1) Deliberative features 
This case is another example of the Court’s broad standing and justiciability policies. But 
what is most instructive in this case is the Court’s style of ruling: the Court examined at 
length the principle of equality, stressing that, unlike individuals, the state cannot 
                                                     
836 HC 6698/95 Ka’adan vs. Israel land administration, the Jewish Agency, Katzir et al [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 
258. English translation available at <http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/en/JudgesAcademy/workshop3/ 
Documents/GS/7/ 28%20AADEL%20KAADAN%20V%20ISRAELI%20LAND%20ADMINISTRATION.doc>. 
837 See Ka’adan, above n 836, President Barak [27]. 
838 Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, ‘A First Step in a Difficult and Sensitive Road:" Preliminary Observations on 
Qaadan v. Katzir’ (2000) 16(1) Israel Studies Bulletin 3. 
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discriminate between people according to their religion or nationality when selling its 
land (even though the discrimination was done indirectly, by a third party): 
Equality is one of the State of Israel’s fundamental values … . Indeed, 
the State is held to honour and protect every individual’s basic right 
to equality. Equality lies at the very foundation of social co-
existence. It is the ‘beginning of all beginnings’ … . It is one of the 
central pillars of the democratic regime.839 
In his judgment, Justice Barak provided detailed arguments as to why Jews in particular 
should not discriminate against Arabs in a Jewish state. This complies with the 
deliberative principle of ‘public reason’ or ‘reason that anyone can accept’. For example, 
Barak stated that because Jews used to be discriminated against in many countries 
throughout history, the State of Israel should be extremely careful not to discriminate 
against non-Jews.840 Barak used his judgment to address Jewish groups who may not be 
convinced by general principles of equality. He also explained that apart from the 
philosophical and moral arguments against discrimination, Jewish traditional law itself 
prohibits discrimination against non-Jews. Barak used references from the Bible and the 
Jewish Talmud to support his reasoning that non-Jews should not be discriminated in a 
Jewish state: 
The principle of equality and prohibition of discrimination are 
embodied in the [Biblical] commandment ‘Thou shalt have but one 
law, for the stranger as for the citizen’. This passage was construed 
by the Sages as requiring ‘a law which is equal for all of you’.841 It 
has been eternally sanctified in the Torah of Israel since it became a 
nation.842 Similarly, Justice Elon insisted that ‘Judaism’s very 
foundation is the idea that the world was created in the Lord’s 
image’.843 Thus begins the Torah of Israel, and from this we derive 
the basic approach to the value of human life, the equality and love 
to which each and every person is entitled by virtue of their very 
personhood’.844  
 
                                                     
839 Ka’adan, above n 836, President Barak [21]. 
840 Ibid, President Barak [24].  
841 Tractate Ketubboth, 33a; Babba Kamma 83b. 
842 HC 200/83 Whatat v. Minister of Finance IsrSC 38(3) 113, Justice Turkel [27] p 119. 
843 Genesis, 1:27. 
844 Kaadan, above n 836, President Barak [31]. 
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Barak also explained in the ruling that the decision does not condemn or nullify previous 
acts made in the past, but rather relates only to the future, and is a first and careful step 
in addressing a complicated matter: 
[I]t is of the essence to comprehend and keep in mind that we are 
taking the first step on a difficult and sensitive path today. It is 
therefore appropriate that we proceed with caution, to avoid 
stumbling; we will therefore proceed most carefully, from one case 
to the next, bearing in mind the circumstances of each particular 
instance. Though the road before us may be long, it is important that 
we always bear in mind, not only where we came from, but also 
where we are headed.845 
Ka’adan brought an end to longstanding policies that enabled the Jewish Agency to 
promote exclusively Jewish settlements in Israel. Naturally, the ruling sparked an intense 
debate in the Israeli public and heated discussions in the media and the Parliament.846 
The ruling attracted international attention and raised intense debates over Israel’s 
Jewish and democratic characteristics.847  
2) Jewish diaspora involvement 
Ka’adan was aided throughout the Court proceedings by The Association for Civil Rights 
in Israel (‘ACRI’), which filed the petition and was party to the proceedings. ACRI is the 
biggest NIF grantee in Israel848 and has filed many Supreme Court petitions over the 
years concerning various human rights issues.849 While the NIF was involved in the case 
through ACRI on Ka’adan’s behalf, the Jewish Agency was involved as one of the 
respondents. The Jewish Agency is the largest Jewish NGO in the world. Founded in 
                                                     
845 Ibid, President Barak [37]. 
846 Uli Schmetzer, Jews-Only Bill Roils Israel (10 July 2002) Chicago Tribune <http://articles. 
chicagotribune.com/2002-07-10/news/0207100326_1_adel-kaadan-arab-galilee-jewish-state>; Laurie 
Copans, Israel: Arabs Can Buy Jewish Land (9 March 2000) Associated Press 
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847 See Yakobson and Rubinstein, above n 102, 115; Steven V. Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law: Religion and 
Liberal Democracy in the Jewish State (Lexington Books, 2006) 235; Kedar; Dan Izenberg, High Court: Arab 
Family Was Unjustly Barred from State Land (9 March 2000) The Jerusalem Post 
<http://search.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/docview/319270937?pq-origsite=summon>; Joel 
Greenberg, Israeli Court Rules Arab Couple Can Live in Jewish Area - (9 March 2000) The New York Times 
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848 See NIF website at <http://www.nif.org/what-we-do/grantmaking/>.  
849 See a list of ACRI legal achievements on their website at <http://www.acri.org.il/en/2013/08/14/acri-
legal-landmarks/>. 
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1929, its main goal was the encouragement of immigration and absorption of Jews from 
the diaspora into Israel.850 The Jewish Agency still finances and operates dozens of 
programs aimed to assist millions of Israelis and Jews worldwide every year. Although 
based in Jerusalem, the Jewish Agency does not receive core funding from the Israeli 
government, but is funded by major Jewish communities, federations and donors from 
Israel and elsewhere around the world.851 The settlement department of the Jewish 
Agency played a central role in the building of the State of Israel, establishing hundreds 
of settlements over the years all over Israel that accommodated new immigrants 
arriving to Israel from the Jewish diaspora.852 In the State’s responding affidavit (made 
by the Israel Land Administration and the Ministry of Construction and Housing) it was 
stated that the Jewish Agency operates as an extension of the Jewish People in the 
diaspora.853 
 
The ruling raised concerns among Jews in Israel and the diaspora. Many were concerned 
that Israel’s Jewish character was under threat.854 Such fears led many Israelis and Jews 
to support legal reforms that they considered would bolster Israel’s ‘Jewish’ 
character.855 In the years following Ka’adan, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its policy in 
other cases, ordering other community settlements to justify their refusal to allocate 
land to Arab families.856 These cases were submitted to the Court by another NIF 
grantee, Adalah, an Israeli NGO that works to ‘promote and defend the rights of 
Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel’.857 
                                                     
850 See the Jewish Agency website at <http://www.jewishagency.org/aliyah>. 
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iii. Petitions by Palestinians  
1) Background 
Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan and Egypt, respectively, in the 1967 
war, but has not annexed these territories (except for east-Jerusalem). After the war, 
Palestinian residents of these territories started to petition the Israeli Supreme Court 
(sitting as the High Court of Justice) against various acts of the Israeli military in those 
territories. 
Over the past decades, the Israeli Supreme Court has considered thousands of petitions 
submitted by Palestinian individuals and NGOs regarding Israeli authorities’ actions in 
the Palestinian Territories.858 One of the most notable examples of the Court’s rulings 
on such issues was a series of rulings in which the Supreme Court, accepting Palestinian 
petitions, ordered the Israeli army to reroute and rebuild parts of Israel’s security barrier 
so as to not violate the rights of Palestinian individuals.859 Another notable example was 
a petition against the Israeli government decision to limit the supply of fuel and 
electricity to the Gaza Strip.860 This petition was submitted to the Court during the 2008 
Gaza war by Palestinian residents of Gaza and ten Israeli NGOs. The Court rejected the 
petition, but only after serious deliberations, concluding that the amount of fuel and 
electricity supplied to Gaza by Israeli conformed to international law. 
2) Deliberative features 
The Court’s rulings in cases submitted by Palestinians demonstrate how it uses broad 
standing and justiciability requirements to expand democratic deliberation. First, the 
Court chose to rule on controversial cases that other courts may deem non-justiciable. 
                                                     
858 See David Kretzmer, ‘The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel’ (2012) 94(885) 
International Review of the Red Cross 207; Michael Karayanni and Center for International Legal 
Education, Conflicts in a Conflict: A Conflict of Laws Case Study on Israel and the Palestinian Territories 
(Oxford University Press, 2014) vol 9; Daphna Golan and Zvika Orr, ‘Translating Human Rights of the 
“Enemy”: The Case of Israeli NGOs Defending Palestinian Rights’ (2012) 46(4) Law and Society Review 
781.  
859 See for example HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel (15.9.2005), English translation 
available at <http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/ 04/570/079/A14/04079570.A14.pdf>; HCJ 2056/04 
Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 43 1099. For more on this see Geoffrey R Watson, 
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Second, the Court in these cases gave voice to non-citizens (in this case, Palestinians) 
who were not able to vote in Israeli elections or otherwise directly shape Israeli policies 
that affect them. 
When Palestinians first started to submit petitions the Court, it was unclear whether the 
Court was authorised to accept these petitions. In countries with legal systems similar 
to Israel’s, such as the United States and Britain, the courts refrain from overseeing 
territories conquered in war.861 Although the State could have contested the Court’s 
jurisdiction to deal with petitions submitted by Palestinians on the grounds that they 
were submitted by ‘enemy aliens’ or because they related to acts performed outside 
Israel’s sovereign territory, it decided not to do so and allowed these petitions to be 
heard.862 The Court adopted this approach and ruled in these cases despite criticism in 
Israeli society from both sides of the political spectrum. Right wing groups described the 
Court’s approach as interventionist and effectively restricting the Israeli security forces 
in their fight against terrorists.863 Left wing groups, on the other hand, depicted the 
Court’s activities as ‘legitimising the occupation’ and facilitating Israeli settlement 
activities in the Palestinian Territories.864 Despite these criticisms, the Court has 
continued to hear petitions and give rulings over such issues.865 This practice allows 
Palestinians, who are not Israeli citizens and are not normally subject to Israeli law, to 
nevertheless seek justice from Israeli courts.866 This approach has reinforced democratic 
principles in Israel and in the territories under its control in a way that other Israeli 
institutions (e.g., the Knesset) have not been able to do. 
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iv. Petitions by asylum seekers and illegal migrants  
1) Background 
Other examples of groups of non-citizens that have used the Supreme Court to challenge 
the constitutionality of Israeli laws and policies are illegal migrants and asylum seekers. 
A recent example of this was the series of rulings in which the Supreme Court struck 
down new legislation aimed at discouraging African migrants and asylum seekers from 
crossing the border from Egypt into Israel (the ‘anti-infiltration’ cases).  
The petitioners in these cases were Sudanese and Eritrean individuals, along with five 
Israeli NGOs (including the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and the Hotline for 
Refugees and Migrants, both NIF grantees). The petitioners argued that both the process 
of detaining illegal migrants and asylum seekers and the period of detention were 
unconstitutional. In September 2013, the Supreme Court unanimously decided that the 
State’s policy of holding the migrants for up to three years without trial was 
unconstitutional and ordered the government to free more than 2,000 migrants being 
held in the Holot detention centre.867 In response, the government moved swiftly and 
enacted new legislation that enabled it to continue detaining illegal migrants and asylum 
seekers.868 In September 2014, the Supreme Court struck down the State’s migration 
policy for the second time.869 Seven of nine judges ordered the State to close the Holot 
detention centre within 90 days and ordered the authorities to cease enforcing certain 
limits on the detainees’ movements. In this ruling the Court also found unconstitutional 
the holding of newly arrived illegal immigrants in the closed detention centre for a term 
exceeding one year (in a 6-3 majority). The government was disturbed by the decision. 
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The Interior Minister, for example, said that he could not accept the verdict of the Court, 
that the Court had ‘made a mistake’ and that the Knesset would have to pass legislation 
preventing the Court from intervening on this issue.870 Indeed, the Knesset revised the 
law again, and in August 2015, the Court upheld the government’s new ‘anti-infiltration’ 
law, ruling that detaining immigrants at a detention facility was constitutional, but that 
the period of detention must be limited to a maximum of 12 months. The Court ruled 
the section of the law that allowed the holding of immigrants for up to 20 months to be 
disproportionate.871 Nine justices ruled on this issue, with eight of them writing separate 
opinions. In its ruling, the Court rebuked the government’s slow pace in processing 
requests for asylum. The Court also ruled that the Knesset must come up with 
amendments to the legislation within six months, and temporarily limited the length of 
detention at Holot detention centre to 12 months. As a result of this ruling, all detainees 
at Holot who had been there for a year or more were released.872 
2) Deliberative features 
Dialogue between the court and other institutions 
The ‘anti-infiltration’ cases demonstrate well the deliberative role the Court plays by its 
interaction with the legislative and the executive branches. The Court ruled over a 
controversial issue, striking down twice a law passed by the Knesset. The effects of these 
rulings were considerable as many detainees were released due to the legal actions 
taken by the different NGOs that were largely supported and funded by Jewish 
communities in the diaspora.  
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Accessibility  
These cases also provide a good example of the Court’s willingness to accept 
submissions from third party NGOs. In the first petition, two organisations submitted an 
amicus curiae brief to the Court: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) made a submission in support of the petitioners, while another NGO, ‘Kohelet 
Policy Forum’ made a submission supporting the State’s position.873 In the second 
petition, ‘The Kohelet Policy forum’ made a submission supporting the State, while 
another think tank ‘The Concord Research Center for Integration of International Law in 
Israel’ made a submission in support of the petitioners.874 In the third petition, two more 
NGOs joined: ‘Eitan – Israeli Immigration Policy Center’ supported the petitioners while 
‘The legal forum for Israel’ supported the State.875 Allowing different NGOs from both 
sides of the political spectrum to join court proceedings and submit their opinions 
contributes to the deliberative process in that it demonstrates that the Court considers 
a variety of viewpoints presented by people who are going to be affected by its decision 
before delivering its decision.  
 
I. Discussion and Summary 
In the previous part, I have reviewed a range of cases in which groups of non-citizens 
were able to challenge government policies through litigation in the Supreme Court. The 
case studies demonstrate several points I have made throughout my thesis. First, the 
cases demonstrate the kind of conflicts that arise between diaspora communities and 
kin-state governments. Second, the cases show the deliberative democratic principles 
that were applied (to various degrees) during constitutional deliberations by the Israeli 
Supreme Court. Third, the cases illustrate that, through the use of such principles, a 
constitutional court can enable diaspora communities to be legitimately involved in 
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constitutional deliberations in the kin-state and shape kin-state policies on fundamental 
and controversial issues.  
 
Through these case studies, I have demonstrated how deliberative features discussed in 
the previous parts of this thesis have been exercised by the Israeli Supreme Court in 
cases that involved the interests of non-citizens. 
i. Accessibility and justiciability 
The case studies show how effective it is for Israeli NGOs and individual activists to 
initiate and pursue legal actions against government authorities, laws and regulations 
through the Israeli Supreme Court. A liberal interpretation of justiciability, broad 
standing policy and wide acceptance of amicus curiae submissions combine to 
encourage various organisations and activists to turn to the Court whenever they feel 
that their needs and aspirations are left unanswered by other democratic institutions.  
The case studies discussed also demonstrate how the deliberative features of the Israeli 
Supreme Court allow groups of non-citizens to influence the laws and policies of the 
Israeli government. Assisted by Israeli NGOs, various groups of non-citizens, including 
people from the Jewish diaspora, Palestinians, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, 
utilise the Israeli Supreme Court’s deliberative democratic features to constitutionally 
challenge Israeli laws and policies. 
As discussed above, there are those who criticise the Court’s interventionist approach 
and point to various problems caused by the Court taking on too many cases, including 
on issues that are more political in nature.876 The Court has become swamped with 
petitions, and some cases are taking years to complete. Also, the Court’s actions are 
perceived by many as encroaching too much on the powers of the executive and 
legislative branches. This has motivated politicians to take steps aimed at limiting the 
Court’s powers to intervene in policy issues.877  
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Some judges in the Court seem to agree that it would have been better if some 
constitutional issues were decided outside the Court. As Chief Justice Shamgar noted in 
the first WoW ruling: ‘It is good to remember that the exclusive focus on resolution of 
difficult issues and problems before the court, the “miracle cure” of our generation, is 
not necessarily an appropriate solution and desired cure for all our ills’.878 Even Justice 
Barak, who once said that ’everything is justiciable’,879 also said that: 
As justices, our power is limited. Admittedly, every problem has a 
legal solution. But the legal solution is not the ideal solution for 
every problem. Not every problem that can be solved in the court 
should be solved in the court.880 
However, in cases of divided societies with large diaspora populations, the costs of 
deliberating perhaps too many constitutional issues in court may be worth paying. 
Giving voice to underrepresented groups (e.g., diaspora people, illegal migrants) who 
cannot change policies that affect them in the same way citizens can (for example, 
through voting and running for parliament) may be worth the price accompanying an 
overworked court. 
ii. Style of rulings 
In the case studies we saw that the Court used deliberative rhetoric in its decisions, 
acknowledging that it deals with complicated matters of great political and 
constitutional importance. Excerpts from the rulings demonstrated the Court’s 
deliberative style. In the judgments, the court engaged with the arguments of both 
parties and acknowledged that each side had its valid points. The Court often published 
long rulings with each judge explaining at length the reasons for her or his decision, 
therefore exercising a deliberative approach. The fact that these detailed reasons are 
published increases transparency and contributes to the legitimacy of the decisions. 
Long decisions, however, are also problematic in that they deter ordinary people from 
reading through and understanding the whole judgment. The decision in Rodriguez, for 
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example, extended to over 80 pages and contained many references to past court 
decisions and to Jewish law sources which are not easily comprehensible by everyday 
Israelis.  
The Court occasionally also made a substantial effort to help the parties reach a 
compromise. For example in the WoW case, the judges repeatedly stated that 
compromise was the preferred way to resolve the issue, and they even joined the parties 
for a tour in Jerusalem in an attempt to find a suitable site for holding WoW services. 
This approach was explained by Justice Barak: 
The solution for the relationship between religion and state and 
healing the national rift requires a national compromise. Judges 
cannot bring about this compromise. We make our contribution in 
our judgments; we do our part in our constitutional approach that 
is based on a balance between competing values; the balance 
between the power of the majority and the right of the minority; 
the approach that human rights are not absolute, but relative; that 
it is permitted to violate them for a proper purpose, but not 
excessively; that democracy is tolerant, even of intolerance. All of 
these are essential, but insufficient, conditions for a national 
compromise. It requires the emotional strength of the whole 
people; it requires love of others, and not hatred of others; it 
requires bringing people closer together and understanding them, 
and not distancing oneself from them and pushing them away.881 
In this excerpt, Barak echoes some deliberative principles discussed in earlier chapters. 
Deliberative democracy is about inclusion of minority views and about listening to the 
other. By emphasising these principles, Barak sends a message to the different segments 
in Israeli society that constitutional litigation should be conducted with respect to each 
side’s arguments and with willingness to accept that the other side might also have valid 
points. 
When compromise was not possible, the Court on occasion produced a judgment that 
granted some small victory to the losing side. For example, in Rodriguez, the Court 
ordered the State to recognise Progressive conversions made in the diaspora, but did 
not change the status-quo regarding conversions made in Israel. This is a good example 
of what Sunstein calls an ‘incompletely theorized agreement’: in cases where there 
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exists strong principled disagreement within the public or among elites about what the 
law should allow and whether a certain practice is constitutional, progress can be made 
if people are able to agree on some practical measures. It is possible to remain silent on 
the bigger questions (e.g., who is really Jewish?) thus allowing each side to maintain his 
convictions, but at the same time to provide a practical solution that both sides can live 
with.882 
iii. Dissenting opinions 
The decisions in the case studies were rarely unanimous, with most decisions including 
concurring and dissenting opinions. In Rodriguez, for example, out of eleven judges, two 
wrote concurring opinions and four wrote dissenting opinions. Dissenting voices serve 
an important deliberative function: they allow minority views to be heard and enable a 
possible future reversal of the original judgment, based on previous dissenting opinion. 
Dissenting opinions also send a message that minority opinions that are ultimately 
rejected are nevertheless legitimate. This is important especially in divided societies 
where there is a greater risk in alienating minority groups that feel that their sentiments 
are not taken into consideration.  
iv. Dialogue between the court and other institutions 
The case studies showed the judicially activist nature of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
following the legacy of Justice Barak. Although the Court often stated that it did not 
want to interfere with government actions, it made it clear that it would intervene in 
cases where the government remained inactive or silent. In some cases, the court 
reinterpreted the law against current policies (as it did for example in Rodriguez and the 
WoW case). The clearest example of this approach was the ‘anti-infiltration’ cases, in 
which the Court disqualified twice a law that was legislated by the Knesset, forcing it to 
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overhaul its proposed legislation and amend it according to the Court’s orders. The Court 
also often set up deadlines for the government, demanded information from 
government officials and ordered the government to provide alternative solutions. For 
example, in the Falash Mura cases, the Court ordered the government to set deadlines 
for reviewing the requests of Falash Mura members to be brought into Israel and for the 
completion of transfers of those whose requests have been approved. 
However, as discussed above, the Court’s judicial activism caused a backlash from 
politicians (e.g., Knesset members and government ministers) who threatened to curtail 
the Court’s power to intervene in constitutional cases.883 Indeed, in recent years, the 
Court has restrained itself to a certain extent. As Friedmann describes:   
From the Supreme Court’s point of view, the situation is a sensitive 
one. It stands firm on retaining the dominance it has assumed for 
itself but is very much aware of how easy it would be for the Knesset 
to strip it of that power. It has to walk a fine line between the 
principles it proclaims and the fear that rulings that elected officials 
and the public fiercely oppose may impel the Knesset to pull the rug 
out from under the Supreme Court’s excessive power.884 
As discussed in previous chapters, the Court relies heavily on public trust for its 
legitimacy. Unlike politicians who are directly elected by the public, the Court is less 
reflective of popular sentiments. It must therefore be cautious when confronting other 
democratic institutions and choose its battles carefully. 
v. Encouraging public debate 
In order for constitutional deliberations to extend beyond the court room into the public 
sphere, court cases must receive ample coverage by the media. As discussed above, the 
Court’s rulings and proceedings in the case studies received extensive media coverage, 
thus initiating and encouraging lively public debate over constitutional issues. In the 
WoW case for example, the continuous coverage of the Court’s rulings, as well as of the 
protests for and against WoW services, resulted in more and more support to Wow from 
ordinary Israelis and politicians.885 
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Perhaps the best evidence of the major effects constitutional litigation in the Israeli 
Supreme Court have had over public political awareness is the fact that many battles 
started with a single case which later became a series of cases. For example, in the WoW 
case, the conversion cases and the Falash Mura cases, the original petitioners were later 
joined by more individuals and NGOs who became aware of the issue as a result of the 
previous proceedings and the publicity they received. Unsatisfied with the original 
result, many petitioners took the case to the Court again. For example, the WoW case 
involved many back-and-forth exchanges between Progressive and Orthodox Jewish 
groups. Progress on the conversion issues was made due to the persistence of the 
individuals who kept petitioning the Court. Ethiopian Jews turned to the Court several 
times to prosecute their case. Ka’adan’s case encouraged more Israeli Arabs to petition 
the Court in cases where they felt they had been unlawfully discriminated against.  
 
The fact that the same issues were discussed and addressed by the Court more than 
once, each time involving different parties, is a clear indication that the media attention 
and publicity that often followed the Court rulings encouraged other people to get 
involved in issues that were deliberated at the Court.  
 
These cases demonstrated the kind of conflicts that arise between the part of the nation 
that lives in the diaspora and the part that lives in the kin-state. Because of the Israeli 
Supreme Court’s deliberative features, diaspora Jews were able to use legal proceedings 
to change policies and laws of the State of Israel, even when their views did not align 
with those of most Israelis. For example, in the WoW case, diaspora Jews managed to 
raise awareness of issues of religious pluralism in Israel, despite the fact that most 
Israelis, at first, considered WoW battle as irrelevant to the daily lives of ordinary, 
secular Israelis.886  
Often, the legal cases deliberated by the Court signified a serious rift between the Jewish 
diaspora and the Israeli government. Some of the issues covered in these cases are 
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ongoing. For example, the battle over non-orthodox conversions and the difficulties in 
implementing the 2016 compromise between WoW and the ultra-Orthodox parties in 
the Knesset continue to affect ties between the Jewish diaspora and the Israeli 
government.887 As Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli defence minister, described the Israeli 
government decision to freeze the 2016 compromise: ’[the] cancellation of the decision 
is a severe blow to the unity of the Jewish people, the Jewish communities and the fabric 
of the relationship between the state of Israel and the Jews in the Diaspora’.888 
These cases reflect not only differences between Israeli Jews and Jews who live in the 
diaspora, but also the different views held by different segments of the Jewish diaspora. 
As we saw in some cases (e.g., the WoW case) Jewish organisations were active on both 
sides of the dispute with some supporting the petitioners and others supporting the 
respondents.  
The case studies involved individuals from the diaspora Jews, diaspora organisations and 
diaspora funded Israeli NGOs that assisted diaspora Jews in their litigation. As discussed, 
the involvement of diaspora Jews is not limited only to their specific interests and rights 
in Israel, but it extends to other aspects of Israeli society. Diaspora funded NGOs also 
play a key role in assisting other groups of non-citizens, such as migrants and 
Palestinians. NGOs funded by diaspora Jews are also dominant in promoting the rights 
of the Arab minority in Israel. This is especially significant as other organisations 
supported by diaspora Jews, such as the Jewish Agency, regard such activities as 
threatening Israel’s character as a Jewish state.  
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The legal activities of NIF grantees have attracted tough criticism from Israeli right wing 
politicians and activists, who claim that these organisations ‘exploit Israeli democracy 
and manipulate the judicial system to further their political agendas disguised as free 
speech and humanitarian concerns’.889 The fact that many of these NGOs are foreign-
funded has led some politicians to propose laws trying to limit their ability to receive 
foreign funding.890 The controversy surrounding the NIF and its funding policies was also 
evident in the Jewish diaspora.891 In 2014, for example, some Jewish organisations 
attempted to ban the NIF from participating in the annual Zionist march in New York.892 
The controversies surrounding the activities of diaspora funded NGOs in Israel 
demonstrate the kind of conflicts that arise between diaspora communities and their 
kin-state and among large diaspora communities themselves.  
  
                                                     
889 See Moshe Dann, A Matter of Sovereignty: NGOs vs Israel (5 July 2012) The Jerusalem Post 
<http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/A-matter-of-sovereignty-NGOs-vs-Israel>. 
890 Committee Passes 2 Bills Limiting Funding to NGOs (13 November 2011) The Jerusalem Post 
<http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Ctee-passes-2-bills-limiting-funding-to-NGOs>; Joanna 
Paraszczuk, NGOs: Bill Is a ‘shameful Moment’ for Israel (13 November 2011) The Jerusalem Post 
<http://www.jpost.com/National-News/NGOs-Bill-is-a-shameful-moment-for-Israel>. 
891 Ronn Torossian, New Israel Fund Supports Groups That Hurt the Jewish State (18 November 2014) 
Observer <http://observer.com/2014/11/new-israel-fund-supports-groups-that-hurt-the-jewish-state/>.    
892 Sam Sokol, Fight over NY’s Celebrate Israel Parade Reignites Debate over New Israel Fund (29 April 
2014) The Jerusalem Post <http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-Features/Fight-over-NYs-
Celebrate-Israel-Parade-reignites-debate-over-New-Israel-Fund-350719>. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I provided an analysis of the challenges and legal implications created by 
the existence of large and influential diaspora communities in today’s modern globalised 
world. I have connected diaspora theory with deliberative democratic theory, filling a 
gap in the deliberative democratic literature. I argued that in divided societies, and in 
societies with large diaspora populations, the court can play an important deliberative 
role, as part of a whole deliberative democratic system. I also presented in this thesis a 
unique form of diaspora-kin-state relationship, one that has not been adequately 
discussed in the literature. I showed that diaspora people can be legitimately involved 
in the political life of their kin-states by way of initiating, joining and supporting petitions 
submitted to the kin-state’s constitutional court.  
In chapter II, I explored the term ‘diaspora’ and how it has developed over the years. I 
then explained how diaspora communities are connected to their co-ethnics in the kin-
state. I highlighted the features they share as well as those that divide them. 
I discussed what drives diaspora communities to identify with and become involved in 
political issues in their kin-states. I showed the great importance of self-identity as well 
as group-identity in shaping the relationship between the diasporic individual and the 
diasporic community and the kin-state. I then outlined various ways by which diaspora 
people attempt to affect political issues in their kin-states and the methods used by kin-
states to engage with their diaspora communities. I described how in an increasingly 
globalised world, the thin line separating citizens of the kin-state from their co-ethnics 
in the diaspora has become blurred. Not only has the size of diaspora communities 
expanded with increased movement of people, but the nature of their connection with 
their kin-states is becoming more complex. I discussed the relationship between the 
concepts of diaspora and explained under what circumstances diaspora people can be 
described as citizens of their kin-states.  
In chapter III, I reviewed the relevant literature on deliberative democracy and explained 
different concepts and approaches prevalent among deliberative democratic theorists. 
I focused in particular on the differences between popular and elite models of 
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democratic deliberation and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of each 
model. Deliberative democratic theorists still face the challenge of coming up with 
initiatives that can engage large numbers of the population in deliberative processes; 
this task becomes even more difficult when the aim is to include not only people who 
live in the relevant territory but also people who are scattered in different parts of the 
world. Ethnic and religious tensions, coupled with the existence of large diasporic 
populations, make it even more difficult to bring people together and deliberate, to keep 
an open mind and to acknowledge the other side’s valid points.  
This thesis addressed the underexplored area of deliberative democracy in divided 
societies. I outlined the specific challenges deliberative democratic theory faces in 
divided societies. In such societies, unfavourable empirical conditions limit the prospects 
and quality of effective deliberation. This becomes even more complicated when 
diaspora populations are involved, as diaspora populations tend to get more involved in 
their kin-state if it is undergoing an ethnic or religious conflict. I explained why popular 
models of deliberation may be neither desirable nor practical in divided societies. In fact, 
popular deliberation in such societies can sometimes be counterproductive.  
In this era of globalised electronic communications, it is easier than ever before for 
diaspora communities to influence political debates in their kin-states, and they have 
several avenues available to them. I explained why it is important (for moral as well as 
practical reasons) to consider diaspora communities a part of the kin-state polity, 
particularly when the kin-state is undergoing a major constitutional change that may 
have major consequences for its diaspora community. In exploring the diaspora-kin-
state relationship, I reviewed the complications and implications this phenomenon has 
for modern democratic theories, and I examined these problems in the specific context 
of deliberative democracy. When conflicts arise, diaspora people are unable to vote and 
directly affect government policies in the kin-state. However, I explained that it is 
possible to influence kin-state government policies through constitutional litigation, 
even where the views of the diaspora do not align with those of the citizens of the kin-
state.  
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In chapter IV, I reviewed the important role played by elites in divided societies and 
young democracies and explained how in such societies, deliberation by elite bodies 
serves a key role in instilling democratic practices and fostering popular deliberation. I 
contended that popular models of deliberative democracy are difficult to implement in 
such societies. In such cases, elite models of democratic deliberation are sometimes the 
more effective way to conduct deliberations that include minorities and take into 
account the interests of all those who are affected by the ultimate decisions. 
In chapter V, I specifically addressed the qualities of constitutional courts as elite 
deliberative democratic bodies. Courts exercise key deliberative principles, including 
transparency, public reasoning and accessibility. I explained why courts often are not 
only deliberative but also fit well within a deliberative democratic framework. First, 
courts that are more accessible promote democracy by allowing more people and more 
issues to be discussed publicly. Second, constitutional cases deliberated in constitutional 
courts often instigate and inspire deliberations in the media and among the greater 
public. Most importantly, courts enable groups of non-citizens to participate in the 
democratic process and allow their voices to be heard. 
The trend in democratic theory is towards expanding the range of people whose views 
should be taken into account when the state decides on new laws and policies. This is in 
line with the principle that all those who will be affected by a decision should have a say 
in the process of shaping that decision. Adopting such a principle would require states 
to sometimes take the interests of non-citizens into account. Moreover, it may require 
states to allow some groups of non-citizens, such as long-term migrants and residents, 
to actively participate in shaping the laws of the state in which they live and work.893 
Currently, however, in most places non-citizens are not allowed to vote in local elections 
and their ability to otherwise influence the laws in the place in which they reside is 
limited.894 A deliberative court is able to address the interests of such groups, either by 
accepting petitions by non-citizens or by including in its deliberations submissions made 
by third parties through the process amicus curiae. However, different courts vary in the 
                                                     
893 See Eisenberg, above n 2. 
894 Song, ‘Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights’, above n 2, 614. 
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range and quality of their deliberative features. At the end of chapter V I provided a list 
of criteria that can be used to evaluate the deliberative level of different courts.  
In chapter VI, I demonstrated the contentions of this thesis by focusing on the Israeli 
Supreme Court as an example of a constitutional court that engages diaspora people 
and their interests in its deliberations. I examined the Israeli Supreme Court’s unique 
deliberative features. For example, the Court’s broad standing and justiciability policies 
make it remarkably accessible to individuals and NGOs. Individuals who are not Israeli 
citizens or even Israeli residents have access to the Supreme Court so long as the harm 
they suffered was inflicted by an Israeli authority. The Court welcomes amicus curiae 
submissions from NGOs and academic think-tanks and it gives voice to minority views 
by allowing dissenting opinions. I explained how these features of the Israeli Supreme 
Court enabled diaspora Jews (and other groups of non-citizens) to participate in the 
Israeli democratic process, challenge constitutional norms in Israel and affect 
government policies and laws. Evidently, the accessibility of the Israeli Supreme Court 
comes at a cost. The judicial system has become overloaded and over litigation 
interfered with legitimate government policies and has reduces efficiency. However, in 
cases of divided societies, the benefits of having an active court that gives voice to 
underrepresented groups and enjoys high levels of trust by the public may be a price 
worth paying. 
Through the case studies, I demonstrated that diaspora communities can be involved in 
constitutional cases taking place in their kin-state. Some cases involved Jewish 
individuals from the diaspora and Jewish diaspora organisations. Other cases involved 
NGOs that were funded mainly by Jewish diaspora organisations. The cases also 
demonstrated how other groups of non-citizens can participate in shaping constitutional 
norms in the countries they reside. I showed how various groups of non-citizens, such 
as Palestinians, illegal migrants and asylum seekers, used the Israeli Supreme Court to 
initiate deliberations over constitutional issues. This feature of constitutional courts can 
be most valuable for today’s democracies, where states are often required to also 
accommodate the interests of non-citizens. The democratic system is enhanced by 
allowing non-citizen access to the judicial system when they feel their rights have been 
violated. 
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The case studies also show how deliberation that takes place in a constitutional court 
can foster deliberation among the greater public. I provided examples of how the cases 
ruled on by the Israeli Supreme Court triggered further deliberations within Israeli 
society. Many of the cases were recurring, pointing to the fact that even when the 
petitioners did not win (that is, in the majority of cases) the mere act of petitioning the 
Court allowed public activists and NGOs to gain further publicity and support that 
enabled them to continue their social battles.895 
I explained how the case studies fit within the deliberative democratic framework I 
outlined in this thesis. The legal battles that have taken place between NGOs and the 
Israeli government should be viewed as a part of a deliberative process that takes place 
in the public sphere and often involves people who are affected by the decisions but 
have no other ways to participate and shape these laws that affect them. Jews in the 
diaspora, Palestinian citizens, illegal migrants, asylum seekers and foreign workers are 
all groups that are affected by actions of the State of Israel but are not able to participate 
thorough voting in Israeli elections.  
Although this thesis only examined one specific court in detail – the Israeli Supreme 
Court – it would be interesting to look at other courts fulfilling similar functions in other 
divided societies. As mentioned above, countries with large diaspora populations 
sometimes emulate Israeli practices regarding diaspora issues. One may wonder 
therefore why this practice of intervention through legal activism has developed among 
Jewish diaspora communities but not among other diaspora communities and their kin-
states. One obvious reason may be that such process is possible only in jurisdictions 
whose constitutional courts exhibit similar properties to that of the Israeli Supreme 
Court. Moreover, many divided soceities with large diasporic poulations are recovering 
from years of conflict and are still in the process of developing viable democratic 
institutions that are accessible to their own citizens, let alone to their diaspora 
populations. Another reason may lie in the fact that Israel is a young democracy – less 
than 70 years old. As Jewish diaspora communities existed and coalesced for centuries 
before the kin-state was reestablished, it may be the case that Jewish communities in 
                                                     
895 See Dotan and Hofnung, ‘Interest Groups in the Israeli High Court of Justice: Measuring Success in 
Litigation and in Out-of-Court Settlements’, above n 660, 3. 
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the diaspora still see an opportunity, or even an obligation, to contribute to forming the 
democratic traditions of the newly reconstructed home land. However, all the above 
does not necessarily mean that courts in other societies with large diasporic 
communities cannot consider using a similar appraoch to that of the Israeli Supreme 
Court in order to foster democratic deliberation.  
The combination of legal analysis and deliberative democratic theory provides a 
theoretical framework for both political scientists and legal scholars. The case studies 
provided a valuable examination of the work of one of the most active constitutional 
courts in the world and can the assist other scholars conducting research in 
constitutional law and jurisprudence. The detailed examples provided by the case 
studies show how diaspora communities can legitimately become involved in major 
political deliberations in their kin-state. Democratic principles of inclusion require states 
to take into account not only the interests of their citizens, but also of other people who 
may be affected by the state’s decisions.896 This, however, does not mean that non-
citizens who live overseas (e.g., diaspora people) should be put on the same level as 
citizens that live in the state’s territory.897 In this thesis, I identified a specific pathway – 
namely, the courts – through which diaspora communities are able to influence the 
social and political landscape of their kin-states. Those legal battles that take place 
between diaspora and state’s representatives are in fact a major part of the 
comprehensive deliberation process that takes place in the public sphere and allows 
people who are affected by decisions, to participate in shaping them.  
Scholars still need to come up with practical ways to differentiate between individuals 
who are ‘positioned differently within a citizenship constellation’.898 As discussed in 
chapter II (E), many scholars agree that diaspora people should be entitled to vote on 
questions of ‘national identity’, but it is hard to define what exactly falls under this 
category. It is also unclear what body can resolve disputes between diaspora and kin-
                                                     
896 Song, ‘Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights’, above n 2, 609.  
897 Eisenberg, above n 2. 
898 Bauböck, ‘Cold Constellations and Hot Identities: Political Theory Questions about Transnationalism 
and Diaspora’, above n 4, 302. 
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states, and so such questions are still waiting to be researched and addressed by legal 
scholars and international relation theorists.899 
Further research could also explore how groups of non-citizens, like diaspora 
populations, can be involved in deliberations taking place in other democratic 
institutions, such as parliaments and special ad-hoc committees (e.g., constitutional 
committees, special inquiry commissions). 
This thesis has provided a theoretical framework and practical tools to engage and 
integrate groups of non-citizens that are currently underrepresented or excluded from 
political participation. The experiences of the Israeli Supreme Court suggest that, in 
some cases and under certain conditions, diaspora people can be legitimately included 
in constitutional deliberations and shape the contours of their kin-state. 
  
                                                     
899 See Addis, ‘Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the 
Diaspora’, above n 5, 1008. 
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Appendix A - List of constitutional cases in the Israeli Supreme 
Court in which the Court overruled a law or part of it 
 Case  Dissent opinion/s Concurring opinion/s 
1.  HCA 1715/97 Investment Managers 
Chamber v. Minister of Finance IsrSC 51(4) 
367 
no yes 
2.  HCA 6055/95 Zemach v. Minister of Defence 
IsrSC 53(5) 241 
yes no 
3.  HCA 1030/99 Oron v. Chairmain of the 
Knesset IsrSC 56(3) 640 
no  no 
4.  HCA 1661/05 Gaza Beach Regional Council v. 
Israeli Knesset (9.6.2005) 
yes no 
5.  HCA 8276/05 Adalla v. Minister of Defence 
(12.12.2006) 
no yes 
6.  HCA 2605/05 Human Rights Association v. 
Minister of Finance (19.11.2009) 
yes no 
7.  VCA 8823/07 Doe v. the State of Israel 
(11.2.2010) 
no yes 
8.  HCA 6298/07 Resler v. the Knesset 
(21.2.2012) 
yes no 
9.  HCA 10662/04 Hassan v. National Insurance 
Association (28.2.2012) 
no yes 
10.  HCA 8300/02 Nasser v. the Israeli 
Government22.5.2012) 
no yes 
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11.  HCA 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset 
(16.9.2013) 
yes no 
12.  HCA 8425/13 Gavrislasi v. the Knesset 
(22.9.2014) 
yes no 
13.  HCA 5239/11 Avneri v. the Knesset 
(15.4.2015) 
yes no 
14.  HCA 8665/14 Deseta v. the Knesset 
(11.8.2015) 
yes yes 
15.  HCJ 1877/14 The Movement for Quality 
Government in Israel v the Knesset 
(12.9.2017) 
yes yes 
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